A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

“What are the Lessons Learnt?”

By Dr. Rolf D. Baldus

With five Annexes by Rolf D. Baldus, Vernon Booth, Rudolf Hahn, Dr. Stuart Marks, Catherine Picard and Chris Weaver

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Cover photos: Dr. Rolf D. Baldus, Rudolf Hahn
is paper is dedicated to the memory of Magololo. He lived in Kisaki, a village on the northern border of the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania. He loved hunting and the bush. He was an experienced “mrumba” (a recognised traditional hunter) and had been a poacher for many years. He regretted to see the game vanish and without knowing the term, he knew that local hunting for bush meat and ivory had become “unsustainable” over the years and that he had developed into a criminal business. He was one of the first volunteers to join the then new concepts of “community-based conservation” and subsequently became a “village scout” and a highly respected teacher of young scouts. He passed away in 1999.

A photo of Magololo waving a tail of a Nyasa wildebeest during quota hunting in the Ajiama WMA north of the Selous Game Reserve in the year 1993 is found on page 1 of the Annex.

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADMADE</td>
<td>Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Community-based Wildlife Conservation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community-based Natural Resources Management</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Community-based Management</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIRDEP</td>
<td>Southern Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Selous Conservation Programme</td>
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<td>TAHOA</td>
<td>Tanzania Hunting Operators Association</td>
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<td>WMA</td>
<td>Wildlife Management Area</td>
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**PREFACE**

by Dieter Schramm
President International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC)

Africa's wildlife is under siege - no doubt. The loss of habitat that results from population growth, poaching and unsustainable wildlife management drive the wonderful and valuable natural resource “wildlife” into extinction at many places. Well meant hunting bans in some countries have speeded up the decline.

In Southern Africa private game ranches had surprising results: Wildlife numbers have soared and game roams on land where it became extinct decades ago. In other countries wildlife is owned and managed by the state, and this has mostly not been a success.

For thirty years community-based conservation of wildlife has developed as a third option. It has proved successful in several countries, where the Governments have been sympathetic and supportive. In other cases, it had limited success only, in particular as a result of bad Governance. Recently this approach has been criticised by animal welfare groups, which are opposed to hunting.

The CIC and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, which have an ongoing cooperation programme on wildlife conservation, found that it is about time to critically review and summarise the experiences of the last three decades in order to draw conclusions for future successful wildlife management and for strategies to reduce or stop the loss of biodiversity.

This paper was commissioned at a good point in time. While this study was being concluded, the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Professor Elinor Ostrom for her work on the sustainable use of commons through community institutions. She regards this choice as an encouragement for community-based conservation of wildlife. It is a study shows that such an approach is without alternative in many developing countries. It is a paper that gives recommendations on how best to organise the collective institutions and the operational procedures and how to optimise support programmes.

**ANNEXES**

Case Study 1: Rural People and Wildlife in Zambia's Central Luangwa Valley: Precautionary Advice from a Long-term Study (by Stuart A. Marks)

Case Study 2: Lessons Learned of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program (by Vernon Bookh)

Case Study 3: Community-based Conservation in Tanzania (by Rolf D. Aslaas, Rod Hohn and Catherine Pearson)

Case Study 4: Achievements and Practical Lessons Learned from a Decade of Wildlife Use in Namibia's Communal Area Conservancies (by L. Chris Weener, Thomas Petersen, Richard Diggle and Greenwell Manyane)

Case Study 5: Community-based Management of Forest and Game in the village of Gebhardshain, Germany (by Dr. D. Aslaas)

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. FOREWORD
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3. INTRODUCTION
4. A PARADIGM CHANGE: FROM “CONSERVATION AGAINST THE PEOPLE” TO “CONSERVATION BY THE PEOPLE”
5. A REVIEW OF COMMON CRITICISMS OF CBC
6. THE COMMONS CAN BE GOVERNED - COLLECTIVE ACTION AS ALTERNATIVE TO STATE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
7. CONCLUSIONS FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES AND FOUR CASE STUDIES
8. TEN “COMMANDMENTS” FOR SUCCESSFUL CBC
9. OUTLOOK: IF NOT COMMUNITY BASED CONSERVATION, WHAT ELSE?

**FOREWORD**

by Guo Ju Han
Head of the FAO Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa

Southern Africa has a long record in experiencing community-based wildlife conservation, an approach that had been pioneered since 1980’s by the well known Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, and subsequently implemented in various countries in the Sub-region under different names and with slightly different approaches and variable results.

A period of strictly centralized wildlife management and exclusive wildlife conservation, there has been a commendable attempt to balance the needs for conservation with these for rural development. The key was to promote sustainable use of wildlife resources for the benefit of rural population.

Food security and poverty alleviation are the core concerns for FAO, this approach was perfectly in line with FAO programme and has been supported from its very beginning by various FAO projects and initiatives at national and international levels. The Community Forestry programme of the FAO Forestry Department provided technical assistance to member countries to build capacities and empower communities to effectively implement community based natural resources management.

Many other technical or development agencies and donors supported the community-based natural resources management over the years and experienced many challenges related to its effective implementation.

Before I very much welcome this new publication contributing to our ongoing FAO/CIC initiative to share best practices and experience in wildlife management and conservation.

The paper provides a summary of practical experiences from community-based wildlife conservation mainly from Southern and Eastern Africa, as well as a valuable set of lessons learnt that, I believe, to serve decision-makers and practitioners in planning and implementing community-based wildlife conservation programmes in their countries, in Africa or elsewhere.
I thank the authors of the annexes for their contributions and the cooperation. My thanks are also extended to Ivan Bond, Tom Bromley, Fred Nelson and Khanh Tran- Anh for providing papers and information.

I thank Lena Baldus, Aline Kühl, Dominique Reeb, Ludwig Siege, Kai-Uwe Wulfheiden and in particular Rene Crudek for reviewing and commenting the text and for corrections. As in earlier publications Andrew Cauldwell played a special role by providing inputs based on his community-based wildlife experience in Tanzania and assistance with proof reading.

I am aware that the paper would benefit from further comments, and critique is therefore invited.

Rolf D. Baldus

"The recognition that nature conservation is fundamental to survival is reflected in ancient spiritual, cultural and material traditions of all continents. But in all such traditions, nature and culture were a continuum or even part of each other, and not separated. Sometime in the last century or so however, the formal conservation movement appeared to lose sight of this. It attempted to separate people from wildlife, and focus on islands of wildlife concentration where intensive conservation efforts could be directed. This was perhaps understandable given the enormous and very visible crisis of biodiversity loss. But we are now realising that exclusionary conservation is simply not sustainable even if it managed to stave off some extinctions and save a number of crucial habitats for a time. Nor is it ethically justifiable when imposed by those who have adequate means of livelihood and even luxuries, on those who are already living on the edge."

Ashish Kotari in "Parks", 2008

"Every forestry department would be well-advised to make it their aim to use the state forests in such manner as would permit future generations to derive at least as much benefit from them as the present generation."

Georg Ludwig Hartig, 1804

1. FOREWORD

The author of this paper has been involved in the practical implementation of community-based management of wildlife and forests in his home-country Germany for 45 years. During his academic life and a further eight years as a professional development-policy consultant he was able to study and coach self-help projects amongst the rural poor in Africa, Asia and Latin America. His experiences, pared with a passion for wildlife, led to his occupation with Community-based Wildlife Conservation (CBC) in Africa. He had the privilege to study such CBC approaches since the early 1980's and as a civil servant to supervise projects of bilateral and multilateral development agencies in many parts of the world. For a period of 13 years he was directly involved in executing CBC-projects in Tanzania and advising the Tanzanian Government on the development and application of its wildlife policy, a wildlife act and CBC programmes on the ground, in particular around the Selous Game Reserve. His diverse and hands-on experience with communities and wildlife management over several decades provides a sound and empirical basis for this paper.

Nothing less than a menagerie of scientists, pseudo-scientists and other literature on the topic of Community-based Wildlife Management now exists. Intention of this paper is not to add another scientific paper to this excessive collection, but rather to condense the wealth of information and to extract the most important and fundamental experiences in a manner that can be understood by conservation managers and political decision-makers. This paper therefore concentrates on:

1. Wildlife, leaving out other natural resources like forests, and

2. Village land outside protected areas.

3. This paper does not cover outreach programmes, collaborative management of national parks and similar community-based programmes in the field of natural resources.

Quotations are kept to the minimum for the sake of easy readability. Only in the case of direct quotes is the source provided. A bibliography at the end provides a list of the literature consulted. As Tanzania serves as an important reference for this study, the author returned to the country for about three weeks in June 2009 and held a number of interviews on recent developments with numerous resource persons from the Governmental, private and NGOs sectors. He also revisited several Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in the bushier zones around the Selous Game Reserve and in the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor to evaluate developments that have taken place there since leaving the country in 2005.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper sums up the practical experiences collected during the past three decades with CBC in Southern and Eastern Africa. A picture of the field is not consistent. Successful cases exist as well as unsuccessful ones. Casemakers and determinants are identified, and key reasons for success or failure are discussed with emphasis on the role of governance, bottom-up versus top-down approaches, the need for governments to devolve power to the communities, the role of governments, donors and non-government organisations in the initiation and implementation of CBC such as training, facilitating and development of a legal framework, and particularly those areas where these players do not have a role. Common criticisms levelled at CBC programmes are evaluated and discussed in detail. Some of these have merit, while others are mere sour grapes or purposeful attempts to derail CBC.

Some proponents of CBC advocate a return to the old "fences and trees" approach, which was responsible for some of the greatest losses of wildlife on the African continent. A return to these outdated forms of conservation would further this loss, yet under CBC schemes many wildlife areas have enjoyed greater protection and populations increased, while at the same time the development of communities has been promoted and steps towards an escape from poverty and self-determination have been achieved. Although failures do exist, the concept of CBC has been widely successful and continues to present the only viable option to combine wildlife and biodiversity conservation with rural development and poverty reduction in the vast unprotected areas of Africa where much wildlife still currently roams free.

Four case studies compiled by different authors present the particularly relevant cases of Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe and the longest existing study of traditional cooperation, a case from Zambia.

"What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all the common interest."

Aristotle

"Every forestry department would be well-advised to make it their aim to use the state forests in such manner as would permit future generations to derive at least as much benefit from them as the present generation."

Georg Ludwig Hartig, 1804
In the early days of modern conservation the answer was simple: Declare suitable land as a protected area, move the people out, erect a virtual fence and lie that all resources within will flourish inside, as it has done since time immemorial. As time went by many of the virtual fences were turned into real ones. National parks became islands surrounded by populations that had on converted their lands into dustbowls and then looked with greedy eyes towards the green grass and the juicy-legged chunks of meat behind the fences. As a result the islands had to be upgraded into “fortresses” to be defended against those “greedy” people surrounding them. Invariably the reality was that neither the African Governments nor their wildlife authorities, which were assigned this task, were able to defend these “fortresses” effectively.

One protectionist approach has in some instances been successful in conserving the biodiversity of the forests, wildlife, water, soil (mostly in national parks) that would otherwise have been turned into maize fields, grazing grounds or dustbowls. Reality has, however, frequently shown that this “fortress” mentality has seldom worked out as intended. Although many national parks and reserves were thus created, these did not necessarily conserve wildlife and nature, and there is a multitude of reasons for this. Most importantly, neither the wildlife nor the people respected the boundaries of these protected areas. Formerly at peace people’s crops and sometimes even the people themselves, while the latter transgressed inside the vast forbidden lands, either to feed their cattle or to harvest the abundant bush meat for food and commerce. Permanent conflict was inevitable, with the result that many of the parks existed as nothing more than protected on paper, but not in reality. The exclusionary approach had backfired on conservation itself. Secondly, it is not seen as politically acceptable anymore when those who have the basic rights of the people are impoverished of people through displacement or loss of access to resources.

In many cases more wildlife still exists outside of the protected areas than within. Biodiversities inside and outside are strongly connected and mutually dependent on each other, and there is a strong interaction between the local people, the natural resources and the protected areas.

New concepts for institutional reform began in the early 1980s, which revolved around the possible inclusion of rural people into wildlife conservation and management. Such concepts were based on the assumption (or expectation) that wildlife management could become more effective and use increasingly sustainable if the local users were able to manage, or at least be involved in the management of the resource, and if they could benefit from it. The reality of such ideals has however proven that wildlife, like forests and other natural resources in Africa were treated as “open access” resources and thus suﬀered from the tragedy of the commons. Every individual tries to maximize his/her personal consumption, even if as a whole the “commons” are damaged. Voting user rights on the groups which have access to the resource and which are using and managing it cooperatively was later seen as a possible corrective, thereby doing away with the commons.

It is now generally agreed that police and command systems have not served conservation well because the Governmental structures are unable to enforce them, although other reasons also exist. The fundamental reason for this failure is that in reality every person pursues his/her own economic interests. People will always indulge in the laws, economic regulations and bans, particularly in Africa.

Apart from the protected areas there was another issue – the wildlife on communal land. With the coming of modern legislation, traditional approaches towards wildlife use became increasingly regulated and controlled. Most traditional forms of wildlife use were declared illegal and culprits were fined or imprisoned. Village hunters were labelled a poacher and criminalised. Control was to some extent justiﬁed, as a growing human population and increased hunting e. ciency made the traditional wildlife uses increasingly unsustainable. However, the a foregoing were never consulted. If they were the subjects of a wildlife policy imposed from above. Needless to say, the authorities had neither the means nor capabilities to implement their own laws, and unsustainable wildlife use became, second to loss of habitat, the most important reason for the disappearance of wildlife in many places.

In recent years it has become obvious that protected areas cannot exist in isolation. In many cases more wildlife still exists outside of the protected areas than within. Biodiversities inside and outside are strongly connected and mutually dependent on each other, and there is a strong interaction between the local people, the natural resources and the protected areas.

For the purposes of this paper, all these cooperative concepts, however diverse they might be, are collectively referred to under the term CBC. CBC is well-known CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe was one of the first practical applications of such strategies and principles. Others to follow were the Southern Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDEP), managed by the late R. Bell and F. Lungu in the eighties, and later ADMADE in Zambia. In Tanzania the Selous Conservation Programme (SCP) began in 1987 and initiated a national community-based wildlife policy and a countrywide programme including a good number of so-called pilot projects. Botswana and Mozambique started with isolated activities in due course. Namibia was the latecomer in 1998. South Africa had nothing of that sort until the first multi-racial elections. There are community programmes including co-management of protected areas were started, but not true CBC has been possible due to their speciﬁc land tenure situation. Most famous case in South Africa is the joint management of a small part of the northern Kruger National Park, which was returned to the Makulele tribe under restitution policies. Kenya has outreach and co-management projects, but no CBC in the sense of this paper due to the hunting ban that has prevailed since 1977 and a general perception of aversion to decentralised wildlife management and “consumptive use of wildlife.” 1 Many, if not most of these CBC projects became the subject of international assistance programmes in an effort to assist the conservation of biodiversities and at the same time to promote rural development.

From the very beginning these programmes were the subject of an enormous number of studies, research works and evaluations. Many students from developed countries have acquired academic qualifications and started their careers in this way.

1 An acro is a term of the approaches in “African” countries is contained in D. Rees et al.

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa "What are the Lessons Learnt?"
For obvious reasons most of them only stayed in the areas they covered for a short time. Very few scholars have indeed been part of the processes they wrote about or were intimately involved with them over longer periods of time. The early studies were mostly very enthusiastic but also unrealistic. Some authors claimed that a panacea for African wildlife conservation had been found. Equally, they ignored anti-poaching activities and policing as outdated, politically incorrect and not up-to-date or even necessary anymore. Later studies and sometimes even the same authors became critical or negative and declared the concept as having failed, thereby “throwing the baby out with the bath water.” For anybody with a sound knowledge of Africa’s development these problems were in no way unexpected, and many of them are of a more general nature and do not concern community wildlife management only. It is quite typical for all the debates that neither the scientists nor the conservationists propagating or criticising the concepts have experienced much exposure to the harsh realities of the African bush.

Such controversies and one-sided judgements are nothing extraordinary. They can be found in many debates about development policies. Wildlife management as such has always been controversially discussed due to the diverse value systems and ideologies of the protagonists and observers. It is all means, however, that much of the literature on community-based management is of little relevance to real life situations. Indeed, in some cases the amount of literature, much of it using scientific-sounding language, cannot be handled by decision-makers and practitioners who carry the actual responsibility for practical management of wildlife and wild lands.

There is a current trend that the half-life periods of political concepts are getting shorter, like fashion trends replacing one another at ridiculously short intervals. There is a danger that community involvement in wildlife conservation will be regarded as such a fashion and that the new spin-doctors of conservation will try to convince the wildlife managers that the time of this or that concept is over and something “new” has to be invented, or a reversal back to the conventional preservation approaches without people’s consultation or involvement. A thorough analysis shows, however, that independent of concrete programmes like CAMPFIRE or ADMADE, which are of course time- and country-related, CBC in general embodies principles, which are not dependent on specific approaches. Instead they reflect socio-economic principles, which are of universal relevance for broad-based, people-centred and poverty-oriented development.

When the author studied the history of conservation in Africa and the evolving new concepts in the mid-eighties he tried to systematise the different approaches (Baldus 1987). He termed the conventional creation of protected areas “Conservation Against the People,” as this summed up in a nutshell the creation of national parks as a people had been moved out of their lands for a purpose, namely to protect nature, was reasonable, but those who decided, those who implemented the actions, and those who applauded were not affected themselves. The costs were borne by poor people, and their human rights were infringed upon. In most cases, the expropriation of land dates back many years. If there were any legal rights violated at that time, the claims have certainly become invalid by now, although in South Africa communities have claimed their land back and were restituted in some cases. It would be counter-productive to conservation and result in widespread loss of biodiversity (and would undoubtedly be misused), if political pressures and the general demand for political correctness led to a broad-based restitution. Interesting enough the displacement of minorities has not come to an end yet, as the case of the San communities in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana shows.

Conservation against the people equally describes the introduction of legislation that bars rural people from being able to derive benefits from wildlife on their own land. Normally they were not consulted. If controlled use was continued, e.g. in the form of licensed hunting, this was mostly regulated in such a way that favoured outsiders and discriminated against the local people, for example by requiring the issuance of licenses and the legal possession of a modern firearm.

Old approaches, which are commonly called “nes and fences,” were clearly a form of conservation without any consultation of the local people and normally worked against their interests. Examples from many parts of the world show that when faced with such situations, people resorted to illegal forms of wildlife use which the Governments were mostly not able to control. Consequently hunting bans, conservation laws and protected areas were put in place, but in reality there was little conservation success on the ground. As this could not escape attention, some enlightened conservationists wanted to win the hearts and minds of the wildlife’s negatives and develop long-term programmes geared from conservation programmes such as the establishment of parks or bans of natural resource use. Governments and international aid agencies financed water reticulation, schools and roads, NGOs provided chicken farms as an alternative protein to meat poaching and national park administrations gave a percentage of their revenues to bordering communities, mostly in the form of infrastructure. It was a kind of compensation, a subsidy for those who su ceded the consequences, or who at least did not benefit from conservation efforts. CBC is paper collectively refers to community outreach programmes, as they may be called, more than twenty years ago as “Conservation For the People.” Communities received voluntary contributions as an incentive to tolerate wildlife or protected areas in their neighbourhood. In such cases communities are not involved in the management of the resource. Instead outsiders who, at their own discretion, let the locals share some indirect benefit. One or more the communities are not harmed and for the communities it is better than nothing, and there is no reason to withhold them from communities. However, they have not been effective incentives to conserve wildlife.

Such “Conservation For The People” contributions do not link benefits to conservation efforts. They are not harmful and for the communities it is better than nothing, and there is no reason to withhold them from communities. However, they have not been effective incentives to conserve wildlife.

Practical experience shows that the more people drive their own development schemes the more likely these are to be successful. CBC is applies equally to wildlife management. Enabling the communities to manage the wildlife themselves on their land became the paradigm shift in the eighties. CBC term describes this concept “Conservation By the People” and was involved in the implementation of such an approach in Tanzania for twenty years. There was some success, but looking back it should be concluded that what was achieved could be more appropriately described as “Conservation With the People” (in accordance with Murphy, 2001). CBC is facilitators and development partners involved people in the development of concepts, provided technical advice in writing up their management plans and assisted them in practicing wildlife management and use. As time went by, and despite government interference and delays, communities played an increasing role in conservation. However, the stage which is now on the table is exclusively the people themselves who manage their wildlife was never reached.

When Muhammad Yunus, along with the Grameen Bank, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 it was in recognition of his achievement to organise the rural poor into self-help groups through which they managed to improve their economic situation by group action. CBC was a key ingredient behind the extraordinary success of all kinds of cooperatives in Europe, in the middle and late 19th century. Members of self-help organisations, like the Grameen Bank, have benefited greatly from cooperative action in developing countries too, but two conditions must be full filled: 1. the association must serve the economic interests of its members; and 2. the association must be voluntary and not enforced by outside forces.

It is an experience that has been proven time and again in Africa, Asia and Latin America, that development from below can improve the economic and social situation of the poor. However development from above, top-down policies and enforcing development models on people are not effective.

CBC is based wholly on the general principles of self-help action of the poor and on development from below. CBC is not must be forgotten. The government criticise CBC claiming that it has not achieved its goals. It must always be asked what the alternative would be and whether governmental wildlife management had ever performed better in the past.

Conservation is still an emotional matter. Towns’ people want to decide conservation matters in the rural areas, and Europeans want to direct conservation in Africa.”

Der Spiegel (Hamburg) 12/1986
Is it realistic to expect that “Conservation By the People” will ever be achieved in Africa? Or is it realistic to assume that it is restricted to a few exceptions only? Biodiversity conservation is mostly enforced upon rural people in Europe. Moreover, the natural resources are usually much more successfully in appea challenging to carry out research on the effectiveness of these schemes in Africa. We can, however, conclude that co-management and “conservation with the people” is already quite an improvement as compared to the former concepts.

5.1 CBC does not Deliver

It was inevitable that once the early enthusiasm for the CBC concept had faded, critical and negative contributions on CBC would start to appear in scientific literature. One type of criticism is decidedly biased: CBC is guiding paradigm is the concept of sustainable use, which includes hunting. CBC is a strong movement, mainly in the Western world, which disapproves of any kind of wildlife use, and the killing of animals for revenue. It is is based on emotions, beliefs and ideologies of the “right” of the individual animal to live, even if it is at the expense of the survival or well-being of the species. CBC is driven as an anti-hunting movement. The debate in order to discredit sustainable wildlife utilisation schemes under CBC without any real preparedness to discuss the rational merits and/or demerits of the approach. Such animal welfare approaches have nothing to do with conservation or the maintenance of biodiversity and does not warrant further discussion in this paper. Valid accusations found in the scientific literature and in the factual debates on CBC centre on the following:

1. CBC does not deliver
2. CBC approach is government and donor driven and top-down
3. CBC fails to stop poaching
4. Central governments have hijacked CBC
5. Communities are not capable of managing wildlife
6. Wildlife conservation and rural development are conflicting targets

Let us deal with these criticisms one by one.

Another benefit is jobs. When the local people negotiate contracts with lodges or hunting companies they usually include clauses in the contracts, which oblige the operator to hire or hire mainly from the local community, which ensures that the local people have a stake in the success of the project. Moreover, the local people have a strong incentive to protect the wildlife, as it is their source of income. Moreover, the local people have a strong incentive to protect the wildlife, as it is their source of income. In some cases, wildlife has a high income potential, which is used by photographic tourism, hunting or other economic uses. A hunting block or a tourist lodge on village land easily represents an annual value of several hundred thousand dollars. In such cases the incentives for governments and the local people to devolve power and not to share benefits are high. Communities will not gain access if the government is not ready to give up the revenues. CBC is not a one-size-fits-all approach. CBC is not a one-size-fits-all approach. CBC is a concept that can be adapted to local conditions and needs. In such cases CBC has no future.

However, sometimes even small benefits can serve as a sufficient incentive for rural people to conserve nature. Nowadays, there are many examples where CBC has been successful. For example, in the author’s home village in Germany, where landowners receive about twenty Euro per year for every hectare of land they own and use the income for local development. Another benefit is the increase in the number of local people involved in the CBC process. This increases their chances for a continuation of leases. Intrinsic benefits are also important in this respect and should not be overlooked.

Concluding one can say that the success of CBC will indeed be decided by the delivery of benefits. We have good examples, however, we have more unsatisfactory examples, and this critique is therefore undoubtedly valid. To overcome obstacles in the delivery of benefits, it is necessary to consider the interests of all stakeholders and to ensure that the benefits are distributed fairly.

5.2 The CBC Approach is Government and Donor Driven and Top-down

Most CBC programmes have been part of governmental policies and were at some stage supported by international assistance programmes of bilateral and multilateral donors or NGOs. It has led to criticism that they were government and donor driven and not developed from within the communities. Stuart Marks similarly formulates this critique on the basis of his long study.

It is certain that the modern CBC schemes are not rooted in African traditions, but the same is true for African government ministries, modern health and school services or for the continent’s football clubs – basically for any “modern” institution. Yet they are considered necessary and they receive international support. Development goes along with social and institutional change and nowhere in the past 150 years has the social change been more dramatic than in Africa. New concepts are not doomed to fail because their origin is not domestic; they fail when they are poorly conceived or they contradict existing social structures, cultures or beliefs.

A multitude of non-community-based conservation concepts have been (and continue with) donor supported, many actually much higher than any CBC projects have ever been. Kenya has received nearly a billion US$ for wildlife.
preservation in the last 30 years, with relatively little success to show for it. Most preservation-oriented approaches and many national park establishments are based on the expectation of permanent outside subsidies. Some large NGOs create national parks without any hope for these parks ever becoming self-sustaining. They expect that, if the park is established some outside Governmental donor will be found. This strategy is not without self-interest, as the particular NGO will later get its share of the outside support for looking after the park. A recent "fashion" of establishing Trust Funds is a direct result of this strategy. As the preservationist approach depends mostly on outside 'nance, the idea is to collect large amounts of capital and to invest it into Trust Funds, which later serve to increase wildlife national parks and similar undertakings using the interest. Such funds are governed and managed by representatives of donors, Governments and NGOs, mostly in the 'shore accounts. Our target groups are not represented and they become entirely the objects of such institutions and their policy.

Many critics underestimate CBC projects when they believe these initiatives do not re-ect the true needs of the communities involved. It is nothing more than simple paternalism. Uneducated farmers, who may not even know how to read and write, are invariably able to clearly assess which outside 'ores of support will bene-t them and which do not, unless they are purposely misled. In Tanzania, for example, co-operative movements were imposed on communities, particularly in socialist regions. Whenever they are strong incentives for communities to join CBC schemes, which override local knowledge and the fear of being cheated once again by modernisation. A reality that communities queue up to join CBC schemes and even start operations on their own without any support (as was the case around the Selous Game Reserve), simply renders the above argument irrelevant.

In most cases the communal policing of wildlife areas is far more effective than the 'orts by Governments. It is empirical evidence from all CBC areas that poaching was reduced as compared to the situation prior to its introduction. The hypothesis that people tend to look after the resource better once they derive at least some bene-t is veri-ed. Real bene-t of successful CBC from a conservationist point of view is an expansion of the wild lands, and a resulting increase in wildlife populations. Co-areas typically remain as protected areas under the management of conservation agencies where the requirements for law enforcement operations remain regardless of CBC, however these operations are greatly facilitated by the greater spread of wildlife and the increased anti-poaching capability from the numerous surrounding village scouts. An example from Namibia that is included as an annex provides ample evidence of this.

5.3 CBC Fails to Stop Poaching

Some observers have expected that CBC will replace the former law enforcement orientated approach. Some idealists even argued that no further anti-poaching would be necessary once communities are able to reap benefits from wildlife and look after the resource themselves. Critics have used this fact to disapprove of the whole CBC approach and have argued that it has failed, because poaching has continued. Experience however, shows that for a number of reasons this expectation has been naive.

Under well-managed CBC, law enforcement through anti-poaching is actually strengthened, as the communities take on these responsibilities themselves and employ village scouts for anti-poaching operations. Districts in Tanzania for instance, where CBC is introduced, now rely heavily on such village scouts for antipoaching, because in the course of the decentralisation process, with few exceptions, their own Government scout force has been cut to virtually zero.

Available traditional and local knowledge comes in useful. Some important elements of CBC operations are based on local knowledge and provide one of the few legal mechanisms that encourage the transfer of this knowledge from the elders to the youth and in this way enhance the development of culture. It is not by accident that in most communities among the 'rst scouts selected for training are community members is a misconception of rural communities' abilities. On the contrary, experiences show that some villages are actually quite exceptional and there are issues to be addressed "at the top" for successful CBC, and some top decision-makers in Tanzania were, however, pro-CBC. CBC in Tanzania are not capable of managing wildlife.

5.5 Communities are not Capable of Managing Wildlife

It is argued that CBC is alien to communities. It is not based on age-old traditions and some aspects like quota setting or accounting are beyond the competence of rural folk. However, the administration of CBC on village level, which involves collection of funds, accounting and budgeting, is not much different from, for instance, the administration of local water schemes, which have now been in existence in many places for decades. A view that the administration of CBC is too demanding for the community members is a misconception of rural communities' abilities. On the contrary, experiences show that some villages are actually quite exceptional managers. An important aspect and also a signi-cant cost factor of all CBC schemes is training. Tanzania, for example, has therefore established a training institution for village scouts and village functionaries in Likuyu-Sekamangula. Curricula comprise the basic knowledge and the skills necessary to manage wildlife on village land. However, without guidance and on the job training from the wildlife authorities most communities would struggle to carry out their CBC activities properly. A backup system is necessary, at least for the starting phase.

Available traditional and local knowledge comes in useful. Some important elements of CBC operations are based on local knowledge and provide one of the few legal mechanisms that encourage the transfer of this knowledge from the elders to the youth and in this way enhance the development of culture. It is not by accident that in most communities among the 'rst scouts selected for training are...
the local traditional hunters. People who are familiar with their surroundings can carry out anti-poaching, hunting and basic ecological monitoring, and in most cases are more effective than government scouts or foreign scientists. During research carried out on elephant migration within the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (in preparation) the interpretation of traditional knowledge of elephant migration routes was combined with results of the latest satellite-based technology for monitoring elephant movements. In this case the local knowledge was detailed and exact and complemented the scientific investigations well.

Using local know-how leads to an improved management of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA). Surveillance of these areas is more or less continuous and the performance of the "on site enforcers" with local knowledge is by and large superior to scout forces alien to the area. On the other hand, traditional hunting methods (hunting with bow and arrow, poisoned and not poisoned), have been found not to be effective under modern conditions. Other traditional methods like snaring and pitfalis are non-selective, wasteful and regarded as cruel and therefore not acceptable. \( \square \) \( \square \) is nowadays the accepted way of hunting and local skills to use it effectively exists. A: or all, the traditional hunter used it as a poacher in the past! At the same time the \( \square \) is an anti-poaching tool, which village scout forces have to possess anyway. Setting sustainable hunting quotas is a specialist task, unless the particular species is locally abundant. If animal counts are necessary, they are usually carried out with assistance from specialist agencies. Communities need assistance in quota setting, but they themselves can collect the required ecological monitoring data for it, and with time are capable of acquiring the necessary skills.

In reality it is di:cult to di: erentiate between traditional and local knowledge. \( \square \) \( \square \) latter might be acquired only recently. How old must knowledge be in order to be considered traditional? For practical purposes it is not necessary to di: erentiate between such types of knowledge. What counts is that local individuals have the opportunity to apply their own knowledge and those skills, which they regard as relevant themselves.

In principle conservation is not considered to be detrimental to development. On the contrary, "Agenda 21", the United Nation's policy document for sustainable development in the \( \square \) century, is based on the view that in the long run development will succeed if natural resources are depleted and destroyed. \( \square \) existence of wildlife is an indicator for a relatively unspoilt environment, which has retained its function for providing the services of climate, water and agriculture. Conservation and maintenance of biological diversity, which are a consequence of successful CBC, can thus be regarded as positive for development.

Wildlife competes with other types of land use. \( \square \) rough CBC wildlife is given a value and for the first time it becomes competitive, and this might reduce alternative and ecologically destructive forms of land use.

CBC converts wildlife into an economic resource and thereby uses conservation as an instrument for economic development. Wildlife can be an extremely valuable resource. CBC is one of the few, if not the only option that can use that resource for the economic development of rural communities. CBC is the tool to turn the old conflict between wildlife and rural livelihoods into a positive correlation. Sustainable wildlife use is thereby not in conflict with rural development. \( \square \) opposite is the case. It can be an instrument of poverty reduction in rural areas.

CBC and rural development are not conflicting targets. Game is an important economic resource in many rural areas. It can be used sustainably and can be turned into a powerful instrument of eco-friendly rural development.

5.6 Wildlife Conservation and Rural Development are Conflicting Targets

\( \square \) ere is an argument that villagers would expect development that may not be conducive to conservation. Economic development would damage natural resources whereas the protection of nature would hinder development. By conserving wildlife under CBC, villagers would miss better economic options to use their land, and as a result development is hindered. On the other hand, they argue that if CBC is successful, this would attract people from outside. \( \square \) immigrants would need additional land, thereby reducing the available land for wildlife management. In a nutshell, wildlife conservation and rural development are conflicting targets.

"Common goods tend to be over-exploited. It is a prerequisite for sustainable wildlife utilisation to restrict its use. Such an approach has to contain the following elements:

- community manages and utilizes wildlife in its own long term interest;
- annual offtake is limited to sustainable production level;
- internal rules limit the individual access to the resource;
- in turn: protected ownership rights or long-term user rights are granted to local communities."

Rolf D. Baldus, 1987
A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

6. THE COMMONS CAN BE GOVERNED – COLLECTIVE ACTION AS ALTERNATIVE TO CONVENTIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS

5 Ostrom, p.1


3 Ostrom, p. 25.

2 cf. Dülfer and Baldus (1976).

6 Ostrom, p. 25.

Environmental economist Ostrom has shown that if users work together, community assets can be effectively used locally in self-administration. People cooperate if they realize that unity makes them strong and is for their benefit.

Ostrom accepts the "tragedy of the commons" dilemma. Like us she rejects the frequent argument that only state or private ownership/management of such resources is a solution. On the contrary, she shows that both have failed on many occasions. She observes that communities have instead relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to successfully govern resource systems over long periods of time. People have organised themselves voluntarily to manage common properties to avoid unsustainable exploitation. Such institutions possess the characteristics of "self-help organisations" and can consequently be termed accordingly, as the author has shown earlier. Ostrom hopes that her enquiry "will contribute to the development of an empirically supported theory of self-organising and self-governing forms of collective action." She goes on to complement and further develop the theory on self-help organisations which have a long history in German economic sciences.

Interestingly enough, the 2006 Nobel Prize for Muhammad Yunus for his concept to create bottom-up economic and social development through the Grameen banking system, another type of self help organisation, and the 2009 Economic Nobel Prize to Professor Elinor Ostrom has shown that if users work together, community assets can be effectively used locally in self-administration. People cooperate if they have twice received recent Nobel Prize blessings.

Environmental economist Ostrom has shown that if users work together, community assets can be effectively used locally in self-administration. People cooperate if they realize that unity makes them strong and is for their benefit.

Ostrom identifies normative design principles as preconditions for stable arrangements to cooperatively manage common property resources:

- clearly de ned boundaries
- congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
- collective-choice arrangements allowing democratic participation of the members of the groups
- explicit monitoring by people who are either members of the group or are accountable to members
- sanctions against members who break the rules
- appropriate con ct resolution mechanisms

In the case of larger and complex systems: communal enterprises at local level should cooperate and coordinate with one-another to build appropriate vertical structures

6 see design principles can serve as useful norms for the organisation of community-based conservation and are further considered in Chapter 8.

"Conservation of nature is not only an ethical responsibility. Often it is economically advantageous. Biological diversity cannot be maintained using orders and bans alone. Instead we have to apply additional economic instruments which ensure that conservation becomes an integrated component in the pursuit of economic objectives. This requires that clear economic incentives for the conservation of nature must be created. In addition we have to increasingly rely on local experience and know-how as this will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of our actions."

Memorandum "Economics for Nature Conservation" by German scientists, August 2009 (translated by the author)

7 CONCLUSIONS FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES AND FOUR CASE STUDIES

7.1 A Mixed Picture

Over three decades of CBC the result is a mixed picture. We have some highly successful cases, notably in Namibia. We have cases like CAMPFIRE, which has been rather successful at some stage but later badly damaged by general political developments. Nevertheless the resilience that CAMPFIRE has shown is remarkable – these are self-help organisations set up to manage wildlife, which is a common pool resource, sustainably achieved by group action. Ostrom can proudly claim that their underlying principle has twice received recent Nobel Prize blessings.

A similar thread emerges in all the areas where CBC was without success: It was never the community as that stalled or delayed the CBC processes. Instead they were quick to recognise their chances, to take up the new ideas and to engage themselves. Clearly saw that the new concepts brought more advantages than risks. Despite their justified scepticism for Government and donor concepts, they took up CBC with enthusiasm. In many places people have even started their own CBC schemes without waiting for the Government or a donor to come on board. Some of these cases became particularly successful or could even spearhead major conservation developments like the Wildlife Corridor between Selous and Niassa game reserves.

In many places wildlife is still an important element of rural food-supply, livelihood and culture. It has a great economic potential but at the same time is a major problem due to human-wildlife conflict. The enforced exclusion from wildlife does not lie so far back that people would not remember how they or their ancestors once managed the resource. They are also aware that their current (illegal) styles of use are no longer sustainable.

CBC has indeed become an accepted form of wildlife management in many African countries and in the international debate. Despite the critique of some of the detail it is still widely seen, in principle, as an overall positive development. CBC fully satisfies the requirements of the Convention of Biological Diversity. Within three decades CBC has become mainstream conservation. Ecosystems and species of conservation relevance have been established and protected. CBC thus serves as a model for biodiversity conservation and empowerment of poor rural people is in line with modern international political and development philosophies.

7.2 The Crucial Role of Governance

Governance is the major factor which decides whether a CBC programme can be made to generate benefits. In cases where CBC was actively suppressed by Government authorities, we find a Bad Governance situation. E.g. Government and its personnel at the district administrative levels do not want to share revenues. Bad Governance is simply not compatible with the devolution of power to communities.

E.g. the role of governance is nicely illustrated with a comparison of the two examples of Namibia and Tanzania. In Namibia there was originally little game on communal land, as it had been overused and mismanaged. Consequently there was little legal wildlife use in the form of tourism or trophy hunting. Only by making the villagers the wardens, and some external support for running the translocation of breeding stocks, did it become possible for game numbers to increase sufficiently that they could be used for tourism and hunting. E.g. revenues were significant to the communities, but not substantial enough for the state to develop too much interest.

In case of Tanzania was quite different. A strong and growing hunting industry existed there and was heavily reliant on the hunting of wildlife on village land. All revenues went to central authorities, except the proposed conservation areas. A crucial factor is that rural communities make their own decisions, and are not dominated by elites or bureaucracy. If local small-scale farmers receive ownership and use rights over natural resources, this creates economic incentives for their conservation.

E.g. use becomes sustainable. Wildlife animals remain common property, but through the self-interest of the users and agreements between them, the open access becomes restricted.

7.3 Conclusions

A decade of CBC has become mainstream conservation. Ecosystems and species of conservation relevance have been established and protected. CBC was not the only factor, but it was a crucial one.

A few Game Management Areas (GMA) had been established CBC structures on the ground, but which is still missing the most important element: namely devolution of power and benefit sharing. We have other countries that have, for political and other reasons, never adopted a CBC concept and have in the last decades lost most of their wildlife. A combination of the old fences and-fences concept has been no more successful in recent decades than it was before.

Wildlife does not lie so far back that people would not remember how they or their ancestors once managed the resource. They are also aware that their current (illegal) styles of use are no longer sustainable.
of the proceeds from hunting and never reached communities. Tourist hunting was a considerable money earner for the central budget. However, there is wide agreement in Tanzania nowadays, and this includes both the Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism and the Parliament, that hunting was not efficiently organised. The Wildlife Department has therefore announced that procedures will be reformed. In the past and for over twenty years, the majority of revenue from hunting was allocated to all hunting blocks to hunting operators. There were neither objective nor transparent allocation procedures. A annual fee per hunting block was US$ 7,5000 per year (recently increased). Based on the prices for comparable blocks in other African countries, one can assume that the same blocks would have cost up to several hundred thousand US$ as a result of competitive bidding. There is might explain why neither the responsible civil servants nor the hunting industry were interested to hand over hunting blocks on village land to the communities.

Neither the Tanzanian Wildlife Department nor the leading people in the hunting industry wanted to change this situation. The whole system would have been greatly disturbed if the communities would have appeared as a new player. Verbally the administration supported the development of CBC. Over the years a respective Wildlife Policy and a new Wildlife Act were worked out, detailed regulations formulated and thus a sophisticated framework for CBC came into being. It had only one major shortcoming: It was never allowed to operate. It was never in conflict with the Ministry for Natural Resources and its Wildlife Division and the hunters represented through the Tanzania Hunting Operators Association (TAHOA) bears the greatest responsibility for the non-operation. It prevented devolution of power and sharing of revenues, although the rural communities were eager to start CBC. Nevertheless the legal and administrative preconditions for CBC have been created, and it would in principle be possible to start e active communal game management at any time.

Over the years NGO and donor countries, in particular the WWF Germany and the United States, financed the development of this framework in Tanzania with development assistance in the range of over US$ 10 million. From the bureaucracy’s perspective, this had the pleasant side effect that its leading members had an additional and significant source of income by being part of these projects. A multitude of unannounced studies, meetings, public hearings etc. secured a steady flow of sitting allowances, per diems, study tours, fees and other windfall incomes. There was never the slightest incentive for the bureaucracy to bring the preparatory process for CBC to an end.

and could be hunted. It was also a high-revenue earner, and CAMPFIRE therefore relied mainly on elephant hunting. Experience shows that tourist hunting has the greatest revenue potential of all available options in CBC programmes. CAMPFIRE hunting of meat for subsistence can add an additional benefit: As meat is scarce in rural areas and regarded as a luxury. Commercial meat hunting schemes have however, never been able to generate enough revenue to cover costs and provide sufficient income for the communities, although such schemes have taken a heavy toll from the wildlife populations. Whether photographic tourism competes favourably against tourist hunting depends on the individual circumstances and must be subjected to an economic assessment in every case. It is a general rule that the species organisation of CBC, types of use etc. are dependent upon the prevailing micro-conditions. Nobody is in a better place to critically assess the respective opportunities of the situation than the concerned communities themselves. Government is certainly not well placed to decide such matters.

7.4 Governance at Village Level

There is a crucial importance of Governance and corruption in greater society and in the wildlife administration has been pointed out. Where corruption exists, such patterns tend to be copied at lower levels of society; for example in the village associations created to manage the wildlife. In such cases individuals who have already dominated and misused other village organisations with financial implications, like village governments, infrastructure projects, cooperatives, water schemes etc., try to take over leading functions, and frequently they succeed. Less democratic controls and requirements for transparency are put in place, the more these individuals will succeed in appropriating a major share of revenues. It can take many illegal forms, i.e., bad, but clever individuals can even legally empty the common bank account by high sitting allowances, per diems for ‘truly travelled’, as frequently has happened in Community-based Organisations (CBO). A lack of participation by members in annual meetings or low transparency in financial issues favours such developments. A pervasive existing stratification in rural society and some observers have noted this as a consequence of successful CBC. If bad Governance at local level is not prevented, then there is little reason to believe that the lessons of CBD will be successful progress of communal action. Transparency, accountability and e active systems of control are of critical importance not only at national, but also at village level and not only for CBC, but for all development schemes.

In this context a word should be said about the ideological Western perceptions and romantic visions of indigenous and rural people living in harmony with their environment and practicing sustainable lifestyles. Where this has been the case in the past, it was not the result of rational conservation-friendly decisions, but rather the result of a low level of demand of nature. East African tribes that hunted sustainably in the 18th century gladly accepted the new technology of muzzleloaders and steel wires when they arrived and greatly increased their hunting efficiency and results. Soon hunting was not sustainable any more, even at that time. Hunting pressure was also increased, as the population grew due to Western medicine and the end of slavery. "Give a ' noble savage' a Kalashnikov, and more likely than not he will play around him. On the other hand not all people are necessarily degrading their environments. Are a few successful traditional natural resource management schemes in Africa which can serve as models. Reality is not black and white, and there is nothing static, neither in an ecological system nor in a society. Many conservationists, due to their relatively short exposure to such situations, are unable to see the nuances of real life situations, and thus fail to portray the full picture in their documentation.

Table 1 is key variables influencing central act and incentives and disincentives to devolve authority for wildlife to local communities, and actual devolution achieved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of Commercial Utilization of Wildlife on Communal Lands</th>
<th>Transparency of Allocation of Wildlife Use (Hunting)</th>
<th>Coercionlessness</th>
<th>Overall Governance of Alteration</th>
<th>Disincentives for Central Authorities to Devolve Authority to Over Wholesomeness Carried Out</th>
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7.5 Choosing the Best Form of Wildlife Use

Whether we like it or not, the hunting industry plays a crucial role in all CBC schemes. Communal land tends to be less attractive to the landscape that were selected for national parks. Consequently they are, in most cases, less suitable for photographic tourism. Usually only a limited variety of wildlife species are present and at low densities that render such areas unattractive to tourists. As long as communities are unable to see the potential to justify a viable tourism operation. Hunting this is all irrelevant. In Zimbabwe it was primarily the elephant that occurred in sufficient numbers on communal lands.

Nelson and Agrawal have related the incentives and disincentives to devolve authority for wildlife with different features in an admittedly simple ed table. It shows that low values of wildlife, high transparency of use and acceptable Governance lead to high incentives to devolve and consequently high levels of devolution achieved, like in the case of Namibia. Opposite case, namely Tanzania, combines high values with low transparency and low overall Governance. It creates a high incentive to keep the centralised system and consequently leads to a low level of devolution.

Is brings to mind other natural resources, like oil or diamonds, which are seen by many as more of a curse than a boon. A kind of paradox of plenty. However, where there is little to grab, the greed of those in power is restrained. Is is obviously does not help us further.

Table 1: Key Variables Influencing Central Act and Incentives and Disincentives to Devolve Authority for Wildlife to Local Communities, and Actual Devolution Achieved

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

"What are the Lessons Learned?"
cases these tasks are assigned to selected members of the communities. ey act as appointed “village game scouts”, eir costs and small allowances are covered from revenues of the Wildlife Management Area, but their real motivation is the pride and respect that they acquire within their own society. Apart from devolving just another function to the community, this is extremely valuable from a conservation point of view, as village game scouts are the most successful method in Africa to bring the widespread meat and trophy poaching under control. Such systems of village game scouts in Namibia and around the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania have been extremely successful.

Last but not least, the defence of life and property by these village game scouts is a service to the community, which cannot be underestimated. Wildlife-human conflict is a major part of life in all African wildlife areas. Dangerous big game kills and injures people. We have estimated that in Tanzania around 100 people get killed every year. We have researched the case of one particular man-eating lion that was involved in 34 killings in 2004. Elephants, buffalo, bushbuck and other game eat and destroy people’s crops, and in subsistence societies this can result in hunger for the affected households. For financial and practical reasons compensation is not paid anywhere, if one leaves nominal small symbolic payments unconsidered. e Government scout force is unable to help for structural, financial and professional reasons. eir costs are just not available. In such cases people turn to self-help. More often than not they resort to poison, that is extremely detrimental for wildlife, against non-target animals and injures people. We have estimated that in Tanzania around 100 of both the communities and conservation.

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A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

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Any democratic process or institution has to be organised and run from the bottom-up. e is in the norm, the ideal to strive for. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to organise participation, power sharing, self-government or self-help from above. ey 40 years of eorts to promote the development of third world countries all serious professionals, and increasingly African experts themselves, agree that it is not possible to initiate people-centred processes and to have people in charge of their own destiny if top-down structures prevail and if outsiders decide for the people instead of the people themselves.

Examples from basically all African countries prove, however, that reality mostly looks di®erent. Social change and community development are frequently initiated from above in top-down processes, be it by Governments, NGO or donors. One of Africa’s great failures has been that most eorts to improve the situation of the rural poor have been characterised by such top-down action. e is applies even to strategies, which are explicitly aimed at the opposite. Participatory conservation initiatives that are imposed from above will in most cases not lead to genuine change, but remain artificial. In authoritarian regimes there is also the danger that in order to follow the mainstream thinking of donors and to obtain their ﬁnance, major programmes of community stewardship and decentralisation are conducted with the rhetoric of natural resource beneﬁts sharing with communities, but in reality this is nothing but mere window-dressing.

On the other hand it is rare that poor communities have the initiative to organise themselves for political, economic or social action to improve their standard of living. Normally it needs outside agents and moderators who supply them with new ideas, who mobilise them to help themselves, who train them in the techniques necessary to run their own e®orts and who defend them against the forces of persistence from above. “Help for self-help” is not only a slogan, but experience shows that it is a necessity, as it may be in reality. Without su®cient capacity building self-supporting community processes can rarely be initiated or sustained.

Fi® paper makes no attempt to explain how capacity building and bottom-up processes can be professionally organised or linking the balance of providing enough motivation, advice and support, while avoiding paternalism, patronage and spoon-feeding, which kill the self-help spirit one wishes to instil. ey are successful examples to learn from, and su®cient handbooks and training courses on important incentive to protect and allow wildlife populations to grow. On the other hand, the delayed action based on the need for monitoring and research results in frustration, distrust and increased uncontrolled wildlife use, which is contrary to the interests of the community and conservation, a lose-lose situation.

In exceptional cases it is however, not possible to start revenue earning at the very beginning if, for example, game populations have indeed been virtually wiped out. In such cases a proper explanation to members is necessary. Experiences shows that communities are quite capable and prepared to understand such an obstacle and are willing to wait for the beneﬁts to build up, if this is properly communicated to them.

All revenues should go directly to the communities. Revenue sharing with the Government levels is mostly counterproductive, leads to all kind of abuses and undermines the economic potential of wildlife. e is not logical. If people grow maize on their land or keep goats and cattle they do not have to share their income with the Government. If they replace agriculture with wildlife or decide that they will not replace the existing wildlife with agriculture, why should they then share with the Government? Beneﬁt sharing between government and communities is actually a heavy taxation for wildlife-based land-use. It makes wildlife less pro table than alternative ways of land-use and therefore secures that wildlife enterprises are not introduced or are not successful.

In the African reality it is also not advisable that local governmental self-administrations such as District Councils become the recipients of the wildlife revenues. Instead the income must go directly to the CBO, which the communities have created for this purpose.

In order to maximize revenues the sale of wildlife should be done at market prices. ey includes the sale of meat to members of the group. Sale is preferable as compared to the distribution of free meat.

Apart from monetary bene®ts other incentives must be adequately incorporated. Intrinsic cultural and political WMAex eorts are to be strengthened. Suitable systems of crop protection and anti-poaching by elected and trained game scouts are to be organised. Scouts are to be reimbursed as part of WMA management costs.
**A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa**

8.4 Keep It Simple!

CBC needs procedures that are agreed by members, in order to maintain a certain order of business and administration and to avoid some members manipulating a aim for their own benefi. Governments also have the right to lay down rules and regulations to safeguard the rule of the law.

Nevertheless, there is no need to make these rules overly complex and compli-cated. Bureaucracies everywhere have this tendency in order to keep themselves employed and to maintain their powers of control. In many CBC schemes, unnecessary complexity has been used to delay the processes of devolution of power.

8.5 Develop at Grassroots; but Care for a Favourable Political Environment!

A centre of gravity in CBC is the primary self-help group and their WMA. In most cases, this is where the success or failure is determined. Experience shows that small groups function better than large groups, which tend to be complex and impersonal. It is therefore justi ed: that all e: orts should concentrate on this primary level. It is not advisable to invest into the development of national structures, if the build up of the primary level is neglected.

On the other hand CBC at village level can only function in the long run if a suitable political, legal and administrative framework exists. It consists of:

- a positive political climate, for example the inclusion of CBC in national poverty reduction strategies,
- a suitable national strategy, for instance a wildlife policy,
- an emphasis on democracy and respect for human rights, which are the right of the community.

For some time CBC can function in the form of spontaneous village activities or specially created small projects, however in the long run a favourable political and legal environment is indispensable. Policy and legislation must require the real needs of CBC. Donors are therefore well advised to include e: orts to develop or strengthen this framework into their programmes. Nevertheless, the focus must remain the community. is is where the cookie crumbles!

8.6 Minimize State Intervention!

ereared: reent philosophical and political concepts about the role of governments in the development process in Africa. Successful conservation is certainly not possible in the long run without the government playing a role. But a government should concentrate on the functions that it does best and leave the rest to the private sector and rural communities. Governments should set a regulatory framework and ensure that it is adhered to. It should leave all business type operations to those who
do it best, the private sector. e: less the government interferes in the management of CBC the better.

How much the government gets involved in training and capacity building depends on the specifi situation of the countries concerned. In many cases this too can be best achieved by the private sector.

Local initiatives, in fact, need the regulatory functions of the state less than the bureaucracy believes.

8.7 Devolve Power to the Lowest Level!

Local democracy works best if power is devolved to the lowest possible unit. Small is beautiful! Participatory democracy is e: di cult to understand for villagers with little experience in modern types of representative democracy, which becomes a problem with large groups. CBCOs must be as homogenous as possible and small and con: nected. Special care must be taken in such cases to ensure that the spirit of self-determination does not get lost, but is the commitment of individuals within the community that will determine whether such structures function e: actively. However, it is mostly economics which dictate the development to larger or vertically structured units, and there is a need to maintain transparency and democratic decision-making under such circumstances.

8.8 Facilitate Governance!

Bad governance at central level with its resulting mismanagement of wildlife industries and administration is, as we have seen, a critical factor and a major stumbling block for CBC, but also very di cult for CBC actors to in: uence. NGOs and donors can try to exert in: uence and pressure on behalf of their target groups, but as practical experience has shown, this is seldom successful. From the viewpoint of the communities the actual governance status in their country has to be accepted as a given factor, which will determine or in: uence the success of their e: orts. Sincerity to allow CBC by those in power is a precondition of success. It is bad luck for CBC if governance leaves a lot to be desired.

On the contrary, governance at the primary CBC level, which normally re: ects conditions in the wider society, is something that can be in: uenced. Appeals to behave responsibly and anti-corruption campaigns do not help. It is more e: active to facilitate governance than trying to propagate it. Outside interventions for installing technical procedures that lead to transparency and increased information transfer to members and generally more democracy at grassroot:s can be successful. Meetings must be held, bookkeeping results and: nal statements must be presented and interpreted for members, and decisions must be available for everybody that is interested. Elected representatives must report back to membership in institutionalised ways, communication between committees and between committees and members must be maintained, etc. e banking system has to be used for payments as much as possible. Reports should be cheaply printed and circulated, as there are always some literate people around. Generally the four-eye principle must be applied. Reimbursement of costs and bonuses for elected representatives has to be controlled.

ere are di erent legal and political concepts about the role of governments in the development process in Africa. Successful conservation is certainly not possible in the long run without the government playing a role. But a government should concentrate on the functions that it does best and leave the rest to the private sector and rural communities. Governments should set a regulatory framework and ensure that it is adhered to. It should leave all business type operations to those who

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

“What are the Lessons Learnt?”
When we underline the role of women in CBC, this is not to follow the general
trend of political correctness, but rather based on empirical experience. Women
should participate as much as possible in general meetings, as this is the most direct
way to get informed and execute a decisive membership right within the CBO.

Women should also be represented in its self-government organs, as here they can
directly influence the use and distribution of income. Generally it is advisable
to elect women into functions which deal with issues like accountants, treasurers or
management of a butchery. Experience from many African villages has shown that
they are normally more reliable, trustworthy, economical and cost-conscious than men. The involvement of women should be encouraged, but not forced through
unnecessary rules and regulations.

Although women increasingly start playing a role in governmental scout forces,
they are rarely employed as village game scouts or in jobs that deal directly with
the management of game, as this has not been a part of their traditional roles and
occupations in the past. Young men, on the other hand, are extremely important for
such activities. Village game scouts recruit themselves from these age groups. In
the modern world many young men lose interest in the bush and in game, unless
they are involved in paid employments such as porters in poaching groups etc. As
youths do not participate in village decision-making to a great extent, it is advisable
to look for innovative ways to actively involve them in CBC.

8.10 Apply all Suitable Sustainable Wildlife Uses!

- An interest of rural communities, which have decided to manage their wildlife, is to
  maximise revenue while maintaining sustainable levels of wildlife use. As wildlife is
  no longer a free access commodity, the "tragedy of the commons" does not apply. In
  theory people should be able to develop a long-term use perspective instead of short-
  term maximization strategies. In reality this is difficult to achieve anywhere, particularly where
  the people concerned live beneath poverty levels, but it is possible nevertheless. It
  is important that the community is able to select their form of wildlife use from
  the range of options available. Some options can be combined, and this will lead
to overall higher revenues. For reasons mentioned, trophy hunting is in many cases the
preferred option, as it combines the highest revenues with particularly low "take" levels. NGOs or governments should take this into consideration.

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"Formerly we fought poaching at Maduba, which is right in the middle of the Selous Game Reserve. Poaching is still a problem, but now we deal with it mainly in the villages outside the reserve – and this is due to Community Based Conservation."

Bakari Mbono, Former Director of Wildlife, Tanzania 1998

9. OUTLOOK: IF NOT COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION, WHAT ELSE?

Nobody can claim that CBC is the ultimate answer to the challenges faced by
wildlife conservation and rural development in Africa. It would also not be advisable
for conservation's sake to deregulate the protected areas and hand them over to the
communities. However, the empirical analysis has shown that many cases in a number
of countries CBC has achieved extraordinary success in unprotected village land. In
other countries a few years of preparation and preconditions are in place to get CBC
going. In a number of countries CBC has failed, mostly because of de:iciencies, which
have little to do with CBC, but are typical for general developments in these
countries, like bad governance and the lack of willingness of elites and bureaucracies
to devote power. A: in thirty years the picture of CBC is neither black nor white.

- There are many grey tones, yet overall we are left with more positive experiences than failures. In fact, what would have happened with wildlife and wild lands in these years without community involvement? CBC is currently the only available strategy that links the goals of conservation with the traditions and aspirations of indigenous communities, and simultaneously addresses poverty in wildlife areas.

Countries that have refused CBC also have a particularly bad record of wildlife
conservation. None who criticize or disapprove of this approach now have failed
present a viable alternative. CBC is the only option to fall back on and continue
with the old "fences and fences approach", a strategy that in most cases has not been
successful.

It is narrow-minded to consider the underlying principles of CBC as being
particular to community wildlife management. To involve people in their own
development, to allow them to make major decisions concerning their own lives and
to encourage their own self-help are fundamental principles of all successful
and free societies. Development strategies that did not comply with such principles have
failed; strategies that did comply have not necessarily succeeded, but in general
it has been proven that they were more successful.

- Reasons why many CBC projects have failed can be identified, and it is possible
to react and improve in practice by adaptive management and learning by doing.

- It takes time and it is not possible to "quick fix - x" solutions. A complete paradigm
change needs time to consolidate. Even in the Tanzanian case the long investments
into the capacity building and the creation of the legal and political pre-conditions
are not lost, if the government would decide to give the communities the freedom
decides for which forms of wildlife use is best suited to their needs. If for example, their particular emphasis is on the creation of jobs, they may prefer labour intensive
photographic tourism instead of or complementary to hunting tourism.

Which type of use or combination thereof is best, depends on the specific
situation: resource base, occurrence of game species, the market demand, how
the community uses the WMA apart from wildlife and other factors have to be
considered. Nobody is in a better position to judge this than the community itself.

Ruling out use options based on ideological grounds of outside individuals or
organisations betrays the communities.

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

"What are the Lessons Learnt?"
A practical summary of experiences after three decades of community-based wildlife conservation in Africa

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A PRACTICAL SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCES AFTER THREE DECADES OF COMMUNITY-BASED WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN AFRICA

WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED?
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**ANNEXES**

**CASE STUDY**

RURAL PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE IN ZAMBIA'S CENTRAL LUANGWA VALLEY: PRIORITY PRECAUTIONARY ADVICE FROM A LONG-TERM STUDY by Stuart A. Marks PhD

In the process of summarizing a long term (1966-1996) study on continuity and changes in beliefs and uses of wildlife within one small scale African society. I am asked to condense what I have learned that might be helpful for wildlife managers. My studies began with a year's residence (1966-67) within Zambia's Munyamadzi Game Management Area (MGMA) to establish cultural and environmental baselines for a dissertation (1969-72) and I have continued with these studies in subsequent years.

During each decade, I have spent up to a year residing here on related inquiries and issues as they emerged within the villages where I resided rather than being tied to the bureaucratic agendas of donor and government programs.

My funding during each period in Zambia came from imperatiinitial foundations which allowed me access to government projects while enabling me to keep a separate identity.

During my studies, the MGMA became national parks (now the Luangwa Valley) and wildlife and other resources as components of their livelihoods.

My focus during each period in Zambia came from impartial foundations which allowed me to access government projects while enabling me to keep a separate identity.

I begin this paper with some background and then divide my studies into two phases. I summarize for each period the main continuities and changes in village life as observed as well as the status of wildlife populations. This is division allows me to compare village welfare and livelihoods as a function of the national economy and wildlife policies. I explore the implications of a state and donorsponsored "community-based" wildlife regime.

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of too little or excessive rainfall. For them, the hunting of and protection from wildlife were both necessary and customary. It was necessary because wild meat was an important supplement in ordinary diets and largely the produce of a few selected men. GMA was known throughout Zambia for its high per capita consumption of wild meat and for its trades of bushmeat for grains during famines. Within this matrilineal society (membership in clans depended upon one's mother's affiliation), gender roles were that related women engaged in mundane agriculture while most men assumed the expansive and chaney activities in hunting, trading, and migrant labor.

What are the Lessons Learnt?

For its trades of bushmeat for grains during famines. Within this matrilineal society known throughout Zambia for its high per capita consumption of wildlife meat and of the tsetse flies were both necessary and customary. Its world view was restricted, place based, culturally-coded and operated religiously on among people rather than on the management of wildlife or habitat resources per se. He accomplished through his marriages to women of other lineages and to reign to revitalize this scheme when individuals failed in their duties. From the standpoint of numbers for the century in the 1970s.

The waters of economic development. My last study of four months in 1988, donors cra...s... a Brave People. [Photograph by

Were encouraged to settle under this new chief or elsewhere in the Luangwa Valley. It is chief had two important political objectives: to integrate his chiefdom (which he accomplished through his marriages to women of other lineages) and to reign within the colonial state's policy of Indirect Rule. Given the comparative di culties in administering this small and marginal territory within a very large district, this chief assumed a large measure of autonomy without clashing noticeably with colonial officials. Given his proximity to important game reserves, European wardens always suspected him of unassailable (of engaging in illegal wildlife activities and in defending similar acts among his subjects. It is echial able to know "common ground" with other colonial officials that outranked those within the game department.

During his tenure, this chief and his local agents incorporated local, regional, and colonial elements into a local wildlife regime that operated as an ex-centric patron-client polity. Local resources were seen as a signi cance to local management priorities and conservation. The impact of this program on the wildlife and livelihoods was studied in detail in the 1980s and early 1990s, and it is clear that while this program had some success in protecting wildlife populations, it also had negative impacts on local communities, particularly in terms of restricted access to wildlife resources. It is important to note that these programs were often imposed by outside actors without considering local cultural and ecological contexts, which can lead to unintended consequences.

Although Valley Bisa society is organized in lineages and clans recruited by descent through women, elderly men controlled the distribution of power and authority within the villages. During colonial and for a decade a er independence, most men spent their youths and middle age as laborers in the towns. In 1967 up to 70% of these men were away employed as displaced laborers; consequently most women were women and children as relatives and clients of fewer older men. Elderly men were away employed as displaced laborers; consequently most residents of the MGMA remained high for decades. The colonial administration resolved not to resettle the Valley Bisa. Education standards in the MGMA were among the lowest in the country, and efforts to improve these standards met with resistance from local communities. However, in the late 1970s, the MGMA was incorporated into a national park, and efforts were made to improve education and health services in the area. Although the MGMA was not built upon local level initiatives. Rather, outside wildlife experts and consultants incorporated local, regional, and national economic asset. One of the wildlife department agendas, unknown to me until my arrival in-country, was their hopes to gather the political clout and data from these international connections to enable them to restructure the Valley Bisa from the MGMA. E rersetlement agenda would allow the department to connect the expansive game reserves within the western Luangwa Valley and to administer them without contending with local resistance. The department was unable to obtain this political objective, yet the 1971 legislation to upgrade the South Luangwa Game Reserve into a national park incorporated a large section of the MGMA, the Chingwéyi Plains. It is extension of state land and the alienation of GMA land was imposed as an external fait accompli and without local consultation. Later this land issue and ADMADE wildlife policies would emerge as a local cultural maneuver to solidify Valley Bisa identity against future state plans.

The game reserves in 1938, people living in the designated reserve were encouraged to settle under this new chief or elsewhere in the Luangwa Valley. It is chief had two important political objectives: to integrate his chiefdom (which he accomplished through his marriages to women of other lineages) and to reign within the colonial state's policy of Indirect Rule. Given the comparative di culties in administering this small and marginal territory within a very large district, this chief assumed a large measure of autonomy without clashing noticeably with colonial officials. Given his proximity to important game reserves, European wardens always suspected him of unassailable (of engaging in illegal wildlife activities and in defending similar acts among his subjects. It is echial able to know "common ground" with other colonial officials that outranked those within the game department.

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What are the Lessons Learnt?

In the 1991 elections, this Sub-Authority was responsible to the District Wildlife and Tourism ministries. MGMA residents responded euphorically as many thought government was about to increase—increases that would boost their community revenues. Initially, material goods and development should they stop "poaching" and allow wildlife to be unaccounted for. The hunters have his gun and hunting licenses in his back pocket. [Photograph by author in 1973].

As this was no Eden, individual and many social problems remained unresolved and accumulated. These predicaments were mirrored in the declining health of the chief, heavy cows: its within his lineage, and in his eventual death in 1984. Inevitable stresses became visible in the life expectations of di:rent generations and in the demographic shift’s toward younger residents, in the progressive erosion of local autonomy that followed contractions in the national economy and in the rapid expansion of the informal economy, in the widespread import and use of unregistered muzzle-loading guns that undermined elder control and contributed to the widespread slaughter of wildlife, meat and ivory markets, and in the increased frequency of droughts and floods which made residents increasingly dependent upon outside connections and relief aid. Barely noticed initially, these incipient di:renses built momentum that eventually led to destructive consequences for most residents and wildlife. These topics were among those studied during the second phase.

As earlier studies are available as a dissertation (Michigan State University), as two books (Large Mammals and a Base People: Subsistence Hunters in Zambia [handback 1976], repruned as a paperback with updates [005] and e Imperial Lion: Human Dimensions of Wildlife Management in Central Africa (paperback 1984, repruned 4x), and as journal articles published in Zambia, East Africa, and elsewhere. These materials document Valley Bisa history and settlement, local knowledge and environments, hunting strategies, life histories, previous cultural changes, and assessments of local impacts and resource. These were for building, for road clearing, and for daily chores. The chief also controlled appointments for those receiving sitting fees, for travel and certain discretionary funds. His priorities became clear in his decisions on structures and where to build them. These constructions included a new permanent palace, the completion of a permanent Catholic church, a community building, grinding machines, water wells, the construction of a permanent wildlife scout command center, and a building for the school- all within the neighborhood of the palace, a site locally designated as Palace Central. Other areas got very little, if any, tangible bene-/ts. Furthermore, the chief was not shy to use the armed wildlife scouts as an escort or as a force against his detractors. Government oversight and accountability were slack, for similar priorities were visible in other Zambian GMAs. These visible decisions, about the placement of bene-/ts with this in other and Zambian GMAs, eventually led to further donor interventions and to the establishment of a Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and new wildlife legislation in 1998.

Locally, ADMADE began with outsiders and locals making large promises to MGMA residents. Donors had initiated and funded this program to counter the widespread slaughter of wildlife then taking place throughout rural Africa. The theory behind this program, to encourage rural participation in wildlife conservation, was appealing. Rather than all taxes on safari hunting going to the state treasury, donors encouraged government to return a portion (75% of some revenue streams) to the GMA community for its use in development and for investments in wildlife management. In practice, the program was never straightforward, for the wildlife department determined what projects were fundable and when and the amounts of funds dispersed to GMA communities. The program created a national (Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund) and a local level institution (Sub-Authority) to receive and manage community funds. These funds were for local employment and for buildings such as for health and education together with the training to improve local capacities in critical management skills. Lacking transparency, undisclosed amounts of funds went unaccounted for. The new chief, a Sub-Authority composed of resident civil servants, the ADMADE Unit Leader, and a few appointed headmen. Until the 1999 elections, this Sub-Authority was responsible to the District Wildlife Authority headed by a political appointee, the District Governor as well as to the wildlife department. These constructions included a new permanent palace, the completion of a Catholic church, grinding machines, water wells, the construction of a permanent wildlife scout command center, and the building for the school- all within the neighborhood of the palace, a site locally designated as Palace Central. Other areas got very little, if any, tangible benefits. Furthermore, the chief was not shy to use the armed wildlife scouts as an escort or as a force against his detractors. Government oversight and accountability were slack, for similar priorities were visible in other Zambian GMAs. These visible decisions, about the placement of benefits with this in other and Zambian GMAs, eventually led to further donor interventions and to the establishment of a Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and new wildlife legislation in 1998.

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By 2006, the MGMA population had increased to some 10,000 residents. Recent cultural processes had shed significant change in tandem with regional in phases and trends. New transformations include those in beliefs (from ancestral to charismatic Christian values, from a lineage focus increasingly toward individualism); most recognized the chief’s role as the main political and economic decision-making authority in village life. Villagers continued to value wild animals in their own ways— for consumption or as trades for other goods—what people received little, if any, tangible benefits. In terms of the “community-based” wildlife programs, ey also witnessed the high personal costs paid for living with large mammals and crocodiles (11 deaths and 138 injuries caused by wild animals recorded between 1990–2007) and for the losses they paid each year for animal depredations in their ‘elds. Moreover among the 460 residents in all village groupings interviewed, 38% responded that either they, or a close relative, had been arrested by wildlife scouts. is arrest rate for residents who had not dropped since the program began, indicating that bene ts from the program were changing neither behavior nor attitudes. Residents increasingly depend upon “poaching” natural resources and the properties and welfare of others.

Unfortunately and tragically, large gangs of commercial poachers from outside the GMA were the main wildlife killers and on too dangerous for the wildlife scouts to tackle. In its present condition, the Zambian state appears to have neither the resources nor the political will to service the needs of the people in this GMA nor the capacity to sustain wildlife there. Yet its heavy emphasis upon law enforcement and “antipoaching” patrols, the state has yet to achieve the ascendancy of its management over wildlife. As of 2006, the MGMA population had increased to some 10,000 residents. Few local people had full-time jobs, mostly community scouts and teachers or safari workers. ey resources supported many more people and multiple marriages. Casual labor was more widely distributed among the village groupings. Average household income was less than one US dollar a day which did not cover the community’s “opportunity costs” under the program. Given the declining natural resource base, frequent famines, and increasing population, many villagers were at a “tipping point” of more drastic transformation, dependency, and increasing poverty.

What of supposedly representativeness and achievements of the imposed local institutions— the Sub-Authority or the Community Resources Board (CRB)? A review of their records shows that their members were neither democratically elected nor responded to their constituents’ needs for development or for information. Agendas were a shambles, dictated largely by ZWA, outside agents, or financial crises, rather than by local needs or initiatives. Board members as clients of the chief focus on the distribution of inconsistent revenues (diminished considerably over time) and on pre-determined projects and structures that take time to complete. With insufficient funding to make a signi cant impact, the CRB had become a facade captured by internal and external agents who subvert much of its resources for their own purposes. Meantime, community wildlife scouts and teachers are not paid their salaries for periods up to a year or more. Board membership and employment for the few becomes ways for individuals to escape poverty, if only temporarily, for most did not remain even if they managed to complete their terms of o ce. Wildlife management is mainly antipoaching exercises pushed by outside interests—a wasteful expenditure of community funds. Perhaps re-acting on the past, an elderly resident summarized this position in 2006 as follows: “Animals are now much more protection and rights than we have. We are restricted and are mere objects in our own land. Many government leaders, who passionately enjoy the ‘revenue’—on wild animals, wish us to accept ‘rivers’—on this ‘ally’ to allow Honourable Animals to walk, reproduce, and graze ‘widely’. What a dream! We will die for and in our land. I trust you will understand that the lack of game meat is at the root of our protest and scarcity of what we eat today.”

Residents have given up on ZWA as a viable partner in development for the Authority dealings local initiatives, monopolizes knowledge creation, and is reluctant to protect local residents and their properties from wildlife. Government has cut back on its supplies and support for rural education and health which have made these local services now dependent upon the community, safari operators, and missions.

Many residents would agree with the ADMADE principle of exchanging some of their wildlife for development revenues, but qualify this acceptance with a stipulation that bene ts be more equitable. More women than men concurred with a statement that such a transaction and exchange would be “fair.” Women’s subsistence roles (outside of crop protection) are less a threat by wildlife policies, and their children bene t from education and the health clinic. Residents’ priority since 1973 has been for the construction of a good road connecting them to the services and markets on the plateau. For most, this road would be the most appropriate means to improve their welfare. From experiences elsewhere with roads and perhaps because ZWA appears incapable of controlling the inevitable poaching along such a road, ZWA and safari operators are against this development. Safari clients employ lightweight aircraft to move into the hunting concessions.

Findings from these latter studies are published as chapters in books, as consultancy reports, as well as articles in African, European, and North American journals. ey topics include local incentives under ADMADE, a method for using local actors to make wildlife counts and analyses of several years’ data, a century’s overview of changes within the central Luangwa, contrasts between lineage husbandry and managerial ecology, colonial political alignments, and a local history and legacy of ADMADE. ey have 2006 assessment of ADMADE (On the Ground and in the Villages: A Cacophony of Voices Assessing a “Community-Based” Wildlife Program in Zambia), which was initiated in limited locales and a manuscript describing the local system of wildlife husbandry and its transformation is in process of publication (Life as a Hunt: A reshould of Identities, Images, and Illusions on an African Landscape).

SOME IDEAS TO WORK WITH

For years most of ZWA’s failures, including those of its predecessors and the “community-based” program were criticized in numerous consultancy reports and on the ground by MGMA residents. Many of these problems stem from its legislative mandate, from ZWA’s lack of a fixed set of institutions, from its strategies to achieve its aims. ey topics include local incentives under ADMADE, a method for using local actors to make wildlife counts and analyses of several years’ data, a century’s overview of changes within the central Luangwa, contrasts between lineage husbandry and managerial ecology, colonial political alignments, and a local history and legacy of ADMADE. ey have 2006 assessment of ADMADE (On the Ground and in the Villages: A Cacophony of Voices Assessing a “Community-Based” Wildlife Program in Zambia), which was initiated in limited locales and a manuscript describing the local system of wildlife husbandry and its transformation is in process of publication (Life as a Hunt: A reshould of Identities, Images, and Illusions on an African Landscape).

My answer is NO. My research shows that at one time, the Valley Basin had the initiative and space to construct a resource regime that worked for them within a colonial envelope. ey had system had thus, but they were their ‘aw and local leaders could handle them. ey had made the rules and their clients largely followed them. ey wildlife prospered (increased) up to the point where the local cultural envelope had fallen apart and was no longer able to respond to overwhelming outside pressures. ey focused on management was with the human or user side concerned with recruitment, distribution of products, causation or reasons for things not happening as expected, hierarchy and status, and operational procedures. As long as individuals kept the right balance in their relationships, they could expect wildlife to meet their needs. My argument is for managers to facilitate and to become sensitive to local cultural counterparts, grasping some insider knowledge and the local organization of users to what outsiders may know about resource indicators of which smaller groups may not be aware. I am not championing a return to wildlife, or even to the idea of wildlife, but wishing to facilitate rural people in using their creative energies to formulate and engage in regime strategies that they can live within and sustain. My premise is that durable conservation solutions to poverty begin with the understandings and engagements of local people; outside expertise remains a local option, not something imposed forcibly. Quick fixes and infusions of technological and material assistance won’t solve these cultural issues. Outsiders can listen, learn and only facilitate these processes. With this background of studies and with hope, I offer the following perspectives to wildlife managers and others who search for appropriate ways and cultural means to sustain local livelihoods and identities while conserving wildlife in rural areas.
1. Most Managers Will be Sponsored and Sent to Achieve a Purpose

If one is employed by the state, a NGO, or a private firm, it is likely that s/he will be expected to perform a given role and to achieve stated objectives. Each organization has its own culture, ways of thinking, acting, and compensating; these preconditions may not allow individuals either the capacity or time to follow directions. Hence, leading means that even if they appear pertinent for the mission, most contract work allows little time for re-education or for spending much time outside of one's own region.

Assignments vary in the possibilities for individuals to create their own agendas and change objectives from those assigned to the group. Any exercise in resource planning is either innovative or conventional. Either it expects to build a new collective or social order, or it strives to reinforce an existing one. Programs in resource development require explorations for new social forms; those in resource conservation seek to strengthen the status quo. Wildlife is not just a commodity but has both "social" and "natural" aspects, both of which must be studied, understood and integrated. Groups, like the Valley Bisa, have no vernacular term that translates into "environment," "Wildlife," or even "conservation," for it is assumed that where people are, they would need adequate materials to meet their needs.

Wildlife regimes capable of sustaining themselves must link actors with their resources in a meaningful way continuously. Every group has ideas about what has worked or might work and why. Hence, seek those who generate local knowledge and find ways to challenge them in collective problem solving, implementation and developmental processes. By encouraging these individuals and by facilitating collective, culturally relevant resource exercises, projects would seem to have a better chance of producing something constructive than treating local residents as passive recipients of knowledge they can't own.

2. Search for Links Between Macro and Micro Issues

Although not readily visible, national and regional forces influence attitudes and behavior throughout rural areas. Even those people now in supposedly remote areas have always been in contact with other groups. Today there is constant mixing of and movements between rural, urban and global communities. Regional and local behaviors and values are in fact inseparable from cultural interpretations of this history and by the nature of past relationships. Wherever a resource project is located, other agents have been there before leaving behind expectations and conditioning responses to outsiders and their missions.

Another local issue in 1966 was the inevitable topic of "problem animals," the devastating effects of wild mammals on cultivation and human lives. Wildlife scouts were no longer responding to local requests for protection, instead they were directed to save these animals for safari clients to take on license to produce more revenue. Residents also expressed concerns about the lack of progress on government promises of decentralization and about inadequate revenues for community uses.

Local knowledge is not necessarily wisdom about stable land use practices, nor is it necessarily a suitable guide for sustainable resource uses. It likely has premises and purposes other than those claiming universal application. It might be a way to bring different local views and cultural values that people have invested in their resources. To dismiss these historical associations and environmental knowledge, wildlife managers import the impacts and longevity of their own values and mission. Administrators are often pushed strategically to rationalize environmental practices to ensure "conservation" (in their own terms) even as they are aware that by doing so they will lose public and governmental support from those outdated rather than to follow local people's own ideas. Insistence on the value of short life spans, that one can gain in the short run by complying with projects and objectives and that, when the project ends, nothing much changes. Behind each of these solicitous individuals there are scores of silent people that outsiders never hear or see. Making a difference means penetrating this "silence" and gaining an understanding of what the project could mean for them.

3. Grounding and Learning Local Issues

Some contentious issues may remain dormant for years before surfacing. Land alienation was an issue in the central Luangwa Valley. When this subject surfaced in 1966, its initial context seemed a simple grievance between a snubbed chief and ZAWA for not consulting him over the establishment of a permanent boundary between the GMA and the bordering National Park. Yet this matter developed rapidly into a major political confrontation with meetings with government ministers and agencies, correspondence with the President, verbal and printed threats and accusations that built upon the history of appropriations of Valley Bisa land. Local leaders used the crisis to solidify identities behind them through their interpretations of recent events, including suspect motives and offensive behavior of outsiders on their turf. This was reinforced by the ever-present fear that outsiders would take over the land. Local people were no longer responding to local requests for protection, instead they were directed to save these animals for safari clients to take on license to produce more revenue. Residents also expressed concerns about the lack of progress on government promises of decentralization and about inadequate revenues for community uses.

Away from this local issue, one of the most famous cases of wildlife management is the valley Bisa. This group has a rich body of knowledge and past history, a way to elicit a meaningful answer (a dichotomy in any case) and by doing so they will lose valuable information that others might be able to provide. The Bisa, for instance, have a system of elder control and privilege. Local leaders used the crisis to solidify identities behind them through their interpretations of recent events, including suspect motives and offensive behavior of outsiders on their turf. This was reinforced by the ever-present fear that outsiders would take over the land. Local people were no longer responding to local requests for protection, instead they were directed to save these animals for safari clients to take on license to produce more revenue. Residents also expressed concerns about the lack of progress on government promises of decentralization and about inadequate revenues for community uses.

Learning what to do when and how to ask

Groups of people, who have invested their time and efforts within a given environment, have developed customs by which they identify, distinguish, appraise, and manage their pasts and how to cope with them. That body of knowledge is linked intricately to their ways they live and is expressed in their meanings (metaphors). Key expressions (metaphors and cultural language) and ideas reoccur in how people talk about themselves and how they interpret events. We use the Bisa discuss "spirits" as active agents in their lives and to explain why things happen in certain ways. They also believe in the capacities of relatives to cause loss of an individual's power and agency through witchcraft. Rather than through magic, they might talk of past deprivations, hoping to elicit an outsider's sympathetic response. Access to such conventions reveals alternative ways people interpret events and how they struggle for resources that matter to them.

My experience is that rural residents throughout southern Africa are suspicious, distrustful, and sometimes hostile to new government initiatives because of what has happened to them earlier; these responses may vary by sex, age, location and experience. I decline of the national economy, adverse trade relations between urban and rural areas, costs and subsidies for agricultural commodities elsewhere, national wildlife policies, communications and frequency of access-all played parts in the transformation of earlier Valley Bisa relationships. Coupled with a demographic inversion (large numbers of youths), these factors overturned on its head the older system of elder control and privilege.

Given the disparity between newcomers as agents of change and rural residents in terms of local knowledge and past history, I stress the preoccupation. It may be appropriate to be suspicious of locals who readily seek you out or wish to join something new. I see individuals may be marginal in their own group or local elites seeking to enhance their positions. Projects will always attract their "yes" men and women, who rapidly learn and provide the appropriate answers that managers crave about their projects. I see individuals may already be aware that projects have short life spans, that one can gain in the short run by complying with project objectives and that, when the project ends, nothing much changes. Behind each of these solicitous individuals there are scores of silent people that outsiders never hear or see. Making a difference means penetrating this "silence" and gaining an understanding of what the project could mean for them.

4. Learning What, When, and How to Ask

Assignments vary in the possibilities for individuals to create their own agendas and change objectives from those assigned to the group. Many exercise in resource planning is either innovative or conventional. Either it expects to build a new collective or social order, or it strives to reinforce an existing one. Programs in resource development require explorations for new social forms; those in resource conservation seek to strengthen the status quo. Wildlife is not just a commodity but has both "social" and "natural" aspects, both of which must be studied, understood and integrated. Groups, like the Valley Bisa, have no vernacular term that translates into "environment," "Wildlife," or even "conservation," for it is assumed that where people are, they would need adequate materials to meet their needs.

Wildlife regimes capable of sustaining themselves must link actors with their resources in a meaningful way continuously. Every group has ideas about what has worked or might work and why. Hence, seek those who generate local knowledge and find ways to challenge them in collective problem solving, implementation and developmental processes. By encouraging these individuals and by facilitating collective, culturally relevant resource exercises, projects would seem to have a better chance of producing something constructive than treating local residents as passive recipients of knowledge they can't own.
from the sense that these information gaps are impossible to fill in from a distance. I was feeling such pressure when early one morning I found an elderly man weeding in his nearby fields. I had spent several days searching for him because I knew he could answer some of my outstanding questions. After the appropriate greetings and inquiries about health, I immediately began asking my questions. He politely took the time to answer two of my questions. While I was asking my third question, he saw my long list. He coughed politely, resumed his own tasks and dismissed me with, “Bwana, you can’t understand everything in one day!” I got his message and it has been instructive ever since.

Dilemmas facing conservation today are exceptionally difficult and interminable. How is one to protect wildlife and habitats against the interests of various parties within and without while at the same time showing appropriate respect for local history, culture, social organization, livelihood practices and local concerns? It is a heady mix of unending challenges with no easy or school learned answers. We know that our continued existence on this planet and our interests in wildlife survival demands changes from us all. Further, we also know that northern institutional management and its “universal” sophistication have not worked everywhere. All policy makers, state officials and conservationists should engage in grappling with the messiness, difficulties and complexities of shi'ing, absorbing, traditional knowledge while encouraging local creativity to sustain biodiversity and livable environments wherever they are found.

Even wildlife managers might one day find that while “anti-poaching” units and force of arms might be necessary on occasion, they are neither sufficient nor a panacea for changing rural behaviors and attitudes in a sustainable direction.

I wish to thank Dr. Rolf Baldus for suggesting that I consider contributing to his review of CBNRM and that I reflect on my experiences and its lessons for rural development. I appreciate the close readings of an initial draft by Martha Marks and to Dr. Art Hoole for his perceptive comments.

Additional Recent References for Assessing the Welfare of Zambian GMA Residents

Simasiku, Phyllis, Hopeson J. Simwanza, Gelson Tembo, Sushenjit Bandypadhyay & Jean-Michel Pavy: e Impact of Wildlife Management Policies on Communities and Conservation in Game Management Areas in Zambia: Message to Policy Makers Published by the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (with support from the Royal Danish Embassy, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the United Nation Development Program, and the World Bank. (dated June :008).


THE EXPERIENCE OF CAMPFIRE IN ZIMBABWE

Much of Zimbabwe is semi arid, with a low and variable rainfall making the country prone to drought. Land use varies from intensive crop production to extensive cattle and wildlife production along a rainfall-altitude gradient as reflected in the agro-ecological survey of the country (Vincent and others 2000) which identifies Natural Regions IV and V as unsuited to rain fed agriculture, and best used for extensive rangeland production systems.

Some 50,000 km$^2$ of communal land is either adjacent to or near the Parks Estate where wildlife populations are relatively abundant, especially where human population density is low (<10 persons/km$^2$) and wildlife habitat (> 50% of land area) is intact (Taylor 1999). It is in these less developed, more remote areas that CAMPFIRE (Community Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) was initially implemented in the late 1980s.

CAMPFIRE was designed by the then Department of National Parks & Wildlife Management (DNWPWL) now the Parks & Wildlife Management Authority, PWMA) in the mid 1980s (Martin 1986) as a long-term programmatic approach to rural development that uses wildlife and other natural resources as a mechanism for promoting devolved rural institutions and improved governance and livelihoods (Child et al. ,2003). The cornerstone of CAMPFIRE is the devolution of rights to manage, use, dispose of, and benefit from natural resources.

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

“What are the Lessons Learnt?”

Case Study 2

LEONS LEARNT OF ZIMBABWE’S CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME by Vernon Booth

ACRONYMS

CDF CAMPFIRE Development Fund
CSPs CAMPFIRE Service Providers
DNWPWL Department of National Parks & Wild Life Management
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe
MAPS WWF Multipurpose Animal Production Systems
MLGRUD Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRM Natural resource management
NRMPI Natural Resource Management Programme Phase 1
PSIP Public Sector Investment Programme
PTD Participatory Technology Development
PWMA Parks & Wildlife Management Authority
RDCs Rural District Councils
SCI Safari Club International
SO1 USAID Mission’s Strategic Objective One
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USF & WS US Fish and Wildlife Service
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
ZinfTrust Zimbabwe Trust
CCG CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group
CASS Centre for Applied Social Sciences
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CA CAMPFIRE Association
AA Appropriate Authority

INTRODUCTION

The following summary provides an overview of the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe (Taylor, 2009). From a number of lessons learnt from the implementation of CAMPFIRE are provided at the conclusion of this annex.
As originally envisaged, CAMPFIRE was to focus on the conservation and exploitation of four natural resources, wildlife, forestry, grazing and water. However, because wildlife is able to provide direct and immediate tangible financial benefits, the initial success of the programme was premised on the use of large mammal wildlife resources, mostly through high value trophy hunting safaris and to a lesser extent through non-consumptive ecotourism.

- The Parks & Wildlife Management Authority (PWMA) is the legally mandated authority responsible for wildlife resources in Zimbabwe. In 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act decentralized state authority and conferred privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife, trees and plants (Government of Zimbabwe 1975). Land owners or occupiers were designated "appropriate authorities", giving them de facto responsibility for wildlife and making them the beneficiaries of sound wildlife conservation and use. A year later, similar rights were extended to communal farmers through an amendment to the Act in 1985, which delegated Appropriate Authority (AA) to Rural District Councils (RDCs).

In practical terms AA represents the decentralization of authority and control over wildlife only to RDCs (Murombudzi 2001).

**FUNDING FOR CAMPFIRE**

- An early establishment of CAMPFIRE as a rural development programme was characterised by a relatively low level of external funding (Child et al 2003), and the DNPWLM had to rely on Government funding through the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) to initiate CAMPFIRE. Furthermore, a CAMPFIRE Agency under an appropriate Ministry was also planned, for which short-term donor funding would have been sought (Martin 1986).

Technical and other support was provided by a coalition of support agencies, initially the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), Zimbabwe Trust (ZinTrust) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and subsequently others, notably the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). Under the leadership of DNPWLM and later, the CAMPFIRE Association, their inputs were coordinated through the establishment of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) which was replaced by the CAMPFIRE Service Providers (CSPs) in 1994.

- USAID support was further enhanced, notably for CASS and ZinTrust through funding provided by USAID Support to CAMPFIRE under NRMP I (1989-1994) whilst that of WWF came through the WWF Multispecies Animal Production Systems (MAPS) Project. CAMPFIRE project was "designed as a pilot initiative to test the CAMPFIRE hypothesis on a limited scale before committing more substantial USAID resources". In total grant was USD$7.6 million over five years and four districts in Matabeleland in northwest Zimbabwe, namely Binga, Bulalima-Mangwe, Hwange and Tsholotsho, were recipients of support.

- The initial success of the programme was premised on the use of large mammal wildlife resources, mostly through high value trophy hunting safaris and to a lesser extent through non-consumptive ecotourism.

**A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa**

"What are the Lessons Learnt?"

**SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMME ACTIVITY**

CAMPFIRE was originally designed by the DNPWLM as a long-term programme to address those problems arising from communal ownership, development, management and sustainable utilisation of natural resources (namely forestry, grazing, water and wildlife) in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe.

- In the process of implementation, three strongly inter-linked principles embodied in the original design have contributed significantly to the evolution of CAMPFIRE policy and practice (Jones and Murphree 2001).

**Economic benefit**

Economically competitive forms of land use have motivated the sustainable use of wildlife outside of formally protected areas in Zimbabwe. Wildlife policy in the 1960s moved from an earlier protectionist philosophy to one promoting the high economic and financial value of wildlife, a key incentive for its sustainable management. Underlying assumption was that economies ultimately determine decisions regarding the allocation of land and the resources thereon. Early success of this utilitarian approach to wildlife on alienated land in the commercial agricultural sector provided compelling arguments for its wider application in the communal sector of the country, particularly after 1980. In the context of rural development and CAMPFIRE, placing wildlife in the realm of economics and land use, rather than conservation provided an important opportunity to complement conventional and subsistence agricultural practice in the communal lands of the country (Jones and Murphree 2001).

- E is wildlife policy shi:

  - formalized in the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act, and amended in 1998;
  - decentralized state authority and conferred certain privileges on occupiers of land. Such devolution, coupled with alternative economic opportunities and incentives for rural development, was intended, inter alia, to better serve wildlife conservation, given the inadequate government resources to do so. It also recognised that land occupiers are the primary determinants of habitat and wildlife utilisation to include non-consumptive eco-tourism ventures, timber and bamboo harvesting, honey and fruit production, sheries, mopane caterpillars and the sale of non-renewable resources such as river sand for construction purposes.

- A second related goal was multi-country regional cooperation in the promotion of NRM activities which would contribute also to the sustainable development of communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture.

- This programme focuses on the remote communal lands in Natural Regions III, IV and V around the periphery of the country. Community participation would be voluntary, but custody and responsibility for NRM would be placed with participating communities. It was to be achieved through group ownership with de facto rights of access to natural resources and appropriate institutions for the legitimate management, use and benefit of these resources (Martin 1986).

- In the process of implementation, three strongly inter-linked principles embodied in the original design have contributed significantly to the evolution of CAMPFIRE policy and practice (Jones and Murphree 2001).

- Economic benefit
status. Further and importantly, CAMPFIRE was viewed as a means of improving rural resource governance through local devolution (Child et al. 2003).

| RESULTS |

What are the Lessons Learnt?

3 Collective proprietorship

Whilst the transfer of proprietary rights, together with accompanying financial incentives, was highly successful on commercial farmland, similar replication in communal lands faced numerous legal and institutional impediments. What was required was a communal property regime behaving as a proprietorship unit over land and resources. Such a regime or unit should comprise a de facto group collectively managing and exploiting common property resources within a de jure jurisdiction (Jones and Murphree 2001). In the event, Ward-level producer communities emerged through the establishment of Ward Wildlife Management Committees (WWMCs) or Ward Wildlife Committees (WWCs)3.

4 Women

In practice sport hunting and ecotourism have provided the primary economic and financial basis for the implementation of CAMPFIRE over the period 1989–2001. Although there is considerable biophysical and socio-economic variability between RDCs with appropriate authority, Bond (2001) describes a general model for the income or revenue earned from the use of wildlife and the subsequent allocation of this revenue. Consumptive (sport hunting) and non-consumptive (ecotourism) rights to wildlife and wild land are leased to private sector operators by the RDC. The remaining revenue came from the lease of tourism rights (%), ivory sales and sale of hides (%), and other minor resources such as crocodile and ostrich eggs (%).

Table 1: Number of Districts and fully participating communities in CAMPFIRE in 2001

Table 2: Revenue earned by RDCs with appropriate authority for wildlife 1989–2003

In 1989 two RDCs in the Zambezi valley, Guruve and Nyaminyami, were granted AA status and commenced earning revenue through the marketing of trophy hunting quotas to an international safari hunting clientele. As was rapidly followed by a further seven districts wanting to join the programme and requesting AA status. By 1999, 17 RDCs had acquired appropriate authority and following major donor inputs and 1996 for building or strengthening institutional capacity and NRM micro-project development. CAMPFIRE had grown to include 37 RDCs with AA status by 2001. Many of the latter, however, were not traditional wildlife producing districts (Table 1). Of these, 19 or 51% could be considered as fully participating i.e. producer districts generating revenues for communities through sustainable natural resource management activities and receiving benefit: is in terms of funded projects, training and membership of the Association. Over 70% of wards (71) and villages (17) in these 19 districts could be considered as fully participating communities.

THE CAMPFIRE MODEL

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Table 1: Number of Districts and fully participating communities in CAMPFIRE in 2001

Table 2: Revenue earned by RDCs with appropriate authority for wildlife 1989–2003

Annual income at the commencement of the programme in 1989 was US$350,000 when only two appropriate authority RDCs were in place and operational, and this increased to over US$ million in 2001 by which time there were 16 wildlife producing RDCs with appropriate authority. Over the 13 years, the average total income was US$1.5 million which translates to approximately US$97,547 per RDC (N=16).

2 Allocation of revenue earned from wildlife 1989–2001

Bond (2001) notes that revenue per category is determined by the allocation of revenue earned from wildlife by RDCs. Councils with appropriate authority are not legally obliged to devolve revenue to sub-district levels but are encouraged to do so through a set of guidelines originally developed by DNFPWL in 1991. These Guidelines for CAMPFIRE were the subject of on-going debate (Jones and Murphree 2001) until they were endorsed by the CAMPFIRE Association in its Financial Management Manual (Anon. 2003).

A seeks to ensure that producer communities are the primary bene’ficiaries of the revenue earned and make the following recommendations:

- At least 50% of gross wildlife revenue should be devolved to ward level;
- Up to 35% can be retained for wildlife management purposes at RDC level;
- No more than 15% retained as a council levy.

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1 Revenue earned at district level from wildlife 1989–2001

Between 1989 and 2001 the revenue earned by Rural District Councils with appropriate authority exceeded US$0.5 million. Some 90% of this revenue was earned from the lease of sport hunting rights to commercial safari operators (Table 3).
Apart from the council levy, the allocation of revenue over the past 13 years has been less than satisfactory in terms of the revenue guidelines (Table 3). Even wildlife rich and well-endowed districts have been unable to devolve the recommended 50% of revenue earned to wards and households and on average only 46% has been disbursed to community level. Across the 16 RDCs this translates to approximately US$47,549/year. Significantly, some 14% (US$3 million) remained unallocated over the 13 years, and generally, is assumed to have been committed to activities not related to wildlife and CAMPFIRE (Bond: 001).

### Table 3: Allocation of revenue earned from wildlife by RDCs 1999-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$9,860,392</th>
<th>US$7,650,799</th>
<th>46</th>
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<tr>
<td>Discoursed to communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District level wildlife management</td>
<td>US$4,000,194</td>
<td>US$3,13,861</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council levy</td>
<td>US$2,508,085</td>
<td>US$1,92,927</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>US$660,491</td>
<td>US$552,945</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allocated</td>
<td>US$1,25,382</td>
<td>US$2,52,414</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bond (2001) & CAMPFIRE Monitoring & Evaluation Database, WITF/SARIR/H Release

Importantly, whilst there has been a diversification beyond wildlife into ecotourism and other NR products, a number of RDCs have treated such income from these activities as General Revenue and not CAMPFIRE income. A study commissioned by the CA (PoC: 001) suggests that these income generating activities may have provided as much as 30% more revenue than is credited in the CAMPFIRE accounts (Child et al: 003). Furthermore, most if not all of this income, falls to reach communities.

#### 3 Household benefits

- **e** total number of households receiving wildlife revenue increased from 7,861 in 1989 to 98,964 in 1995, there**e** declining to 76,863 by 001. **e** nancial benefit per household (ward dividend/number of households, Bond: 001) between 1989 and 001 is low. In real terms the median benefit per household declined from US$19.60 in 1989 to US$3.87 in 001. In part this has been due to the decentralized wildlife management as an input potential in the growing number of districts joining the programme. Overall, but excluding 1989, the annual nancial benefit per 50% of households has amounted to US$4.57 or less during the life of the programme.

#### 4 Maintenance of wild land and wildlife habitat

No simple universal or systematic approach to measuring wildlife areas over all CAMPFIRE districts has been undertaken and that this is a serious omission (Child et al: 003). However, as an initial assessment of the likely extent of wild land and habitat within CAMPFIRE areas, Taylor (1999) used wildlife producing wards as a proxy for this land, recognising that such wards comprised a mosaic of wild and settled land. Wildlife producer wards on average made up 36% of the total number of wards in CAMPFIRE districts, with their land area of 39,580 km² constituting 55% of the total area under the programme.

For the primary wildlife producing districts the amount of wild land varied from less than 500 to over 5,000 km² with an average size of 3,300 km². Of these, three districts had wild land in excess of 90% of the district area, six had 50-70% wild land and in 3 districts only, less than 35% of the district constituted wild land.

- **e** availability of wild land is negatively correlated with human population density (p<0.01), with the maintenance of wild land (>50% area) more likely under lower rather than higher population densities (<10 persons/km²; Taylor 1995, 1999). At a coarse scale of resolution, these results suggest that wild land has been maintained in an intact state. This has important implications for potential, household earnings from wildlife with those areas sparsely populated and relatively high wildlife densities standing to bene’t more (Bond: 001, Munombozidz: 001).

- **e** loss of wild land and habitat over 8 years between 1989 and 1997 in three wards of three districts in the Zambezi valley was minimal amounting overall to no more than 5% of a total 1,850 km². **e** major threat was identiﬁed as population growth and demand for more agricultural land (Conybeare 1998). In contrast, Dunham et al (003) examined more critically the area and quality of wildlife habitat in selected CAMPFIRE areas using a combination of aerial photography and remotely sensed imagery. Notwithstanding the problems associated with using and comparing diﬀerent methods of mapping, it was established for three Zambezi Valley districts that the percentage of habitat destroyed by settlement/cultivation had increased markedly between 1981 and 1999. **e** eﬀect of good quality habitat declined by half in Binga District and almost totally so in North Gokwe. Only Nyaminyami District retained much of its original natural habitat. Natural habitat in both Binga and Gokwe was <50% coverage in the baseline year compared to Nyaminyami which was >50%.

#### 2 Quota oﬀtakes and trophy quality

- **e** eﬀect of big game trophies has been maintained in CAMPFIRE areas suggesting that trophy hunting and monitoring systems are eﬀective (Child et al: 003). A review of quotas, o’ake, trophy quality and “catch e ort” across four key species (elephant, bo: , lion and leopard), however, indicate that whilst national quotas and actual o’akes for elephant and bo: have been increasing between 1997-000, trophy quality for these two species has been declining (Grobbelaar and Masulani, 003). For lion and leopard, o’akes have either declined or are stable, whilst trophy quality is stable for leopard and increasing for lion. **e** eﬀect is also a strong correlation between increasing quotas, declining trophy quality and increased “catch e ort”.

- **e** has been a noticeable shift in DNPWLM quota setting policy in the latter half of the 1990s. Whereas quotas were set to maximise returns prior to 1996, there was a switch in emphasis to more sustainable trophy quality, which resulted in a reduction of most quotas. Although attribution of causality is diﬀicult, following the commencement of CAMPFIRE in 1989, and as further RDCs were granted Authoritative Authority, increasingly more of the key wildlife districts were surveyed and censused for large mammals (Taylor and Mackie, 1997). Censuses have either been part of larger country-wide surveys or of specific CAMPFIRE areas and not all districts have been surveyed on a regular basis over the 14 year period (1988-003).

#### 3 Wildlife populations

- **Note** that habitat assessment by Dunham et al (003) was for all of North Gokwe District but that of Conybeare (1998) was unco ond to the Wildlife Corridor, an area set aside by North Gokwe residents for wildlife.

#### 4 GOVERNANCE

From the inception of CAMPFIRE to the mid-90s, the amount and proportion of revenues devolved to producer communities increased rapidly, providing the primary impetus for wildlife conservation and for improvements in community institutional development and governance. Subsequently, the rate of devolution levelled off: and a: er 000, the process reversed itself (Child et al: 003). By 001, only 38% of revenue was being returned to producer communities with 10% being used for CAMPFIRE management with over 40% retained by RDCs for general purposes, compared to the guideline upper limit of 15%.

Nevertheless, in 003 the concept and level of devolution in many districts was still strong. **e** is concept is used by ZimTrust (003), which reported the strong correlation between local devolution and institutional development. **e** rough NRMP II investments, such as the CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) and the establishment of community Trusts, these principles are being adopted in most projects as the norm rather than as previously contentious issues. **e** remains however, a high level of taxation imposed on producer communities by RDCs through their various levies. More recently, and in response to these adverse and imposed conditions, some wards and village collectives, notably in Chiredzi, Chipinge, Gurove and Nyanga 11, are beginning to negotiate directly with safari operators and other private sector partners, direct payments of hunting and ecotourism revenues. Some RDCs, especially their technical sta: , tend to support such advance, even if only implicitly, recognising their own limitations and inability to overcome this problem.

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* Producers wards are used as a proxy for the area of wild land

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1. Note that habitat assessment by Dunham et al (2003) was for all of North Gokwe District but that of Conybeare (1998) was unconnected to the Wildlife Corridor, an area set aside by North Gokwe residents for wildlife.


One of the more notable achievements of CAMPFIRE has been the strengthening of institutional development at the producer community level (Child et al. 2003).

The use of wildlife dividends appears to be decided democratically, that people retain and sometimes (uncommonly, Bond 2001, see above) use their right to have household cash benefits and that many projects are implemented properly. Finances are reasonably well managed in a transparent and peer reviewed manner, thus preventing widespread or large-scale misuse.

In terms of good governance, in excess of 100 democratically elected and constituted village and ward CAMPFIRE committees exist in 13 districts. These structures provide for a high level of community participation and decision-making with a transparent flow of information relating to key issues, planning and projects. These committees have been equipped with basic organizational skills including holding meetings, minute taking, book-keeping, and the fundamentals of project and financial management. In the primary wildlife producing districts, the community leadership and locally employed NR monitors are able to organize and implement a number of wildlife management skills including counting wildlife, setting quotas, monitoring hunting, marketing wildlife and undertaking problem animal mitigation measures. Fire management has been implemented in the four districts of Chipinge, Chiredzi, Gokwe North and Guruve. Illegal activity is also monitored and penalties imposed on offenders. However, the basis for such achievement is inextricably linked to the incentive to do so which in turn, is directly related to the strength of the associated bene

**PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

CAMPFIRE (and its equivalents elsewhere in southern Africa), means the concept that the devolution of responsibilities and accountability for natural resource management can be highly effective for the collective and participatory management of such resources. Such devolution also leads to improved local institutions and governance. However, it is pertinent to examine also, the assumptions or external factors underlying the success or otherwise of CAMPFIRE.

Based on the “Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for CAMPFIRE” (Wright 1997), four areas of assumption and their indicators were identified as necessary for the successful implementation of CAMPFIRE. These are government policy, markets for natural resources, climate and macro-economic performance (Table 5). A review of these assumptions indicates that at least three are presently unfavourable for CAMPFIRE (WWF SARPO 2003).

Firstly, the commitment of Government to creating and sustaining an enabling policy framework for devolved natural resource management has not yet been achieved through legislative changes. More recent policy changes, especially those from PWMA indicate a re-centralisation of wildlife management. Most NR and land legislation still continues to ensure state control of resources and land. Furthermore, under an adverse macro-economic environment, PWMA and other NR agency budgets have declined dramatically in recent years.

Secondly, although the markets for wildlife products appear generally robust, particularly on State and Communal Land, a collapse of the wildlife industry on former large-scale commercial farmland, although not yet impacting significantly, can only be expected to adversely affect CAMPFIRE, does have implications for both State and communal areas as all three are linked, each adding value to the other. National hunting revenues peaked at US$16m annually in 1998 but have since declined to US$6m in 2001 (Booth 2000). This is also reflected in the number of sport hunting days sold, declining from more than 0,000 in the late 1990s to 18,000 in 2001.

Thirdly and importantly, the macro-economic indicators examined all point to declining economic performance. An increase in unemployment and the decline in real wages act to place increasing pressure on land and other natural resources in the communal lands of the country.

Direct and causal links between rainfall and CAMPFIRE are difficult to establish. Long-term impacts of cumulative and variable rainfall deficits (> 1,000 mm by 2001) experienced over the past 30-30 years remain difficult to predict. It is climatic variability however, that provides one of the strongest justifications for adopting wildlife, and other NR-based land uses as an alternative and sustainable strategy for social, economic and ecological betterment (Taylor, 2009).

The RDCs and their sub-wards are core of “service providers” in communities and localities. The RDCs are usually the lowest tier of government and operate in a highly devolved context. The CAMPFIRE Development Fund has been awarded the status of AA (Allied Agency) however, the CAMPFIRE Development Fund is a sub-district fund, which means that the RDC has to agree to the CAMPFIRE Development Fund as an appropriate recipient for these funds. However, the RDCs are still required to ensure that such funds become effectively available to the lowest tier of government. Therefore, although CAMPFIRE has been relatively successful in securing support from local communities and local government, it has failed to secure areas for other wildlife.

Institutional development at the producer community level (Child et al. 2003) experienced over the past 30-30 years remains difficult to predict. It is climatic variability however, that provides one of the strongest justifications for adopting wildlife, and other NR-based land uses as an alternative and sustainable strategy for social, economic and ecological betterment (Taylor, 2009).

**LESSONS LEARNT**

1. Decentralise to the lowest level

   a. fact that RDCs were awarded AA status instead of to the lowest possible level was recognised early in the process as being one of the most fundamental problems inhibiting the implementation of CAMPFIRE. Over the last 30 years, the promoters of CAMPFIRE have tried to work around this problem with little success, leading to the withdrawal of signi cant donor funding and broad scale technical support.

   If the principles of CAMPFIRE are to be promoted further as originally envisaged, specifically meaningful devolution, as opposed to re-centralisation of authority, of natural resource production systems to producers then CAMPFIRE needs to emulate more recent experiences in the region. This is includes the Mahenya community in Chipinge RDC; Kanyurira Ward in Guruve RDC and Chikwarakwara Village in Beitbridge RDC.

   Both the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ authorities need to agree on resource boundaries and rights of access to land if there is discord between them. Community-based landlord resource management cannot function effectively if democratic governance does not, whenever appropriate, recognise traditional values. This is most clearly seen in regard to migration of people between communal areas. Both formal and informal systems directly act to protect consent under an adverse macro-economic environment, PWMA and other NR agency budgets have declined dramatically in recent years.

2. Improve the accountability of RDCs

   RDCs still retain excessive control, especially regarding revenue retention, resulting in the intended primary bene: citizens being severely disadvantaged. Given the poor macro-economic indicators and without the appropriate incentives, these producer communities are likely to continue or return to unsustainable practices on marginal agricultural land, thus reining the assessments of Cuming and Lynam (1997),ONYEABEARE (1998) and DUNHAM et al. (2003) reported above. This is compounded by the CA still precluding producer community membership and limiting such membership to RDCs, thereby continuing to avoid addressing policy issues such as devolution of AA to sub-district level.

3. Transition from “traditional” conservation to “modern” conservation practices

   A great deal has been written regarding the loss of traditional conservation practices following the imposition of colonial wildlife management systems. CAMPFIRE provided the opportunity for such systems to be reinvigorated, however the political and policy environment has shifted this, especially in the absence of land tenure systems at the communal level. Con: lucts have arisen where homogeneous communities at a village level wanting to take better control of NRM have clashed with RDCs e.g. the Mahenery community in Chipinge RDC; Kanyurira Ward in Guruve RDC and Chikwarakwara Village in Beitbridge RDC.

   Both the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ authorities need to agree on resource boundaries and rights of access to land if there is discord between them. Community-based landlord resource management cannot function effectively if democratic governance does not, whenever appropriate, recognise traditional values. This is most clearly seen in regard to migration of people between communal areas. Both formal and informal systems directly act to protect consent under an adverse macro-economic environment, PWMA and other NR agency budgets have declined dramatically in recent years.

4. Diversification of NRM

   CAMPFIRE as a movement grew rapidly when signi cant donor funds became available through the CAMPFIRE Development Fund, resulting in a wide variety of local community projects being sponsored. However, once these funds were exhausted, the enthusiasm to continue supporting the CAMPFIRE philosophy waned, leaving behind a few core areas that could continue to exploit the sport hunting potential of the large wildlife populations. By large, these areas have been financially successful, however virtually no RDC or localised community has taken the initiative to “grow” this business by developing wildlife based land use systems at the communal level, mostly because of the inappropriate land tenure systems at this level. Therefore, although CAMPFIRE has been relatively successful in securing habitat for elephant and buffalo, it has failed to secure areas for other wildlife.

5. Requirement for core technical support

   CAMPFIRE exploded as a means to promote community-based conservation when it was first promoted. Driving this process was a dedicated core of individual ecologists, sociologists and economists that at the time had considerable political and institutional support throughout the country. This is core of “service providers” was free to try a variety of approaches to advance CAMPFIRE, and in the process raised the expectations of many stakeholders, including those from outside of southern Africa. However, once these funds were exhausted, the enthusiasm to continue supporting the CAMPFIRE philosophy waned, leaving behind a few core areas that could continue to exploit the sport hunting potential of the large wildlife populations. By large, these areas have been financially successful, however virtually no RDC or localised community has taken the initiative to “grow” this business by developing wildlife based land use systems at the communal level, mostly because of the inappropriate land tenure systems at this level. Therefore, although CAMPFIRE has been relatively successful in securing habitat for elephant and buffalo, it has failed to secure areas for other wildlife.
Zimbabwe. However, the pace of CAMPFIRE obscured the early signs that in its present form it was not able to deliver as a result of not being structured correctly at the institutional level, and was unlikely to meet all the expectations. It became clear once the level of net dividends to communities became more apparent, together with the associated costs of the implementing the programme.

Critically the programme lost many of its early promoters who could have taken CAMPFIRE to the next stage and as such it was never able to develop new paradigms to devolve access rights to individual communities. Communal people have had neither the authority, the mechanism, nor the technical training to establish new institutions for them, although Child et al. (2003) conclude that the greatest contribution of CAMPFIRE has been the lesson that "real devolution leads to improved rural democratisation, governance and NR management." Lessons learnt thus far supports this conclusion, but CAMPFIRE is still constrained by a number of fundamental issues, mostly in the policy arena. Where devolution to beyond an RDC has been successful, there have been promising results, but even then the task of empowering an individual or group of individuals in a community environment from developing sustainable NRM initiatives. Whilst communities are able to manage funds, implement projects and contribute to wildlife management, appropriate and strategic interventions by way of technical advice and guidance are still required. Nonetheless the recent acceptance and implementation of direct payments to communities is probably the most significant development since 1999. At this has happened cannot be attributed to CAMPFIRE enabling communities to maximize their roles within the existing set of rules, and by so doing, allowing these rules to be challenged.


REFERENCES


A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

"What are the Lessons Learnt?"

Communities have continued to settle and farm around wildlife reserves.

The Wildlife Act of 1911 is a landmark in Tanzania's history. It is the first modern legislation to protect wildlife, and it includes many of the protective and "fortress" features of the former colonial legislation. Conservation education and awareness campaigns have been launched, including religion-based education and the promotion of local wildlife tourism.

CBCTC starts operating and village game scouts and members of village natural resource committees and village game scouts, participatory land use plans and maps; identification of WMA; obtaining subsistence wildlife quotas for villages; village hunting; anti-poaching by village game scouts. Proceeds from the sale of the meat are used for both community development projects (construction of classrooms, village centres, meetings rooms, milling machines etc.), as well as support for the village game scouts.

MBOMIPA (DfID, Tanzania), another CBC pilot project, operates in Iringa District.

1996 CBCTC starts operating and village game scouts and members of village natural resource committees and local government leaders from different parts of the country participate in formal training.

A:er having received applications for support to CBC from villages in Southern Tanzania along Ruvuma River: first plans are being discussed at Wildlife Division and SCP for a Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor based on CBC.

1997 Task force to draft a new wildlife policy as well as regulations for CBC formed by Wildlife Division with support and participation of different donors.

Wildlife Policy is passed. It has a strong CBC component. A right of local communities to manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit is a strong component of the policy. Insofar the paradigm change in the wildlife policy of the country has become official. Wildlife conservation is perceived as part of the strategies to improve local livelihoods and reduce poverty. Full implementation of this policy requires that the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 1 of 1974 (WCA) is revised.

A document is published only in English language. It takes several years for a donor to obtain permission by Director of Wildlife (DW) to have it translated into Swahili, so that the villages can inform themselves about their rights according to national policy. When really a Swahili version has been printed, all copies are locked away by order of DW.

1998–2003 Guidelines and Regulations for the formation and establishment of WMA are being worked by using the SCP project as a prototype for the design. Communities are involved in a number of participatory meetings. A framework is originally envisaged as to be simple enough so that the villages can work with it. DW insists on an extremely complicated set of rules, on very complex organizational structures and on a multitude of land use plans, environmental and business plans, wildlife counts, studies etc., so that the villages cannot deal with CBC anymore without outside technical and financial assistance. As a matter of fact, CBC projects cannot be established without the help of a foreign donor, as the DW does not provide the necessary assistance. Furthermore the DW forces donors into year-long studies, evaluations etc., the results of which are mostly never used.

A new Wildlife Act is passed which has many of the protective and "fortress conservation" features of the former colonial legislation.

1994 SCP: Village land use plans and maps are completed and approved by participating villages in Morogoro, Tunduru and Songea Districts

A national Community-based Conservation Training Center (CBCTC) established by Wildlife Division in a former UNHCR refugee camp at Likuya-Sekamanganga, Southern Selous

Policy and Management Plan for Tourist Hunting is signed by the Director of Wildlife but never subsequently implemented.

Tanzania Village Land Policy passed.

1999 Local Government Law is approved with the intent to facilitate political, administrative and financial decentralization.

A:e Land Act and Village Land Act No 4 of 1999 are passed. All land is classified as either general, village or reserved land. However the Act also legally devolves power to village level organs, particularly the Village Council to decide on land issues. Other changes include the institutionalization of participatory and transparent mechanisms in land allocation, determination of use, appropriation or access mechanisms and resolving conflicts related to land ownership and use. These changes have significant implications for use, access and conservation of natural resources.

Planning starts for a WMA based Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor a:er several years of preparations. Aerial surveys and research into elephant migrations are conducted in following years. Communities actively drive the process. Ground work is conducted with the assistance of local villagers, village game scouts and traditional hunters to gain additional information about wildlife populations, migration patterns, poaching and human-wildlife conflict.

More villages join CBC in the districts neighbouring the Selous. Altogether there are 16 pilot WMA in Tanzania.

2001 WD withdraws rights formerly given to village game scouts like identity cards through which they have a recognized status in WMA.

2002 DW hands over the WMA of a particularly motivated and successful village to a private hunting company while the legal process of registration is advanced even though the village has full fledged all requirements. A village is not consulted. A company had been accused in the "official" Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption.

2003 A working group under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and lead by a series of extensive nation-wide stakeholder dialogue conferences. A draft of the new Wildlife Act a:er is never presented to Parliament.
for debate. Instead it is withdrawn by the Wildlife Division for about two years and changed signiﬁcantly in its relevant contents without any of the formerly involved groups being informed. The results of the stakeholder dialogue have little or no impact upon the contents.

e SCP as a joint Tanzanian-German initiative comes to its end in December. Some major results in the ﬁeld of CBC can be summed up as follows:

- extension from 15 (1990) to 51 villages participating in CBC around the Selous Game Reserve; more would join, if they were allowed
- 8,600 km2proposed WMA under village management
- 300 village game scouts on duty
- functioning self-administration at village level, National training centre

CBC villages are supported to visit other WMA in the country.

However, a lack of beneﬁts from wildlife utilisation on their land, in particular tourist hunting, according to an ofﬁcial sharing formula promised years ago, but only receive some handouts from the WD based on individual arrangements.

e new Wildlife Act (GN 9, 1998) has still not come into force, and it is unknown how much devolution of powers and revenues it will allow.

A Reference Manual and Guidelines for the Designation and Management of Wildlife Management Areas is published in English and Kiswahili explaining the procedures for the creation of WMA to the 16 pilot WMA. e funding is by donors.

16 pilot WMA exist and are in different stages of registration. None of them has fulﬁlled the complicated requirements by the WD despite international expert advice, ‘nanced by donors.

CBC villages are supported to visit other WMA in the country.

A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

“What are the Lessons Learnt?”

Case Study 4

ACHIEVEMENTS AND PRACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM A DECADE OF WILDLIFE USE IN NAMIBIA’S COMMUNAL AREA CONSERVANCIES

by L. Chris Weaver, Emmanuel Petersen and Greenwell Matongo

Conservancy staff on annual game count. (Photo by Helge Denker, 2009)

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Namibia has long been at the African forefront in the development and application of successful wildlife use policies and practices. In 1967, visionary conservationists enacted the 1967 Nature Conservation Ordinance 31, providing private land owners with rights over wildlife use – thereby transforming the perception of wildlife as a competitor to livestock production to a valuable asset to be sustainably managed for personal gain. A legislative foundation of wildlife use in Namibia was re-established eight years later through the Nature Conservation Ordinance Number 4 of 1975, which further entrenched private land owners’ rights over wildlife and related benefits. A series of incentive-based reforms have produced startling results, precipitating wide-scale recovery of wildlife populations on Namibia’s private lands (43% of the country).

In order to qualify for these wildlife rights, the involved communities are required to meet the following legal conditions:

a) be legally constituted;
b) have clearly defined physical boundaries that are accepted by neighbouring communities and conservancies;
c) be composed of members of the community within the conservancy;
d) have a representative conservancy committee, having a sound accounting system and effective secretariat; and
e) have a sustainable game management plan.

3. COMMUNAL AREA CONSERVANCIES

Following independence in 1990, conservationists took bold steps to address the dwindling game populations in Namibia’s communal areas by passage of a new communal area wildlife policy in 1995, followed shortly thereafter by an amendment to the Nature Conservation Act in 1996, granting communal area residents with conditional rights over wildlife if they formed a conservancy. In 1998, the Namibian government amended the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 with Amendment No. 5 of 1996: Nature Conservation Amendment Act, 1996, which provides the legal basis for communities to gain rights over wildlife through conservancies. Cumulatively, the enactment of this new policy and Act were aimed at empowering rural African communities with the same rights over wildlife which Namibian private land owners had enjoyed for more than a decade (1998–2009) of wildlife use in Namibia’s communal area conservancies, illustrating progress made along the way.

Namibia is a large country (8: 3,988 km²) located in southwestern Africa, where it is enclosed between South Africa to the south, Angola to the north, and Botswana to the east (Figure 1). With a population of approximately 2,000,000, Namibia is one of the most sparsely populated countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A predominantly arid land, Namibia is surprisingly species-rich. Its vast wilderness areas and diverse ecosystems provide superb habitat for a range of Africa’s megafauna, while endemism for both flora and fauna is unexpectedly high for such an arid setting.

From 1966 to 1989, Namibia was under military occupation, with South African Defense Forces (SADF) taking on the dualist roles of fighting internal revolutionary forces seeking freedom from an oppressive apartheid system and countering the perceived spread of communism into southern Africa from Angola. During this period, wildlife were subjected to heavy commercial poaching operations (i.e., rhino horn and ivory) and uncontrolled hunting by both SADF soldiers and community members. As a consequence, wildlife populations in most of these northern communal areas were at historical lows by the mid-1980s and early 1990s. In some communal areas, large game animals had been completely eradicated (i.e., north central Ovambo lands), while in other areas (i.e., East Caprivi floodplains, parts of Kavango and Bushmanland, and the southern communal lands) only fragmented populations of game remained. Prior to and immediately post-independence, communal area wildlife populations trends were largely downwards and in need of urgent assistance.
A key driver in the conservancy formation process has been the rapid manner in which conservancies can secure benefits from wildlife use. Conservancy quotas are requested during the initial stages of conservancy formation, thereby positioning conservancies to quickly seek a private sector partner to market and manage their lucrative trophy hunting concessions a registration of the conservancy. In most instances, a newly registered conservancy can start receiving income from a trophy hunting concession within four months of its registration. In the immediacy of the income and related benefits (meat, employment, etc.) from trophy hunting activities is a crucial reward to community members who may take two years (or longer) to secure conservancy registration, with the receipt of such benefits quickly demonstrating and reinforcing how valuable the conservancy’s wildlife resource is. The increased community awareness of the value of wildlife is a powerful anti-poaching stimulus, creating a positive internal social pressures against poaching. As wildlife populations recover, then conservancies advance to the other forms of wildlife use and tourism as described above.

Benefits from wildlife have demonstrated a steep growth curve, rising from nothing in 1997 to N$117.0805 (US$1586,036) during 2008 (Figure 3). This amount represents approximately 41% of the benefits received by conservancies in 2008. Cumulatively (from 1998 to 2008), conservancy members have received a total of N$486,3418 in sustainable use benefits since registration of the first four conservancies.

![Figure 3. Total annual benefits generated from sustainable wildlife utilization in communal area conservancies from 1998-2008 (Source: WWF Annual Reports, 1998 - 2009)](image)

Trophy hunting has been the largest contributor from sustainable wildlife use, followed by the combined value of meat received by conservancy members through trophy-hunted animals and conservancy harvesting of meat through its own-use meat quotas (Figure 4, below). Other benefits include: 1) far outweigh income from employment or the income from shoot-and-sale operations, which has overtaken employment income for the two of the past three years. In addition to these direct tangible benefits, sustainable wildlife use in conservancies have also precipitated a number of important social benefits including: community recognition and empowerment; rural development through conservancy funded projects; and improved community governance – a factor which is doubly important given Namibia’s long history of apartheid.

![Figure 4. Comparative benefits generated annually by wildlife utilization in communal conservancies through trophy hunting, meat, salaries, premium hunting, catch and sell, and shoot-and-sell harvesting from 1998-2008 (Source: WWF Annual Reports, 1998 - 2009).](image)

4. CONSERVATION BENEFITS CATALYZED BY SUSTAINABLE USE

- An acquisition of wildlife benefits from trophy hunting and where only a small proportion benefits were realized.
- A shift towards community-based community-based wildlife conservation policies.
- A shift towards community-based community-based wildlife conservation policies.
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- A shift towards community-based community-based wildlife conservation policies.
- A shift towards community-based community-based wildlife conservation policies.

5. CURRENT STATUS OF GAME USE IN COMMUNAL CONSERVANCIES

A total of 33 communal conservancies now participate in trophy hunting (Figure 6) on 7 individual community-managed trophy hunting concessions operating on 79,076 km² of land through communal conservancies. Growth in trophy hunting concessions can be contrasted to the pre-conservancy era, when no communities were allowed to benefit from trophy hunting and where only a small handful of communities in northwest Namibia were allowed to conduct own-use harvests of game under highly controlled conditions.
In addition to the increase in trophy hunting concessions, several communal conservancies have initiated the concept of "Premium Hunting." This is a form of hunting that is done under the auspices of a qualified conservancy hunting guide, who hosts and guides clients on high-quality natural hunts taking place within the conservancy boundaries. This type of hunt is aimed at ensuring a safe and enjoyable experience for the client, not to experience a high-quality hunt, but to do so for the experience of the hunt, rather than the export of a trophy. As a result, game are less costly and done under more rustic conditions than a high-end trophy hunting experience. Shoot-and-sale forms of wildlife harvesting has been implemented too.

Lastly, more than 40 communal conservancies are now able to legally hunt their own game through "own-use" hunting operations; this form of hunting allows conservancy members and/or stakeholders to have productive relationships. Consequently, communication is a challenge, and individual members, traditional authorities, government officials, safari operators, tourists, and more. Namibia’s conservancies has shown that communities will go with what they know; the reverse approach has been in operation for a number of years, but participants have not necessarily welcomed by some stakeholders. Many traditional governmental conservationists perceived community members as the enemy (i.e., the poachers who must be punished). Similarly, many of the safari operators did not want to be accountable to a community, nor deal with the transaction costs of working with a conservancy committee on day-to-day operations of the trophy hunting concessions.

Concession Tender Processes Are Critical – Tenders for hunting concessions have proven invaluable for a number of reasons. First, a widely disseminated tender ensures that a competitive market and optimal value for a concession is received. Secondly, the tender allows community members to quickly see how valuable wildlife are and the relative values of the species on offer. Thirdly, the tender process is empowering to a conservancy, as it promotes accountability by the potential, bidding safari operators to the community. Fourthly, tenders lay the groundwork for working relationships, specify community employment/capacity-building requirements, and secure additional conservation investments. Lastly, tenders assist in creating transparency around the award of concessions and reduce the risk of bribes or political interference in the concession award process.

Contracts Are EVE: enE Conseration And Development Tools – A good contract should protect the interests and rights of all parties, placing performance responsibilities and penalties on each party if they fail to meet contractual obligations. enE contract codes are legally binding each party on the matters agreed upon by the parties through the tender process. In the case of Namibia, trophy hunting concession contracts contain clauses aimed at ensuring the operator makes timely payment for animals harvested, employs and trains community members with the knowledge and skills required to be competent in the hunting sector, invest in conservation and development projects, distributes meat from harvested animals in a timely and agreed-upon manner, and promotes reports against his activities. On the other side, the conservancy is to control poaching, adhere to its conservation management plans and zones, provide an area for the operator’s hunting camp(s), and ensure good relationships with the broader community.

Not All Contracts Work Smoothly – though the conservation movement has been largely successful, it has not been without its problems. enE are documented situations in which conservancies have not met their contractual obligations to safari operators (i.e., not followed their management plans, not enE actively communicated with the operators, etc.) or mis-managed funds received from contracts. On the other hand, there are safari operators who have consistently not honoured contractual payments, have used unethical means of harvesting game, or have attempted to bribe stakeholders to influence the outcome of concession awards. enE are a need to have support systems in place that assist in the resolution of such occurrences and ensure that good governance is in place.

Communication Is Essential – Conservancies tend to operate in large, remote areas where communication facilities and means are limited. Similarly, conservancies must deal with a large and diverse set of stakeholders ranging from hundreds of individual members, traditional authorities, government officials, safari operators, lodge operators, tourists, and more. Consequently, communication is a challenge, and poor or ad hoc communication is frequently the cause of lack of awareness of issues, disputes, and/or misunderstandings. enE: enE communication is essential for conservancies and related stakeholders to have productive relationships.

It’s Not All About Money – Many over-estimate the importance in money when decisions are made around the award of trophy hunting contracts. Experience with Namibia’s conservancies has shown that communities will enE: enE choose safari company operators who enE: enE are the potential for respectful and constructive partnerships in exchange for less income. enE is point was particularly emphasized in the 2006 award of the Bwabwata concess. enE: enE the community turned down the top enE: enE operator (which was more than US$500000 higher on the second bid than the second) enE: enE because of the negative experiences the community had with this operator in the past.

Quota Setting Is A Skill And Art: enE: enE at Takes Time To Master – enE: enE setting of sustainable and appropriate harvest quotas is essential to ensure attainment of species management objectives and maintenance of trophy quality. Quotas for communal conservancies are updated annually, based upon available data (i.e., aerial censuses if done, road counts, community game guard counts, safari operator reports, local community knowledge, and the previous year’s harvest data). A quota setting development and review approach has been in operation for a number of years, but participants have yet to fully master the skills and arts to integrate the various information bits into an optimal quoting setting process. It takes time and persistence to bring stakeholders together and transfer the appropriate knowledge and skills to allow stakeholders to come up with consistently reliable quotas.
to benefit from wildlife through as many means as possible. In this regard, communal conservancies are capitalizing on their recovering wildlife resources through the forms of use (i.e., trophy hunting, own-use meat harvesting, shoot-and-sale, premium hunting, and live game sales) and a range of photographic tourism options (i.e., joint venture lodges, campsites, mobile tours, etc.). Effective management of these multiple (and often incompatible use) requires disciplined spatial and temporal zoning, and the capacity for a conservancy to practice and enforce such rotations.

- Communities Are Part Of -

Many of Namibia’s old-school safari operators do not want to acknowledge or work with communities. However, the future of wildlife on communal lands is dependent upon the attitudes and livelihood strategies of Namibia’s growing rural human population, and it is short-sighted not to recognize the need for communities to become responsible stewards of communal area wildlife. It is predictable that if government is to choose between the hunting industry of the livelihoods of communal area residents that human needs will prevail. Consequently, it is necessary for operators to become strong conservancy partners if the hunting industry is to grow and sustain itself in future years.

7 SUMMARY

In slightly more than a decade, the communal area conservancy movement has made impressive strides towards linking recovering wildlife populations with improved community livelihoods. Namibia’s 55 communal conservancies now cover more than 15% of its land surface and encompass one out of eight Namibia citizens. The conservation success of the conservancies has been documented by rapidly increasing wildlife populations across the communal landscapes, with top of the food chain predators showing extensive expansions of their range. The achievement of such wildlife recoveries (especially of iconic species) would not have been possible without the growing community awareness and appreciation of the value of wildlife.

- Sustainable use of wildlife, largely through trophy hunting, has played a key, catalytic role in conservancy movement, providing almost N$50 million in benefits (cash income, employment, and meat) directly to participating conservancies and their members since the initial establishment of the first four conservancies in 1998. The speed, at which wildlife use benefits have been acquired, combined with the direct and tangible linkages between the use of wildlife and benefits received, has assisted communities to quickly grasp and appreciate the value of wildlife in a very short period of time. Consequently, there is both a growing demand for more conservancies and ever increasing community requests to assist new and emerging conservancies with the establishment of viable game populations.

We have been many lessons learned through trial and error over the past 10 years, but progress has and continues to be made. Some stakeholders have found it difficult to adapt and recognize the validity of communities as key players in wildlife conservation or participants in the hunting industry. However, there can be no denying of the role that conservancies have played in assisting communities to embrace wildlife as an added and diverse livelihood strategy, and the resultant positive consequences to the hunting products on offer in Namibia. With 7 large communal conservancy trophy hunting concessions, and more on the way, Namibia is becoming an internationally recognized big game hunting destination.

- The conservancy movement, though not without its challenges, bodes well for the future of both conservation and development in Namibia and offers examples for others in Africa and the world to emulate.

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A Practical Summary of Experiences after Three Decades of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Africa

“Who are the Lessons Learnt?”

Case Study 5

COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST AND GAME MANAGEMENT IN THE VILLAGE OF “GEBHARDSHAIN”, GERMANY by Rolf D. Baldus

INTRODUCTION

Developing countries, and Africa in particular, are not the only places where cooperative self-help organisations with the objective of sustainable management of natural resources can be found. The author of the main paper has been involved in such activities in his home village in Germany ever since he was a child (quite a considerable period of time). He was aware of applications gained through a lifetime of experience to the CBM and from the very early days of the establishment of the cooperative described here (and still enforced in modern Germany) dates back to the imperial decree of 1890 which starts with the words “We Wilhelm, by the grace of God, King of Prussia …”

Professor Ostrom has analysed a variety of operational case studies of self-organised and self-governed common pool resource programmes from around the world, some of which have been in existence for centuries. She acknowledges that an extraordinary rich case study literature exists and frequently has appeared in “obscure publications” (Ostrom 2008, p.xv). It is but another such case study in an admittedly “obscure publication”.

THE SETTING

Gebhardshain is a village of about 1900 inhabitants situated in a forested low mountain range of the Westerwald (Western Forest), in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate between Frankfurt and Cologne. The nearby Sieg River drains this land into the Rhine, and gives the greater area the name “Siegerland”.

In the late middle ages people ceded out a meagre existence from subsistence agriculture, and poverty was widespread. It is situated in the forest of the previous century, and it is no coincidence that the German and subsequent rural cooperative movement was started here. Friedrich Wilhelm Raiesen (1818 – 1888) created the first credit and savings societies. His cooperative self-help organisations were similar to those of Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Raiesen never achieved international celebrity status, but the global impact of his contributions was far greater over time until today.

Around the late 16th century 4 families of Gebhardshain, which were the majority of inhabitants, established the Hauberg cooperative for the purpose of utilizing the forest in a mutually agreed upon manner. “Hauberg” literally means “the hill where you cut down trees". Each cooperative in the village had its own name, the two more recent ones are referred to as the “member” received one 4 th share of the forest as collective ownership, and the other one described here was simply “Hauberg”, meaning “Forest”. Each family (the subsequent head of that family is referred to as the member) received one 4 th share of the forest as collective ownership, although nobody could lay claim to a specific piece of land.

Siegeland has rich iron ore deposits coming up to the surface, and iron was processed here for tools and arms since about 500 BC. Great quantities of charcoal were needed for those primitive iron ore smelting technologies, and destruction of the forest started back to those ancient times. The forests required hundreds of years to recover yet deforestation was repeated several times over up until the medieval times. As the forest provided such a vital resource of common ownership, shortages that resulted from excessive use attracted a great deal of attention. It is stimulated processes for development of strategies for sustainable use, and evolved into mechanisms that could overcome the “tragedy of the commons” through regulated community access to the forest resources. Once the authorities realised the public benefit of such an order they put it into law. Various decrees have legislated sustainable forestry procedures, the ruling gentry, the Dukes of Nassau and Sayn, in the mid 16th century and later by Imperial Prussian legislation in the 19th century. The legal basis for the cooperative described here (and still enforced in modern Germany) dates back to the imperial decree of 1890 which starts with the words “We Wilhelm, by the grace of God, King of Prussia …”

Villagers of Gebhardshain created three separate forestry cooperatives over the years, and they still exist today. The following document to a simple description of the main cooperative, known as the Hauberg.

MANAGING THE HAUBERG FOREST COOPERATIVELY

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Regeneration cycle of the forest was set at 10 years, and the total Hauberg land was therefore divided in 8 parcels, with only one parcel of land used each year.
Every year each member received one share of forest within the parcel of land selected for use. The lots were distributed by raffle, as the shares were naturally not equal. The drawing of lots was complicated but transparent, as the outcome should be a fair distribution that is acceptable to all members. Members and their families would cut the trees themselves, and in return were entitled to the wood and other by-products.

The typical vegetation consisted of broad-leaved trees, such as oak and birch. Wood was used primarily for charcoal production (for iron ore smelting), but also for domestic energy such as for heating homes in the winter and for cooking purposes. Bark of oak trees was sold to tanneries or bartered for leather, which was then processed into shoes by the village shoemaker. Small branches were collected and woven into baskets and brooms. Bushwood was used for starting/heating the public ovens which were used to bake bread and cakes.

Trees were cut down with axes and a slasher tool typical for this area, similar to the African machete or pangas. These trees would sprout more readily when cut with an axe rather than a saw. In the first two to three years after cutting, the clear cut land was planted with primitive types of grain, as due to poor soils and a harsh climate, the agricultural land did not produce enough to feed the large families. The area of the cut down piece of Hauberg was used as communal pasture for cows which served as draught animals, for milk, and also for meat. As in Africa today, it was the work of the children to tend the cows in the Hauberg, and was amongst my father’s duties as a child around 19:00. There was then alone in about the tenth year the harvest so that the trees could grow until they reached a diameter sufficient to cut and the whole cycle could start over again.

Shares of members were handed down, always to the child, who inherited the house, not necessarily the oldest boy. Shares could be sold, normally to a resident of the village. The cut down piece of Hauberg was used as communal pasture for cows which served as draught animals, for milk, and also for meat. As in Africa today, it was the work of the children to tend the cows in the Hauberg, and was amongst my father’s duties as a child around 19:00. There was then alone in about the tenth year the harvest so that the trees could grow until they reached a diameter sufficient to cut and the whole cycle could start over again.

Shares of members were handed down, always to the child, who inherited the house, not necessarily the oldest boy. Shares could be sold, normally to a resident of the village, but could not be divided. Hauberg Cooperative is a legal entity and can thus conclude contracts and engage in business and economic transactions. All important policy and management decisions are taken by an annual general assembly. Membership elects a managing board, and the Chairman of this board is the Manager of the Hauberg. Hauberg meets regularly to decide on management issues. A local Government forester renders professional advice, and the cooperative pays a prescribed fee, based on the number of hectares, for this service.

Members have always managed to keep public bodies out of the cooperative. e municipality would have liked to acquire shares in order to exert influence, but this was always prevented. e applies in the same way to the other two Hauberg cooperatives in the village. During the Nazi rule (1933–1945), for example, a part of the forest of one of these two cooperatives was expropriated by the fascists. This was due to political reasons rather than to economic reasons.

The Hauberg forest is of great economic importance at the time it was created. Charcoal production lost its prominence in the 19th century due to the availability of more efficient energy sources. The tragedy of the commons resulted in the over-exploitation of natural resources, which had a negative impact on the local economy.

Over the years, the Hauberg has increased in importance again, as many members have gone back to using it for reforestation and for agriculture.

Hunting and wildlife use in the middle ages was the privilege of the higher and lower gentry. Farmers had to pay the costs of living with wildlife in form of crop damage and labour to assist driven hunts. Human-wildlife conflict prevailed, and the right of the common man to hunt or kill wildlife had always been an important demand in all German counties. The Peasants’ War (1524–1526) was a social uprising and rebellion, as in the “Peasants’ Wars” (1524–1526). The right of the common man to hunt or kill wildlife has always been an important demand in all German counties.

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Sale of buffalo meat by village game scouts of a village Wildlife Management Area, Selous Niassa Corridor, Southern Tanzania.

Photo by Rudolf Hahn

Discussing wildlife management with villagers on a market place.

Photo by Rudolf Hahn

Village hunters with a duiker.

Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Villages have a quota for hunting crocodiles: skinning crocodiles.

Photo by Ludwig Siege

People must live side by side with dangerous animals.

Photo by Ludwig Siege

Communities can benefit from trophy hunting: Roosevelt sable from a village hunting area.

Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Villages carry meat from a community hunt back home.

Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Village game scouts in Ngarambe Village with poachers they caught.

Photo by Rolf D. Baldus
ANNEX

Village Wildlife Committee debates wildlife management issues
Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Village game scouts have collected snares
Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Members of a wildlife committee with impounded wire snares and a muzzle loader
Photo by Rudolf Hahn

Village game scouts preparing for a foot patrol in a wildlife management area
Photo by Rudolf Hahn

Village game scouts have collected snares
Photo by Rolf D. Baldus

Interviewing women who trade with fish
Photo by Rudolf Hahn

Burning nylon snares
Photo by Rudolf Hahn