Final Report of the Review of Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana

Volume 1: Main findings

A study carried out for the National CBNRM Forum

September 2003
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## VOLUME 1: MAIN FINDINGS

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Abbreviations

AA  Appropriate Authority (Zimbabwe)
ADMADE  Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (Zambia)
AWF  African Wildlife Foundation
BOCOBONET  Botswana Community-Based Organisation Network
BOCONGO  Botswana Council of Non-Government Organisations
BWMA  Botswana Wildlife Management Association
CBNRM  Community-Based Natural Resources Management
CBO  Community-Based Organisation
CBTE  Community-Based Tourism Enterprise
CCF  Community Conservation Fund
CPP  Community Private Sector Partnership
CSD  Community Services Division
CDSW  Community Development and Social Welfare
CEDA  Citizen Economic Development Agency
CECT  Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust
CEG  Community Escort Guide
CHA  Controlled Hunting Area
CITES  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CPA  Communal Property Association (South Africa)
DDP  District Development Plan
DET  District Extension Team
DLUPU  District Land Use Planning Unit
DNR  Department of Natural Resources (Zimbabwe)
DWNP  Department of Wildlife and National Parks
DNPWLM  Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (Zimbabwe)
EHF  Environmental Heritage Foundation
EU  European Union
GAM  Game Management Areas (Zambia)
GEF  Global Environmental Facility
HATAB  Hospitality and Tourism Association of Botswana
IFS  Integrated Field Services
IUCN  World Conservation Union
IRDP  Integrated Rural Development Programme
JVA  Joint Venture Agreement
JVP  Joint Venture Partnership
KCS  Kalahari Conservation Society
KDT  Khwai Development Trust
KyT  Kgetsi ya Tsie
MET  Ministry of Environment and Tourism (Namibia)
MEWT  Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism
NKXT  Ngwaa Khobee Xeja Trust
NACOBTA  Namibian Community Based Tourism Association
NACSO  Namibian Community Support Organisation
NCSA  National Conservation Strategy Co-ordinating Agency
NDP  National Development Plan
NGO  Non-Government Organisation
NRM  Natural Resources Management
NRMP  Natural Resources Management Project
PAC  Problem Animal Control
PACT  Private Agencies Collaborating Together
RADP  Remote Area Development Programme
RALE  Representative, Accountable and Legal Entity
RDC  Rural Development Council (RDC)
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Recommended brief citation of the report:
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Acknowledgements

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The CBNRM Review has benefited from the support and input of many people in the CBNRM villages, private companies, government officers and non-government organisations.

We are particularly indebted to the people from Khwai, Lerala and other Tswapong villages, Sankuyo, Ncaang, Ngwatle and Ukhwi. They participated actively and talked frankly in the group discussions. We also received a lot of co-operation from the CBO Boards and other village institutions, including the village headmen and chiefs and extension workers.

We are also indebted to HCH and Rann Hunting Safaris for their contribution to the case studies. During fieldwork, we ran into the project manager of Safari Botswana Bounds, who kindly shared his views with us in Hukuntsi.

The two case study NGOs were very co-operative in group discussions and availing material to us. We are very grateful to the Kalahari Conservation Society and Thusano Lefatsheng.

While many government departments have supported the review study, we would like to mention the role of DWNP in particular. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks chaired the Review Reference Committee, and aided the review in many other ways, both in Gaborone as well as in the Districts (Hukuntsi, Maun and Serowe). The membership of the Review Reference Committee included the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, Agricultural Resources Board, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of Local Government, Department of Lands, District Councils, Land Boards, BOCOBONET, NGOs, HATAB and BWMA, donors, national CBNRM Forum and CBNRM Support Programme. We are gratefully for their comments and valuable ideas.

We are also indebted to the IUCN Botswana office and the CBNRM Support Programme for facilitating the review and acting as the secretariat of the Review Reference Committee. Thanks a lot Masego Madzwamuse, Cathrine Wirbelauer and Nico Rozemeijer.

As so many people and institutions have assisted the review, we have not even attempted to acknowledge everyone. For the ‘great collective’ that we have not mentioned by name, we are very grateful for your support, and hope that you will find that the time invested in the Review is rewarded in a report that will contribute towards the establishment of a strong CBNRM programme and that will lead to more and better CBNRM projects in future.

Jaap Arntzen,
Team leader,
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and study’s objectives

Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects have mushroomed in Botswana during the 1990s. While their unique blend of environmental, economic and social potential is being recognised, concerns have been growing that the projects are not yet mature, and cannot yet sustain themselves. In addition, concerns have grown about community’s abilities to manage the substantial resource revenues and productive activities. Questions have been raised about the capacity of CBNRM support organisation. Many donors have withdrawn, leaving gaps in the support network that were not always filled. Finally, the rural development and conservation principles and impacts are being questioned.

For these reasons, the CBNRM National Forum commissioned in April 2003 a study to review Botswana’s Community-Based Natural Resource Management projects. The contract was awarded to the Centre for Applied Research, Gaborone.

The objectives of the review are threefold, to:

- Review the progress made so far with respect to the implementation of the CBNRM projects;
- Analyse the current problems and constraints of CBNRM projects; and
- Recommend improvements.

The specific objectives are to:

1. Analyse the design, evolution and current state of CBNRM in Botswana;
2. Describe and analyse the CBNRM-related objectives of all stakeholders, their capacity to achieve these objectives and progress made to-date;
3. Analyse interests of stakeholders (conflicts and concurrence) and other obstacles to successful CBNRM implementation;
4. Recommend ways of removing obstacles, including enhancing concurrence of stakeholder interests, and of creating favourable conditions for CBNRM implementation;
5. Recommend CBNRM-related capacity building efforts of all parties involved;
6. Analyse the contribution of CBNRM to resource conservation and recommend improvements;
7. Analyse the CBNRM potential for economic development and diversification and recommend improvements at community and district level; and
8. Analyse the linkages between CBNRM and rural livelihood priorities and recommend methods to improve CBNRM contribution to such priorities.

The study has three main foci, i.e. the policy/legislative context, the review of project achievements and impacts, and the organisational capacity analysis.
1.2 Methodology

An attachment to the Contract, specified that the following eight case studies would need to be considered during the study:

- Four Community-Based Organisations (CBO): the veld product-based Kgetsi ya Tsie (KyT) and three wildlife-based Trusts (Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust or STMT, Khwai Development Trust or KDT and Ngwaa Khobee Xeja Trust or NKXT);
- Two private companies involved in joint venture agreements. The first one was HCH, the joint venture partner of STMT in NG 34; the second company was Rann Hunting Safaris, the joint venture partner of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust CH1); and
- Two Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) that support CBNRM projects (KCS and Thusano Lefatsheng).

Brief characteristics of the case study CBOs are given in Table 1.1. STMT is the oldest CBO, and NKXT and KDT\(^1\) the youngest. Two of these deal with multiple settlements (STMT and NKXT). All wildlife-based CBOs have hunting and photo-safari rights. STMT and NKXT have a five-year joint venture agreement with a private company (HCH and Safari Botswana Bounds respectively); KDT sells its hunting rights annually by auction. Three of the four CBOs have a head-lease from the Land Board; KyT does not possess exclusive resource rights.

Table 1.1: Details of case study CBOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area and date of registration</th>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>Natural resources</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NG 34 29(^{th}) of November 1995 Lodge in NG 32</td>
<td>Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT)</td>
<td>Wildlife, scenery</td>
<td>Sankuyo</td>
<td>Hunting and photo-safaris in WMA</td>
<td>Exclusive rights through 15 year head-lease from Land Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG 18 (and two lodges in NG 19) 2(^{nd}) of March 2000</td>
<td>Khwai Development Trust (KDT)</td>
<td>Wildlife, scenery</td>
<td>Khwai settlement</td>
<td>Hunting and photo safaris in WMA</td>
<td>Exclusive rights through 15 year head-lease from Land Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswapong Hills 1(^{st}) of February 1999</td>
<td>Kgetsi ya Tsie (KyT)</td>
<td>Veld products</td>
<td>2 villages</td>
<td>Collection and processing of veld products</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KD1 10(^{th}) of June 1998</td>
<td>Ngwaa Khobee Xeja Trust (NKXT)</td>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>Ukhwi, Ncaang and Ngwatle</td>
<td>Hunting and photo safaris in WMA</td>
<td>Exclusive rights through 15 year head-lease from Land Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\) Formal registration of KDT was delayed until a controversial clause in its original constitution was removed.
The CBOs were visited during the months of July-August, and focus group discussions were held with the Boards, employees and different segments of villagers (e.g. youth, women, men, extension workers). In addition, Trust documents, Board records and books were reviewed.

The Terms of Reference further indicated that District workshops be held in three Districts (Ngamiland, Kgalagadi and Central Districts). These were conducted in August, with participation from the private sector, CBOs, NGOs and government staff. The number of participants varied from around twenty in Kgalagadi to sixty in Ngamiland.

The following methods have been employed:

- Secondary data collection through literature review and analysis of existing statistics;
- Interviews with key informants;
- Primary data collection through the case studies and district workshops. Primary data collection was guided by checklists and PRA schedules;
- A mail questionnaire was sent out to over one hundred stakeholders so as to offer each stakeholder the opportunity to make inputs into the CBNRM review. Regrettably, the return was poor, an therefore stakeholders missed an opportunity to give their opinion; and
- Comparative CBNRM review of Namibia, Zimbabwe and other SADC countries.

The study started in April 2003 and was concluded in September 2003, and represented a total of 150 person days; of which at least 50 were spent on fieldwork and district consultations.

1.3 Organisational structure

A Review Reference Committee (RRC) chaired by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and with the IUCN Country Office as its secretariat was established to monitor the study’s progress and directions. The following institutions were represented in the RRC: Department of Wildlife and National Parks, Agricultural Resources Board, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of Local Government, Department of Lands, District Councils, Land Boards, BOCOBONET, NGOs, HATAB and BWMA, donors, national CBNRM Forum and CBNRM Support Programme.

The Centre for Applied Research formed an experienced multidisciplinary team with its core in Botswana and with contributions from Namibia and Zimbabwe. The team composition and responsibilities are summarised in Table 1.2.

Prior to this report, an inception report was written in May and an Issues and Options Report in July. The latter constituted the basis for the District workshop and subsequent CBNRM-analysis.

1.4 Report structure

Chapter two discusses the background to and current situation of CBNRM projects in Botswana.
Chapter three contains the findings of the stakeholder capacity analysis. The chapter discusses the roles, performance and strengths and weaknesses of the direct stakeholders (i.e. CBOs and private companies involved in joint venture agreements) as well as those of support organisations such as NGOs, government institutions and donors. It further discusses the interactions between the main stakeholders and areas of conflict and concurrence.

Table 1.2: Composition and responsibilities of consultancy team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Primary areas of responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. J.W. Arntzen</td>
<td>Team leader and project management, analytical framework + checklists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic impacts, Environment and Sustainable Development, case studies-fieldwork, workshops, synthesis of findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. D. K. Molokomme</td>
<td>Organisational capacity analysis, PRA development, gender issues, case studies-fieldwork, Facilitation workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. E. Terry-Namibia</td>
<td>Organisational capacity analysis, tourism and marketing, Namibian CBNRM experience, case studies-fieldwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. D. Mazambani-Zimbabwe</td>
<td>CAMPFIRE-experience, SADC experiences with respect to CBNRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. N. M. Moleele</td>
<td>Environmental review of CBNRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. O. Tshosa</td>
<td>Policy/legal review of CBNRM in Botswana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter four discusses the socio-economic impacts of CBNRM projects at the local as well as national level. It reviews the projects’ contributions to rural livelihood, and examines ways of enhancing and diversifying the revenue basis of CBOs.

Chapter five reviews the environmental impacts of CBNRM projects, primarily based on secondary data sources, interviews, and views expressed during focus group discussions.

Chapter six reviews the current policy and legislative framework of CBNRM projects. It identifies gaps and areas of overlap, and recommends improvements.

Chapter seven puts the previous chapters that focus on Botswana in a regional perspective. The chapter discusses the main features and achievements of other CBNRM programmes in southern Africa, in particular those in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Chapter eight offers a synthesis of the main findings and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO
CBNRM PROJECTS IN BOTSWANA

2.1 The history of CBNRM in Botswana

The CBNRM approach was pioneered in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. CBNRM was subsequently introduced in Botswana in 1989 by the USAID-funded NRMP project (1989-1999), which was located within the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP).

The following major milestones can be identified in the CBNRM projects:

- 1993: first CBNRM project;
- 1998: formation of BOCOBONET;
- 1999: NRMP discontinued. Formation of the National CBNRM Forum;
- 2002: CBNRM approach recognised in the revised Rural Development Policy;
- 2003: DWNP suspends quota for some CBOs.

The first CBNRM projects started in 1993 in the Chobe Enclave, when the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) engaged in a joint venture agreement. The number of CBNRM projects has grown rapidly during the 1990s and according to the CBNRM Status Report 2001 46 Trusts have been registered in a total of eight districts covering 130 villages and around 40,000 people. Thus, an average of four CBOs have been formed per annum, and the number is growing.

The DWNP remained the lead government agency in terms of policy development and government support for CBOs through its Community Services and Extension Department. It has also taken the lead in the drafting of the CBNRM policy with important inputs from the Ministry of Agriculture and the National CBNRM Forum.

The CBNRM landscape diversified in the late 1990s. In 1998, the CBOs decided to establish an umbrella organisation that could serve their common interest (BOCOBNET). The CBNRM Support Programme was established in 1999 by IUCN-Botswana and SNV to act as a CBNRM focal point, exchange information and improve dialogue among stakeholders. The CBNRM Support Programme filled some of the gap left by the NRMP. In 2000, the National CBNRM Forum was established to bring together all CBNRM stakeholders and to discuss issues of common interests, identify constraints and ways forward.

Table 2.1 offers a more detailed time line of the CBNRM projects and movement in Botswana.

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2 More recent data are not yet available. The CBNRM Support Programme is working on an up-date for the 2002 CBNRM Status Report.
Table 2.1: Timeline of the CBNRM projects and movement in Botswana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>No of registered CBO</th>
<th>No of JVA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>NRMP, based within DWNP, started to lay foundation for CBNRM. NRMP and DWNP) has been instrumental in the following areas: Policy development, Preparation of management plans for CHAs and WMAs; CBNRM pilot enterprises</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Preparation for first CBO and JVP started</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>First CBO and joint venture agreement concluded (CECT)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Government support and promotes the CBO-JVA model for wildlife resources</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Joint venture guidelines published by NRMP-DWNP.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Community-based rural development strategy launched, but seemingly without much impact on the CBNRM projects</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>BOCOBONET was established to represent the interests of the CBOs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>NRMP ends after investing US$ 25 million or $2.5 M per annum. DWNP continues to be the lead support agency of CBNRM through its Community Services and Extension department. Revised Join Venture Guidelines Launch of CBNRM support programme by SNV and IUCN Botswana. The programmes objectives are to: 1. establish a focal point for CBNRM in Botswana; 2. To make an inventory of CBNRM project approaches and best practices, and to disseminate knowledge and information; 3. Improve the dialogue between CBOs, NGOs, private sector and government. The National CBNRM Forum organised conferences on community mobilisation, enterprise development and natural resources monitoring.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The National CBNRM forum was established and a first national meeting was held in May 2000. The Forum published the 1999/2000 CBNRM Status Report. The CBNRM Support Programme produced four occasional papers (CBNRM approaches in southern Africa, community benefits, perceived land rights and legal rights)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Savingram to recentralise to district level some aspects of CBNRM, particularly financial management and control The second National CBNRM Forum Meeting was held in November 2001 The CBNRM Support Programme published two occasional papers (women’s involvement and joint venture options)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The CBNRM Support Programme published the proceeding of the 2nd National CBNRM Forum Conference and the CBNRM Status Report 2001. The Programme published three occasional papers (CECT case study, CBNRM facilitation guide, guide to start tourism business) Revised Rural Development Policy recognises the role of CBNRM in rural development, and recommends community management in designated areas.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Draft CBNRM Policy in March CBNRM review starts in April CBNRM Support Network publishes four occasional papers (e.g. on economic aspects of CBNRM and labour).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 The current CBNRM situation in Botswana

Botswana’s CBNRM projects are now found in eight of the ten rural administrative districts. Over half of them are found in western and northern Botswana. The spatial distribution of CBNRM Trusts and projects is given in Table 2.2. While the projects are fairly evenly spread over rural Botswana, the direct financial benefits for communities from joint venture agreement (JVA) are concentrated in Ngamiland and Chobe.

In 2002, twelve joint venture agreements existed, which generated an estimated P 8.1 million in direct financial revenues to CBOs in 2002 or P 735 722 per CBO (no data for 1 JVA). This is a substantial increase of revenues from the mid 1990s, which were on average below P 200 000 per CBO. Increased competition among private operators, better awareness on the part of CBOs and their support organisations of the wildlife value and better mechanism to realise the wildlife value are responsible for this increase.

Table 2.2: Spatial distribution of CBNRM projects and benefits (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chobe/Ngamiland</th>
<th>Kgalagadi/Ghanzi</th>
<th>Eastern Botswana</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of registered CBOs</td>
<td>14 (29.8%)</td>
<td>11 (23.4%)</td>
<td>22 (46.8)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues received from JVA</td>
<td>P 7 065 000 (96.5%)</td>
<td>P 185 000 (2.5%)</td>
<td>P 74 000 (1.0)</td>
<td>7 324 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefiting Population</td>
<td>28 371 (63.5%)</td>
<td>5 150 (11.5%)</td>
<td>11 180 (11.8%)</td>
<td>44 701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most CBOs heavily depend on revenues from joint venture agreements. According to the CBNRM Status Report 2001, CBOs managed to increase their JVA-revenues by 24.6%. The CBOs employ just fewer than one thousand persons with an average employment of 21 employees per Trust in 2001. These employment figures exclude the members of some of the CBOs that are self-employed and sell to the Trust (e.g. close to 1 000 Kgetsi ya Tsie members).

The significant growth of CBNRM projects is shown in Figure 2.1.

2.3 The nature of CBNRM projects

Due to its history and the strong DWNP support, CBNRM projects are often equated with wildlife projects, be it hunting, photo safaris or both. This perception is wrong, even though wildlife-based projects constitute the majority of projects and generate the highest revenues. CBNRM projects also comprise projects that are based on the utilisation of veld products. Moreover, an increasing number of CBNRM projects engage in wildlife and veld products utilisation as well as cultural activities. It is important to recognise the diverse nature of CBNRM projects.
The review has used the following description of a CBNRM project:

**a project or activity, where a community (one village or a group of villages) organise themselves in such a way that they derive benefits from the utilisation of local natural resources and are actively involved in their use as well as conservation. Communities form an institution that is responsible on their behalf for the utilisation and conservation of local natural resources. Often (but not always), communities will receive exclusive rights and responsibilities from government.**

The spatial boundaries of CBNRM projects follow standard administrative wildlife categories, and are not determined locally. For non-wildlife CBNRM projects, the spatial boundaries are not explicitly defined, and therefore communities do not hold exclusive resource use rights.

### 2.4 CBNRM procedures

The procedure for wildlife-based CBNRM projects in Botswana is as follows. First, land-use planning and DWNP determine best uses for Wildlife Management Areas and community Controlled Hunting Areas (CHA): hunting, photo safaris or multiple purpose areas. Subsequently, land and resource use and management plans are prepared for these areas. Communities are mobilised and workshops are held to discuss procedures, roles and responsibilities of communities and management groups (Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 1999). A community wildlife off-take quota from DWNP and a resource-use lease (that includes a tourism concession) from the Land Board are required for each wildlife-based CBNRM project. In order to get community quotas and a head lease, the communities need to have established a management entity—a representative, accountable and legal entity or RALE, which needs to be approved by District Authorities.
In order to get the quota and resource rights, communities need to accommodate the interests of remote area dwellers, who previously held special game licenses, and to adhere to joint venture guidelines (Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 1999). If communities fail to adhere to guidelines and plans, the quota may be withheld by DWNP, as happened for the first time in 2003.

Veld product-based CBNRM projects may operate without any special permission as long as the project does not harvest grapple and other veld products governed by the 1974 Agricultural Resources Conservation Act. Because of the lack of knowledge about the commercial potential of most veld products, the incentives to start such projects have been low historically.

2.5 The CBNRM potential of Botswana

CBNRM approaches have been adopted in most Southern African countries (cf. chapter seven). Jones (2003) argues that it is important that CBNRM activities are based on comparative advantages to ensure long-term economic, social and environmental sustainability. Botswana shares with other southern African countries that it has (had) indigenous development systems, which are based on local resources and involve communities, for example through kgotlas. Botswana has several additional advantages, including:

- The large portion of communal areas, leaving lots of land for CBNRM and offering tourists vast wilderness areas;
- Varied and abundant wildlife resources. While wildlife resources went down in the 1980s, they recovered and stabilised in the 1990s;
- Attractive and renowned Parks and Game Reserves. In 2003, three Botswana Parks/Reserves (Moremi, Chobe and Gemsbok) featured in the top ten list of African parks (Getaway magazine);
- Low population density which offers good conditions for wildlife resources and wilderness experiences; and
- A democratic tradition, good governance, a positive international image, and liberal foreign exchange regime.

2.6 Concluding remarks

CBNRM projects have rapidly grown during the 1990s; the main incentive probably being the substantial financial benefits from wildlife-based CBNRM projects around the Okavango and Chobe. JVAs appear to have been the engines of revenue growth.

While CBNRM projects remain strongly associated with wildlife resources, they have diversified to veld products and cultural activities. At present, CBNRM is a ‘group of fairly diverse projects’ with the common denominator of a village institution in control of resource utilisation and conservation.

During the late 1990s, several CBNRM support and lobby organisations (BOCOBONET, National CBNRM Forum and CBNRM Support Programme) were established and DWNP established an extension department in support of CBNRM.
Despite the development of ‘bits and pieces’ of CBNRM policy (e.g. joint venture guidelines), there is no overall CBNRM policy as yet, nor umbrella legislation. The CBNRM projects remain in the sphere of natural resource conservation and have not yet sufficiently linked up with community-based development initiatives such as the Community-Based Rural Development Strategy, the Revised Rural Development Policy and the Remote Area Development Programme.
CHAPTER THREE
CBNRM STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results of the stakeholder capacity analysis. It reviews the roles and performance of the direct stakeholders, i.e. CBOs and private companies involved in JVAs, and of support organisations such as government, non-government organisations and donors.

The analysis also covers the performance of the various stakeholders with respect to CBNRM, and reviews their strengths, weaknesses and opportunities and strengths.

Relationships between the stakeholders are also discussed in terms of concurrence and conflicts.

The analysis is based on focus group discussions for the four case study CBOs, the literature review, and interviews with key persons and case studies of HCH, Rann Hunting Safaris, KCS and Thusano Lefatsheng. In addition, views expressed during the District workshops have been used.

The chapter starts discussing the CBOs (section 3.2) and the private sector companies involved in JVAs (3.3). Section 3.4 deals with government and NGOs while section 3.5 examines the role of donors. Section 3.6 looks at the interactions between stakeholders, while section 3.7 contains conclusions.

Figure 3.1 shows a simplified organogram of the organisational structure of the CBNRM process in Botswana. It shows the CBOs and private companies as the direct stakeholders and government, NGOs and donors as support organisations. In addition, there are three lobby organisations, representing interests of direct stakeholders, i.e. BOCOBONET for CBOs and HATAB and BWMA for private companies. The CBNRM Support Programme offers additional support to CBOs, and draws upon NGOs, Government and donors. Finally, the National CBNRM Forum has been formed to promote CBNRM dialogue and progress (see Table 2.1). All direct and support stakeholders are represented in the Forum. Despite its strategic importance, it has been left out of Figure 3.1 to avoid making it too complex.

3.2 Community-based organisations

3.2.1 Introduction

The forty-six (2001 figure) Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) are the key to CBNRM in Botswana. A snapshot of their objectives, areas of interest and

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3 Government also holds overall responsibility for promoting development and resource conservation.
4 CBOs are a form of community organisation, which involves people, groups of people, a community or groups of villages coming together to achieve shared development and conservation goals.

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Final report of the CBNRM Review Study
activities was made for twenty-five CBOs, for which sufficient information was found.

*Figure 3.1:* The organisation structure of CBNRM in Botswana

Notes:

Final report of the CBNRM Review Study
Interactions among direct stakeholders:
Linkages with external stakeholders and government
The CBNRM National Forum could not be fitted into the diagram
Most CBOs are organised in Trusts (23); one is not yet registered and another one was a cooperative. Nine of the twenty-five CBOs were located in Ngamiland, and fifteen were multiple village CBOs.

Resource conservation and improving livelihoods are the most common areas of interest (24 and 22 CBOs respectively). Other common areas of interest include craft production and marketing (15); sustainable use of natural resources (14); community-based tourism (10); wildlife utilisation (10); sustainable use of veld products (8); and environmental education of communities (6).

CBOs have clearly articulated objectives, most of which are closely related to improving people’s livelihoods through the use of natural resources. The development objectives include:

- Gaining benefits through the sustainable use of natural resources;
- Promotion of community-based tourism activities;
- Sustainable use and marketing of veld products for community benefit; and
- Promotion of craft production and marketing.

The environmental objectives include:

- Protection and conservation of natural resources;
- Community education on the importance of and wise management of natural resources;
- Safeguarding the cultural heritage of the people associated with the area; and
- Conservation and sustainable use of areas of historical, archaeological and biological importance for the benefit of communities.

A few CBOs have objectives that relate to resource monitoring, and only one of the twenty-five has a research objective. Although the preservation of biodiversity is implicit in some of the CBO objectives, only one CBO has an objective of “ensuring that the natural processes of the ecology of the area proceed unhampered.”

CBOs have a wide array of roles and activities related to CBNRM, including:

- Identifying, managing and using local natural resources;
- Development of a range of plant-based natural resource products that are produced and marketed;
- Auctioning or tendering of hunting quota;
- Managing or leasing out photographic tourism operations;
- Using part of the quota for community game licences;
- Managing community camp sites;
- Propagation, collection and sale of veld resources, including fish;
- Using natural resources in craft production and marketing crafts;
- Running tourist attractions, historical, archaeological scenic tours; and
- Running cultural villages and cultural tourism operations.

3.2.2 Ability to meet the objectives and progress to date
The performance of CBOs varies and is primarily determined by their capacity, which in turn depends on stage of development; quality and quantity of the resource base; revenues generated by their CBNRM projects; mechanisms for equitable benefit sharing; availability of support; and effectiveness of CBO management structures. Generally, the CBOs assessed are only partially meeting their long-term objectives, as listed in section 3.2.1.

There appears to be a strong relationship between the stage of organisational development and CBO capacity. The ability of CBOs to respond to the changes in their internal and external environments is another factor that influences their organisational capacity. Largely because of their short period of operation and infancy of their operations, newly formed CBOs generally lag behind in terms of the achievement of the objectives. However, given factors such as access to funding and technical support they successfully meet their short-term objectives such as the establishment of a legal entity and representative community structures, legal access to resources, and the development of management plans. Some of the more established CBOs have gone beyond the establishment stage, and are involved in the implementation of projects. Of course, there are exceptions to the above generalisations. Some CBOs have been in existence for a significant number of years, but are not performing well. In contrast, others that have been established recently are performing well. The inconsistent performance of older and more recently established CBOs shows that organisational capacity changes over the life-time of organisations, and is determined by the ability of organisations to effectively respond to the challenges they meet in both their internal and external environment.

Poor performance of CBOs is mainly attributable to the lack of capacity in several key components of organisational effectiveness. It is important to note that at this stage no CBO can be expected to excel in all components. Some of the key capacity gaps experienced by the majority of CBOs is insufficient management skills, insufficiently developed management and administrative procedures, weak leadership and governance structures, inadequate financial management and controls, insufficiently developed human resource base, insufficient project development and management expertise.

Although some of the achievements that follow manifest themselves as weaknesses in other respects, CBOs as a group have had the following accomplishments:

- The establishment of legal entities to provide leadership and oversight to CBNRM projects;
- CBNRM organisations have been established and are consulted on issues of national and CBNRM development in their communities;
- CBNRM projects have been identified, established and are to varying levels of success being implemented;
- Wildlife-based CBNRM initiatives have identified Joint Venture Agreements, which have generated revenues and employment;
- Some CBOs have developed successful tourism enterprises;
- CBNRM projects are to varying levels of success having positive socio-economic and environmental impacts in their management areas (see chapters four and five for details);
Some skills development has taken place in areas such as cleaning, guiding, waiting, cooking, skinning, craft production, veld-products processing and to a limited extent tourism management;

- A significant number of CBOs have developed management plans for their areas.
- Networking and co-operation has assisted the formation of some CBOs; lesson-sharing on comparative CBNRM projects within Botswana and the region has to some extent enhanced the project development;
- A significant number of CBOs have established mutually beneficial relationships with the NGO sector. CBOs have to different levels of success benefited from access to funding, advisory support and capacity building;
- Wildlife-based CBOs have overall strengthened their relationship with the DWNP. This has primarily occurred through the creation of the Community Liaison Office within DWNP, which has been instructive in changing the image of DWNP as an exclusively “policing” institution.
- Largely through the assistance of NGOs, CBO’s have been successful at acquiring development funding from donor agencies to establish and/or expand CBNRM projects.
- Through the efforts of BOCOBONET and the CBNRM Forum Structures, a significant proportion of wildlife-based CBOs have participated in the policy dialogue and have played an active role in lobbying and advocacy on issues of importance to CBNRM.

With regard to the image and legitimacy of CBOs, the perceptions of community members, co-operating NGOs, government departments and donors whose opinions were sought were mixed. Of the twenty-five CBOs, only fourteen could be assessed on this component. Generally, the criteria used to judge a CBO is its economic performance to include prudent financial management, the direct benefits that accrue to members or the community and the extent to which its leadership is transparent and democratic. Of the fourteen CBOs five were considered legitimate and having a positive impact on the community while four were viewed as evolving and showing an average image. The remaining five CBOs were perceived as having a negative image primarily because the trusts were at that point in time bankrupt and the Boards were either ineffective or considered corrupt and not representative of the diversity of the community.

3.2.3 CBO strengths and weaknesses

The CBO capacity was assessed in five performance areas: internal environment, sustainability, CBNRM views, benefits and capacity in various areas of interest (tourism, NRM). Table 3.1 summarises the results of the assessment, which is based on literature, key informant interviews and the field work in the four CBOs selected as case studies for the review. The afore-mentioned data sources formed the basis of the consultancy team’s analysis of CBO strengths and weaknesses. A scoring of 1 to 4 (1 poor; 2 average; 3 good; and 4 very good) was used to measure the capacity of CBOs in the five performance areas. All individual components in the five performance areas were given an equal weighting (total of 42) and scored to establish strengths and weaknesses.

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Some of these relationships have been halted as a result of lack of capacity to continue providing support or because of misunderstandings and conflict.
While this approach is an attempt to clarify strengths and weaknesses in a succinct and semi quantitative manner, it should be realised that the results are indicative, and the relative scores are more important than the absolute ones.

**Table 3.1: Analysis of CBO strengths and weaknesses (no. of CBOs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review Component</th>
<th>STRONG</th>
<th>WEAK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Internal Environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure (offices, lodges, hunting camps, campsites, etc.)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology (computers, office equipment)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational structure &amp; development (HR, management, planning, leadership)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance (decision making, transparency, representative, accountable)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic plan / annual plans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Sustainability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short &amp; long term sustainability plans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from membership, clients, community</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial &amp; fundraising capacity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. View of CBNRM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of CBNRM Concept</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation of CBNRM Concept</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Benefits from CBNRM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits from CBNRM to organisation (financial, material, social, intrinsic)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits distribution (decision making, transparency, equity)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of benefits (investments, com. Projects, new enterprises, HH distribution)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy input/ formulation/review</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy &amp; legislation awareness</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy &amp; Lobbying</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering &amp; Disseminating Information</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking &amp; Co-operation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict management &amp; mediation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal writing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendering</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical skills (in general)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify viable business options</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR management</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tourism related skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of what tourists want/expect</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resource Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify resources</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify use of resources</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct resource inventories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.1 provides the review components and the total number of CBOs that demonstrated strengths and weaknesses. The areas of relative strengths will be discussed first, followed by areas of weaknesses.

While Table 3.1 presents an overall summary of the performance of the CBO world, Figure 3.2 summarises the strengths and weaknesses score of each of the twenty-five CBOs individually. There is high variation in the net scores that range from 14 to 77 or a variation ratio of 1:5.5. Six CBOs score below 20; thirteen score between twenty-one and fifty and seven above 50%.

**Figure 3.2:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of CBOs</th>
<th>% score (no. of strengths divided by total no. of strengths and weaknesses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>83.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>84.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>84.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>84.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>84.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>84.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>84.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>84.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>84.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the method of scoring is explained in the text.

**Common areas of strengths**
The main areas were many CBOs are showing improvements and some capacity include:
- Infrastructure development;
- Technology;
- Support from membership; and
- Understanding and appreciation of CBNRM as an approach that can improve livelihoods while at the same time conserving natural resources for future generations.
With regard to the capacity of CBOs to meet their objectives and to carry out CBNRM activities, the areas in which more CBOs demonstrate capacity rather than weakness include awareness of and input to policy as well as advocacy and lobbying. BOCOBONET, the National CBNRM Forum and NGOs have played a pivotal role in promoting the participation of CBOs in issues of policy as well as advocacy and lobbying strategies on issues of concern to the sector. For example, CBOs have made inputs in or comments on the draft CBNRM policy, the moratorium declared on the hunting of lions, the Botswana Elephant Management Policy and Strategy, and the Ministry of Local Government savingram that sought to transfer the management of CBO revenues to District Councils. CBOs were also involved in lobbying CITES on the ban on trading in elephant products.

CBOs are also strong in the area of networking and co-operation. Again through BOCOBONET and support NGOs, CBOs have been involved in exchanges to similar organisations in Botswana and the region. Such exchanges have strengthened existing CBOs and assist new ones to learn lessons from others. Botswana CBOs also host CBNRM projects from other countries in the region (e.g. Sankuyo and KyT). CBOs have also established relationships with the private sector, NGOs and government departments.

Some of the areas that feature as a CBO strength are in fact strongly supported by and dependent on NGOs. This demonstrates the value and necessity of CBO support. These areas include the following:

- Proposal writing. The CBO strength often lies with the NGOs that provide support or with the advisors that the CBO uses or hires;
- Identification of viable business options, almost exclusively through support organisations and consultants;
- Access to donor funding. Funding, however, has relied heavily on efforts of support NGOs, the DWNP and funding agencies; and
- Identification of potential of natural resources such as morula products, craftwork and thatching grass. CBOs almost always require substantial external support for this.

Common areas of weaknesses

The majority of CBOs are registered as trusts and implementing the organisational structure of CBOs has been difficult. The majority show deficiencies at the staffing and operational level. An example is STMT, which has a clearly defined structure where the members and board are concerned, but lacks the same clarity in operational terms of who is the most senior amongst staff, reporting relationships and lines of communication. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of CBOs do not employ qualified managers. Organisational implementation deficiencies coupled with ineffective management practices have affected strategic and annual planning, the development of administrative policies and procedures and human resources development.

Other organisational management problems include micro-management by the Board. In some CBOs, employees, including managers, face constant interference in day-to-day management of CBOs from sometimes-illiterate Board members. Policymaking and administration are not clearly separated, adversely affecting the CBO management. The consequences of such structural deficiencies include low motivation amongst the general
membership and employees, late and inappropriate decisions, conflicts and lack of co-
ordination and inadequate adaptive capacity to respond to changes.

Another weakness is that most Deeds of Trust are written in highly technical language and have not been translated into local languages. Although there is evidence that community members are consulted during the drafting of constitutions, CBOs have not been effective at ensuring ongoing awareness building and understanding of constitutions.

Although some CBOs demonstrate a participatory management style and membership is involved in decision-making, the majority of CBOs shows serious deficiencies in this area. Some CBOs for example, are facing serious financial problems, but have failed to keep the general membership abreast of the challenges. This adversely affects the ‘sense of ownership’ of the CBO by the general membership.

Allegations of abuse of power and concentrating decision-making by a few individuals are rife in some CBOs. Transparency in the employment and benefit sharing practices of some trusts are perceived as unfair. In multiple villages the issue of dominance of one community over the other and the perceived favouritism of individuals from that particular community raises concern. In this regard, ethnicity also plays a major role in the perceptions about the accountability and the extent to which the governance structure is representative.

Organisational monitoring is another area of weakness in CBOs. This weakness is also caused by the absence of strategic and annual plans that could be monitored on a regular basis. Monitoring of organisational progress generally occurs on issues of current affairs and not on clear objectives that the CBO may have set for itself at the beginning of the year. Although management plans may exist for some CBOs, they are not necessarily used as guiding documents and very limited monitoring and review of these plans takes place.

The issue of benefit distribution is another grey area in CBOs. The fact that few CBOs distribute benefits directly to households has meant that CBNRM revenues are not having the desired impact on the incomes of vulnerable groups. Another weakness is that none of the CBOs have developed a clear, long-term benefits distribution plan.

Few CBOs gather and disseminate information pertaining to their CBNRM projects. CBNRM experiences are often not documented, thereby undermining the potential of CBOs to record best practices and failures and to strengthen their performance. Gathering and disseminating information occurs primarily through support NGOs.

CBNRM is considered an empowering approach as the rights to the use of resources is placed in the hands of the community. However, real empowerment is yet to be achieved. The transfer of power has by and large been to the Boards or governance structures of organisations. Participation and community consultation in decision-making is overall weak in CBOs.

Skills to manage conflicts and negotiate deals are lacking, even though conflicts are common between various stakeholders and within communities. Similarly, CBOs lack skills and experience in negotiation, particularly towards the joint venture agreement. Therefore, CBOs have to rely on NGOs or the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). An
example is the amendment of the JVA between Safaris Botswana Bound (SBB) and NKXT in KD1 wherein the community had to call on the TAC and Thusano Lefatsheng for assistance.

CBOs generally lack technical capacity. The various training workshops by NGOs and Government departments have had limited impact on the technical capacity of CBOs. Capacity building interventions have consisted of short-term, often theoretical training courses and did not offer assistance for the use of the new knowledge into existing work.

Financial management is yet another weakness that afflicts the CBO sector. The absences of budgeting procedures and processes, weak financial controls, management, monitoring and reporting have been major constraints in CBOs. Although financial audits are becoming a regular feature of organisations, inadequate financial management systems result in poor performance of CBOs in this aspect.

Tourism-related skills and marketing are other areas of CBO weakness. There is a general dearth in CBO awareness of what tourists expect and in marketing tourism enterprises without external assistance. A situation exists where CBOs have tourist facilities, which are not advertised or marketed. In other cases tourist facilities are advertised and marketed mainly through signposts and brochures but are not run effectively to attract tourists.

Although CBOs have been successful in identifying resources and their uses, resources inventories are not as a matter of course conducted. Similarly, mechanisms for wildlife monitoring exist in wildlife-based CBOs but there is no active management of resources. In addition to this, CBOs do not have a common vision and a sustainability strategy for natural resources management. Resource monitoring is also a major weakness in both wildlife-based and veld product-based CBOs.

Sustainability can be defined as the ability of an organisation to continue to pursue its objectives with minimal external inputs. This implies that for CBOs to be sustainable, they need to generate sufficient resources to sustain their operations and activities in the long term. The necessary resources thus include human, financial, natural, institutional, governance and infrastructural aspects. CBOs vary in terms of the availability of these factors of sustainability. As a group, CBO infrastructural developments are generally strong while human, financial, natural, institutional and governance aspects range between average and weak. For example wildlife based CBOs are almost entirely dependent on the wildlife quota and land rental, which are subject to changes and fluctuations. The fact that wildlife CBOs do not have full control over resources negatively affects the sustainability of their CBNRM initiatives.

The projects that CBOs have initiated aim at diversifying sources of revenue but presently do not generate sufficient resources to sustain CBO activities. Experiences from the implementation of CBNRM show that with the withdrawal of external support, CBOs either under-perform or collapse. Overall, sustainability is a weak component in CBOs, which is further compounded by the fact that very few have developed long-term strategic and sustainability plans and that the identification of viable investment projects has largely been unsuccessful.

3.3 Private companies involved in JVAs
There are currently at least seven private companies in Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs) with twelve community trusts. The first JVA took place in 1994 between Rann Safaris and the Chobe Enclave Community Trust (see the case study for Rann Safaris in the Appendices). Most JVAs cover hunting and photo safaris, and only one is purely hunting. The case study CBOs show that private sector interest in hunting is highest, presumably because it requires less investment, and has higher and safer returns; hunting companies often sub-lease the photo safari part. Most companies have a three to five-year sub-lease, which has been acquired through tendering; a few have an annual agreement acquired at an auction.

Private companies get involved in JVAs because they see opportunities to do business and make profits. Some have a parent company with similar activities in other countries, and some are also involved in private concession areas in Botswana. CBNRM areas are becoming popular because of the limited availability of private concession areas, problems in other countries and desire of some companies to 'go regional'. Some private companies get involved in CBNRM projects to complement their wildlife resource on private concession areas or to break into the local market from outside. It appears that the competition between companies bidding for CBNRM tenders is growing.

Nonetheless, the private sector may be labelled as a ‘reluctant’ participant in the CBNRM process. Firstly, companies tend to prefer private concession areas because of the higher profitability, but such areas are not on the market. Secondly, the participation of private companies in the CBNRM process is very limited, and usually does not exceed the JVAs. The private sector is a rare sight at the CBNRM Forum and only one participated in the District workshops held for this review. There is sometimes representation from HATAB and BWMA. Thirdly, private companies tend to be suspicious of communities (and vice versa). One reason for that may be that the playing field is not understood and not levelled. Some respondents feel that private companies are always the stronger partner of the JVA coming with more money and more skills and still trying to maximise profit and put as much of the risk as possible onto the CBO and community. Some feel that the private companies need to be forced to uphold all the conditions in their lease agreement even when the business climate clearly changes. Others feel that the private companies are “pulled by the nose” by communities, always having to provide more and more to keep the community happy and to ensure that their lease will be extended another time. Neither of these one-sided relationships makes for a true partnership that can work and be successful. Until there can be true JVAs where each side respects and trusts the other, the community-private sector partnership aspect of CBNRM is doomed to fail.

There is little evidence of any of the private companies offering meaningful training to the community trust members. There has been no real sharing of business skills and experience. The private operators have trained few from the communities up to middle or senior management levels. This may be due to the low level of skills level in communities and to the fact that private companies do not necessarily have the skills to be educators or trainers, especially if they are dealing with rural people with low education levels.

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6 This does not imply that all companies make profits. One of the companies reviewed claimed to lose money at present, but stayed in the JVA for a better future. Generally, no data exist on the level of profitability of private sector in hunting and tourism.
The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to private companies are summarised in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: SWOT-analysis of private companies in JVAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Some companies keep management staff and camp staff to a minimum, which allows them to operate optimally and profitably.</td>
<td>- Some companies seem to be forced into hiring many community members for positions that are not necessary. This creates frustrations on both sides. The safari operator has employees that are not necessary and therefore sit around being unproductive and the employees complain that they are not being trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Some have a good track record and reputation, and operate as professional, profitable businesses.</td>
<td>- Some of the companies specialising in hunting have had to take on a photographic operation because this was part of the community lease agreement with Land Board or in the land allocation plan. The operator then tried to run the photographic part of their JVA. Not realising that the two tourism sectors are very different they have failed to run successful photographic businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Some operate in a US$-based environment so do not suffer from exchange rate fluctuations.</td>
<td>- Some made their community tender bid in Pula, but their client business is US$-based so they suffer badly from exchange rate fluctuations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Some of the companies have a very good, professional relationship with their CBO partners. There are few conflicts or problems.</td>
<td>- Several are embroiled in messy relationships with the communities and CBOs characterised by tension and mistrust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Some have a clear-cut relationship based effectively on a sub-lease agreement.</td>
<td>- Several are over their heads in trying to do ‘community development’ work and are pulled in all sorts of directions by the community and the trust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ HATAB notes that more of its members are gradually seeing the advantages of the CBNRM concept.</td>
<td>- Most PS tourism companies prefer to run operations in private concession areas than in communal areas under the CBNRM ‘approach’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Hunting safari companies feel the impact of global problems (e.g. 9/11, Iraq war, conflict in Caprivi, Zimbabwe political situation, SARS) less than photographic tourism companies.</td>
<td>- Photographic tourism companies feel the impact of global problems (e.g. 9/11, Iraq war, conflict in Caprivi, Zimbabwe political situation, SARS). Any loss of business affects those involved with communities doubly hard because they must still honour their financial agreements with the communities even if business has declined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Botswana is the best place in the world to hunt elephant, buffalo and lion.</td>
<td>- A ban was placed on hunting lions based on no scientific evidence. The ban was only announced one month before the start of the hunting season; long after the lion hunts were marketed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Support organisations

Support organisations can be grouped into non-government organisations (NGOs), the Government of Botswana and donors. Support organisations aim to assist the primary stakeholders, i.e. communities and private companies involved in JVAs. At present, the support is almost entirely focused on communities; private companies receive little—if any—support. This section deals with NGOs and government. The role of donors in the CBNRM process will be discussed in section 3.5.

3.4.1 Background to support organisations

Non-government organisations

NGO here includes any organisation that is neither government nor profit making, therefore it includes umbrella and network organisations such as the National CBNRM Forum, the CBNRM Support Programme as well as interest groups such as BOCOBONET and HATAB. This definition also includes the international organisations that provide expertise and funding to NGOs and CBOs. In total, nineteen NGOs are involved in CBNRM support. Their organisational form, geographical scope and employment opportunities are summarised in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Summary of basic background information on the NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of NGO</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
<th>Aspect of NGO</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geographical Spread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Start-up</td>
<td>range 1974 – 2000</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ngamiland</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society/Association</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chobe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ghanzi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Government Development Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kgalagadi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Staff</td>
<td>range 3 – 35</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CBNRM CBOs or CBNRM projects that NGO works with or has worked with</td>
<td>range 2 – 76</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The oldest NGO dates back to 1974, but most were formed in the 1980s. Four came to being in the 1990s and three in the year 2000. No new NGO has been formed in the past three years, probably due to reduced funding opportunities. The majority of NGOs are registered as trusts. The number of staff members is estimated to be in 186 total and ranges from 3–35 per NGO, while the average number of staff is eleven. The geographical spread is fairly even. Six NGOs claim to be working nationally, six in Ngamiland and six in Ghanzi. Central District has four NGOs working there, Kgalagadi.
and Kweneng each have three NGOs, Chobe two NGOs, while Southern and North East each have only one NGO working in their districts.

Table 3.4 indicates the main areas of interest of NGOs. The most common area of interest is ‘sustainable use of natural resources’, followed by ‘community empowerment’, ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘eco-tourism or community-based tourism’. Seven NGOs specifically target marginalised groups; another seven work in the area of craft development and marketing. Six NGOs are interested specifically in veld product (VP) aspects of CBNRM including research, management, utilisation, processing and/or marketing. Only three NGOs are interested in wildlife management and utilisation, possibly because of the heavy government presence in this sector. Only one NGO appears to have a broader interest in other environmental issues such as sanitation, waste management and water resources and supply.

Table 3.4 Summary of NGOs' areas of interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Interest</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
<th>Areas of Interest</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Alleviation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Veld Products (VP) Research</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Empowerment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>VP Mgt./Sustainable Use</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>VP Processing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalised Groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>VP Marketing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Broader environmental issues (sanitation, waste management, water)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable use of NR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Craft Production Development</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Utilisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Craft Marketing</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Eco-tourism/CBT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NGO-objectives and activities are categorised in Table 3.5. The most common activity (eleven NGOs) is ‘institutional strengthening’, followed by ‘lobbying and advocacy’ and ‘community mobilisation’. Very few organisations are involved in tourism marketing and/or building CBOs capacity to run tourism projects.

Table 3.5: Summary of NGOs’ objectives and activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives &amp; Activities</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
<th>Objectives &amp; Activities</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gathering &amp; Disseminating Info.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>CBO Formation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CBO Constitution</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising for CBOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>CBO Registration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying and Advocacy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>CBO Board Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutional Strengthening</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking/Linking service providers, PS, CBOs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Identification of Viable Enterprises</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological/Environmental Research</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Facilitation of Enterprise Development</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Studies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>JVP ID, Negotiations, Monitoring</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives &amp; Activities</td>
<td>No. of NGOs</td>
<td>Objectives &amp; Activities</td>
<td>No. of NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Mobilisation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Training/Advice: CBO/Com Business</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Land Use Plans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Training/Advice: CBO/Com Tourism</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Management Plans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Training/Advice: Technical (in Area of Interest)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism Marketing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are nine central government departments working in the field of CBNRM in addition to District Councils and District Technical Advisory Committee, made up of government officers. Table 3.6 summarises their main role in and contribution to CBNRM projects.

**Table 3.6: CBNRM interests and activities by government department**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Department</th>
<th>Area of Interest/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) • Community Service Division (CSD) • DARUDEC Wildlife Conservation &amp; Management Programme</td>
<td>• Prepared Joint Venture Guidelines. • Manages the Community Conservation Fund (CCF) • Community Service Division (CSD) • Mobilising communities to form trusts • Provides direct assistance to CBOs in drafting trust constitutions, advising on elections, financial management training, board training including roles and responsibilities, organisational development, providing advice on JVs, and some other CBNRM technical advice, such as training to Community Escort Guides (CEG). • CSD sociologist, resource economist and community liaison officers also work with communities at district level. • DARUDEC Wildlife Conservation &amp; Management Programme • Promoting stakeholder cooperation (communities, PS and others). • Facilitate increased benefits to communities from CBNRM. • Improved research and monitoring at central level and community level. • Strengthening capacity of DWNP at headquarters and district level. • Manages the Community Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Resources Board Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>• Issues permits for gathering certain veld products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Tourism</td>
<td>• Created an Eco-tourism Unit • to support community based tourism enterprises • provide awareness about tourism and the importance of tourism for Botswana, • facilitate tourism related training, and • provide some general extension services. • Developed Botswana Tourism Development Master Plan. • Developed national Eco-tourism Strategy. • Helping CBTEs to market their products. • Implemented Community Camel Utilisation project in the Kgalagadi for CBTEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Conservation Strategy Agency</td>
<td>• Implemented a project to increase the coordination and management of CBNRM. • Focused in the areas of training, community mobilisation, institutional development and building of partnerships. • Provided grants to NGOs and CBOs to carry out income generating activities, NR management and community development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Lands including Land Boards</td>
<td>• Houses Land Boards that administer tribal land in Botswana.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The information in this section comes from various available documents, the 2001 CBNRM “Status Report” (CBNRM Forum, 2002), interviews and opinions of key informants.
3.4.2 Achievements and progress to date

NGOs
While some of the NGOs are doing well, some do not perform well. (see Figure 3.3). Six score below 60% when dividing the number of strengths by the total number of strengths and weaknesses for each NGO. The biggest problem of some NGOs seems to be lack of capacity due to insufficient numbers of staff, poorly qualified and experienced staff, insufficient money to operate, and ineffective and inefficient ways of operating. Specific examples of lack of capacity will be explored more in the next section by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of the support organisations.

Achievements or ‘progress to date’ revolve mainly around ‘community mobilisation’ and ‘lobbying and advocacy’. While many NGOs indicate they are interested in ‘community empowerment’ and are doing ‘institutional strengthening’, and DWNP has great confidence in their ability to implement CBNRM support at the ground level, there are only a few examples of communities and CBOs really managing their own affairs in a successful manner. The few exceptions that are doing well mostly had very intensive, longer term and local support.

Other achievements to date have included some successful veld products projects run by NGOs that have been operating for many years by supporting rural people to utilise VPs in a sustainable manner in order to gain income (examples here include grapple...
and crafts made from natural resources, and more recently thatching grass identification and marketing). Ironically some NGOs have had more success in fundraising for the CBOs they are working with than to raise funds for themselves.⁸ Other achievements have included the ability to gather and disseminate information.

NGOs have encountered setbacks in the form of drying up of funds, and the opportunistic switch towards areas where they had little expertise, but where funding was still available. Some NGOs spend an exorbitant amount of time "chasing money". Capacity that had been built up over many years of working in specific areas is no longer being utilised fully because the NGO has switched mandates or added completely different activities to their mandate. Thusano Lefatseng spent years building up their capacity in processing and marketing of veld products and are now working more in other CBNRM areas, especially eco-tourism, without specialised skills in this area. Their extensive physical infrastructure is currently under utilised.

**Figure 3.3:**

In terms of the support organisations ‘image’ or ‘legitimacy’ (from their own viewpoint and others), of fourteen NGOs that could be judged, seven of the organisations are considered to be legitimate and are appreciated, while three suffer from almost universal public relations problems and hostilities from others. Four of the organisations have

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⁸ In fact this is not surprising since donors are more attracted to funding specific projects rather than the running/core costs of a NGO.
mixed ‘reviews’, being considered in a positive light by their members or target group recipients but not by other support organisations.

The sustainability of NGOs is a major concern at present. Of the 19 NGOs examined, eight have been around for more than twenty years and two have existed for more than ten years. This demonstrates their ability to adapt and be flexible and sustainable. More NGOs receive positive ‘moral’ support from their membership and constituencies than those who do not. Eight of fourteen NGOs (57%) have sufficient funds to operate for at least a few more years, but only four have a long-term sustainability plan (Table 3.7).

**Government institutions**

Many government institutions suffer from similar problems as those that create a lack of capacity in NGOs, but in addition some government institutions are not clear about their role in CBNRM projects and have poorly defined objectives. The Department of Tourism, which claims to have skills in the business-side of tourism, appears to lack staff capacity at the district level to be able to implement any of their objectives. The premier district for tourism – Ngamiland – has only three of their four professional positions filled and none have job descriptions (“sense of you must do everything”), and apparently none of the staff can support CBTEs on the ground. The relationship with the District Council Tourism officer needs clarification.

One major achievement has been the creation of the DWNP Community Services Division, which focuses on CBNRM. The Ngamiland office for example has eleven officers covering nine trusts; half of these officers are trained in community extension practices.

3.4.3 Assessment of capacity

**NGOs**

The assessment uses the same five categories used in the CBO assessment. Table 3.7 lists by category the activities that a CBNRM support organisation can be involved in, and indicates the number of NGOs that are strong in these areas and the number that are weak. Using this information some conclusions can be drawn about the overall capacity of NGOs in Botswana who are supporting CBOs.

In certain areas there are more NGOs that are strong than there are ones that are weak. These include for the internal environment:

- Ownership of infrastructure;
- Technology (computers, office equipment, and sometimes processing equipment);
- Organisational structure and human resource management; and
- Good governance.

Almost all of the NGOs also have a good understanding of the CBNRM concept, appreciate the usefulness of CBNRM in rural development, and benefit from CBNRM.

In terms of capacity to achieve their objectives and to undertake CBNRM activities, the areas in which there are more NGOs that are strong than weak include:

- Policy and legislation input, formulation, review, and awareness;
- Advocacy and lobbying on behalf of their members or target group recipients;
- Gathering and dissemination of information.

*Final report of the CBNRM Review Study*
- Networking and co-operation;
- Proposal writing for themselves and ability to provide assistance to the CBOs;
- General experience and skills to provide training;
- Ability to provide assistance to the CBOs in report writing; and
- Ability to identify key natural resources and specific uses for them to generate income.

**Table 3.7: NGO strengths and weaknesses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of CBNRM Work</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Internal Environment</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure (offices, lodges, hunting camps, campsites, etc.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology (computers, office equipment)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational structure &amp; development (HR, management, planning, leadership)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance (decision making, transparency, representative, accountable)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic plan /annual plans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sustainability</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short &amp; long term sustainability plans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from membership, clients, community</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial &amp; fundraising capacity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. View of CBNRM</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of CBNRM Concept</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation of CBNRM Concept</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Benefits from CBNRM</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits from CBNRM to organisation (financial, material, social, intrinsic)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits distribution (decision making, transparency, equity)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of benefits (investments, com., Projects, new enterprises, HH distribution)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Capacity</td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy input/ formulation/review</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy &amp; legislation awareness</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy &amp; Lobbying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering &amp; Disseminating Information</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking &amp; Co-operation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict management &amp; mediation &amp;/or ability to provide assistance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal writing &amp;/or ability to provide assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation &amp;/or ability to provide assistance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendering &amp;/or ability to provide assistance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training skills/ capacity building skills (in general)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Development (to do or teach or assist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ID viable business options</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Final report of the CBNRM Review Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of CBNRM Work</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
<th>No. of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STRONG</td>
<td>WEAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism related skills (to do or teach or assist)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of what tourists want/ expect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify resources</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify use of resources</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource inventories</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propagation/renewal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: numbers across do not equal the total number of NGOs examined because some NGOs do not work in certain areas or not enough information was available to make an assessment on the NGO in that area of capacity.

In contrast, capacity areas where more NGOs are notably weak rather than strong include: access to funding; ability to monitor their own activities and progress and those of the CBOs they work with; conflict management and mediation; ability to provide assistance to CBOs in the tendering process.

In terms of helping CBOs in the area of business development, about an equal number of NGOs are strong in certain areas as those which are weak; this includes 1) ability to assist CBOs to identify viable business opportunities, 2) planning business ventures and 3) financial management of the business. However most NGOs are very weak in helping CBOs to manage or sustain their business, in marketing, and in monitoring their business activities and progress. In terms of tourism enterprises specifically, again about an equal number of NGOs are strong in this area as compared to those who are weak. Areas include the ability to develop CBO awareness and skills in knowing what tourists expect and in delivery of tourism related services. Furthermore, it must be noted that very few NGOs are working in this area of tourism development. In terms of capacity in certain areas of natural resource management, firstly very few NGOs are working in this area and of those who are, about an equal number of NGOs are strong in the areas of resource inventories, active management of resources and monitoring as compared to those who are weak. However, very few NGOs have had any success with propagation and renewal of veld products.

Government institutions
At least one DWNP district office has great confidence in their ability to implement CBNRM, saying, "we are in control" and "we have more strengths than weaknesses, unlike the NGOs". Others would view DWNP’s capacity differently feeling that they are taking on too much, in areas that they do not specialise in and without having the required skills. Another district DWNP office feels its strength lies with the ability to provide funds to run short courses and workshops, but that it lacks sufficiently trained human resources and many are poorly motivated. DWNP prepared a strategic plan to cover the years 2002 to 2006, but it lacks information on how they will implement and achieve their ideals (DWNP 2002). In 2002, the DARUDEC Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme came to Botswana to help develop the capacity of DWNP both at headquarters and district levels. The DWNP has played a leading role in the implementation of wildlife-based CBNRM projects. The department has in this regard performed well as its efforts have generally had a positive effect on CBNRM projects.

Final report of the CBNRM Review Study
The Department of Tourism seems to have great plans and ideas but lack the number of experienced staff at the district level to carry out the plans. The Agricultural Resources Board is mostly a regulatory body, and does not get directly involved in implementation. The RADP has had a recent evaluation conducted offering a number of suggestions for needed improvements (BIDPA 2003). The RADP does appreciate the positive impact that CBNRM can have on its target audience, remote area dwellers. At the district level some TACs are made up entirely of government officers, while others invite NGO representatives to participate. Some TACs try to be implementing bodies rather than advisory bodies, and this proves difficult because every member is in a full-time position in some government department or NGO.

The department of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery is another stakeholder in CBNRM and has played a pivotal role in assisting communities identify various archaeo-tourism/cultural heritage site projects. Although part of the mandate of the department articulates community management of these sites, it lacks a clear strategy on how it will assist in the implementation of CBNRM. CBNRM is not factored into the job descriptions of staff.

3.5 Donors

CBNRM initiatives are supported by several domestic and international donors and funding programmes. The number of international donors has dropped over the last decade due to the fact that Botswana is classified as a lower middle-income country. Table 3.8 lists the domestic and international donors and programmes that continue to support CBNRM initiatives in the country.

Table 3.8: Donor-funding programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor/Funding Programme</th>
<th>Area of Interest/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Embassy's Democracy and Human Rights Fund</td>
<td>Support to activities that build democratic institutions, promote political pluralism and protect human rights. Specific areas of interest are projects that enhance the civil and political status of women, children and minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Fund for Local Initiatives</td>
<td>Support to small community based projects providing technical, economic, educational and/or social development assistance to the local population. Water and sanitation projects are one of the priority areas of the Canada Fund.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| DWNP Community Services Fund    | This is a specific government fund that aims at promoting CBNRM through the provision of financial support to CBOs and other conservation initiatives geared towards the protection and breeding of endangered species or environmental education. Support to CBNRM could include:  
  • Support towards constitution and Trust development and other legal fees  
  • Training technical assistance and proposal development  
  • Development of Management Plans or Natural Resources Profile  
  • Wildlife and veld-products related processing of natural resources  
  • Marketing studies and market development |
| RADP Economic Promotion Fund    | This fund targets Remote Area Dwellers and seeks to promote employment opportunities, exploit resources and promote the participation and self-reliance of RADs in national development. Specific areas of interest include:  
  • Promotion of production orientated activities  
  • Resource evaluation and exploitation in communities  
  • Community participation in development  
  The packages provided under this programme include:  
  • Production oriented/income generating activities such as game ranching, harvesting and utilisation of veld products and arable agriculture  
  • Infrastructural development and activities to facilitate income generation such as tanneries, crafts, livestock schemes and poultry farming  
  • Training and studies pertaining to income generating activities |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Environmental Heritage Foundation (EHF) NGO/CBO Empowerment Project</strong></th>
<th>This fund aims at promoting general and environmental resource management capacity amongst CBOs and NGOs for sustainability. The fund also seeks to support initiatives that promote cooperative relationships and partnerships. The EHF also manages a fund for community environmental conservation and empowerment projects.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP Global Environmental Facility</strong></td>
<td>The purpose of this fund is to support and promote community-based projects that address global environmental challenges. The fund targets communities, CBOs and NGOs and supports community based initiatives that aim to: mitigate climate change effects; protect bio-diversity; protect international waters; combat desertification; strengthening organisations involved in activities that address global environmental concerns and promote lesson sharing on best practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **African Wildlife Foundation** | The AWF aims at:  
- Promoting Trans-boundary Natural Resources Management projects through the Four corners project  
- Supporting community based ventures to promote income generation through sustainable use of natural resources  
- NRM Research  
- Support to sub-grantees to promote capacity building and training of NRM organisations |
| **Action for Economic Empowerment Trust** | This fund aims at:  
- Promoting participatory development methodologies for human development and planning  
- Developing the capacity of NGOs/CBOs to manage and sustain development initiatives and their benefits  
- Supporting the establishment of enterprises by CBOs through intermediary organisations (NGOs) for sustainable employment and income generation. |
| **IFS Training and General Support Fund** | This fund aims to address the constraints to the establishment or expansion of non-farm rural productive activities. The specific objectives of the programme are to promote income generation and employment in the rural area and to fully exploit local resources and to satisfy local demand for goods through local production. Assistance could be towards the following activities: feasibility studies; market surveys; training; small-scale infrastructure development; pilot demonstration projects; seminars and workshops. |
| **Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme** | This programme aims to:  
- Promote stakeholder co-operation in CBNRM to include communities, NGOs and the private sector  
- Facilitate increased benefits to communities through CBNRM  
- Carry out relevant research and monitoring at the community and central level  
- Strengthening the capacity of DWNP for effective service delivery  
- Managing the Community Development Fund for capacity building; micro-enterprises at community level, setting up effective management structures within CBOs. |
| **Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA)** | This fund aims to support business development amongst citizens of Botswana. CEDA seeks to facilitate the development of viable, sustainable citizen owned business enterprises through:  
- The development of and access to entrepreneurial and management skills training  
- Business monitoring and mentoring  
- Access to finance and risk sharing  
- Management and implementation of a Venture Capital Fund |
| **LG 109 Village Development Programme** | This programme aims at improving rural livelihoods through promoting productive and employment generating activities. Possible projects eligible for support include: tanneries; market stalls; market surveys; bakeries; communal training/production centres; poultry farms; manpower and resource availability studies; horticulture Projects |
| **Micro-Project Programme (MPP)** | This is a funding mechanism established between the Government of Botswana and the Delegation of the European Commission. The programme aims at supporting local communities to improve their area and improve livelihoods through promoting sustainable small-scale activities at grassroots level. Priority target groups include the elderly, poor, female headed households, the unemployed and marginalized groups. NGOs and CBOs are ineligible for funding support. Areas of activity include: production units: provision of equipment, infrastructure, training and credit schemes; training and capacity building; social infrastructure |
| **NCSA CBNRM Support Project** | This fund aims at providing general support to the implementation of CBNRM to include: support to trust formation; development of Land use/management plans; training and capacity building; infrastructural development. Although support targets CBOs and NGOs, the fund will not support recurrent costs |

Source: CBNRM Status Report 2001

The major constraints of donor support and funding programmes include:
• Limited, scattered funding programmes;
• The size of the funding available is small compared to the number and needs of CBOs and support NGOs;
• Few donors support overheads of NGOs;
• Short-term funding orientation, which does not sufficiently recognise the time involved in building viable CBOs and CBNRM projects;
• Cumbersome, highly technical and time consuming application and approval procedures;
• Reporting requirements; and
• Limited co-ordination amongst donor agencies takes place.

3.6 Assessment across stakeholders

The above section shows that many stakeholders do not perform badly, although there is considerable room for improvement. Nonetheless, the CBNRM projects do not appear to fare well, primarily because Botswana does not have a CBNRM programme. The CBNRM process is best described as a number of diverse projects and support organisations without a comprehensive vision, strategy and programme. This leads to lack of leadership, coordination, common vision, common strategy, etc. Support organisations trying to stake their claim without much coordination.

Table 3.9 at the end of this chapter summarises the interactions between direct stakeholders and support organisations. On paper, two structures have been given the responsibility to coordinate CBNRM in Botswana, but neither seems to have managed. The case of BOCOBONET is found in the Appendices. The CBNRM Forum is the other. The review TOR did not require a specific case study on the CBNRM Forum so it was not looked into in detail and it did not complete a questionnaire. However, some conclusions can be drawn, by looking at the TOR for the CBNRM Forum (2000) and the findings of this review. The TOR states that the aim of the CBNRM Forum should be “to co-ordinate efforts and share information”. One of its objectives is “to improve stakeholder co-operation and collaboration” and two of its functions are to “facilitate the development of a shared vision for CBNRM in Botswana” and “contribute to rationalisation and harmonisation of CBNRM strategies”. Besides sharing information, little of this appears to have been accomplished.

Other reasons have lead to the lack of co-ordination, including:
• None of the existing legislation or approved policies details government’s CBNRM objectives or its role in implementing CBNRM (CBNRM Forum 2002).
• The authority over CBNRM resources has been housed under two different government bodies: DWNP for wildlife and ARB for veld products.
• Weakness of linkages between various government departments and committees, especially within the rural development sector (BIDPA 2003).

3.7 Concluding remarks

The analysis of CBOs indicates that performance is a function of time and the support that is available to CBOs. Organisations that have been in existence for some time and have had adequate support generally perform better and after the withdrawal of direct, on the ground support, struggle to survive. The image of the different CBOs assessed
varies but generally organisations involved in CBNRM initiatives are viewed positively as they offer the potential to diversify the rural economy. Although CBOs are developing some capacity, as a group, CBOs lack capacity to effectively undertake CBNRM projects.

Private companies enter JVA primarily for the business opportunities they present and to make profit; not all make profit however. Their major strengths lie in their ability to finance JVP and their expertise is in business management, marketing and safari operations. Linkages between the private sector and CBOs are weaker than they should be due to common suspicion and mistrust between both parties. The private sector plays a marginal role in the CBNRM process, as it does not sufficiently participate in the whole approach and the support focuses on communities, assuming that private companies possess the capacity and expertise for the successful implementation of JVAs.

The capacity of CBNRM support organisations, including government departments, NGOs and donors, has over the years improved and support is having some positive effect on the implementation of CBNRM. Government departments have generally viewed CBNRM too much as a DWNP programme, and the role of key departments such as the ARB, National Museum and Integrated Field Services in contributing effectively to the implementation of CBNRM projects was marginalised. Donor financial and technical assistance is increasingly domestic and is characterised by fragmentation and lack of co-ordination. While international donors are decreasing their assistance, funding has not dried up, and some donors appear to increase their involvement. The major challenge for CBOs is to access funding, while funding agencies need to co-ordinate and simplify their funding procedures.

Support organisations have been successful in mobilising communities and seeking funding for the start of CBNRM projects. However, support organisations are yet to develop sufficient capacity to assist CBNRM projects grow and become sustainable. There is also lack of specialisation among support organisations, either along thematic or spatial lines. Overall, there is a lack of co-ordination amongst support organisations, a situation, which has certain causes and effects some of which include: unclear mandates and responsibilities resulting in duplication of efforts, gaps in expertise, lack of specialisation, competition and conflict. The lack of co-ordination amongst support organisations is further compounded by the absence of a long-term vision and overall strategic plan for CBNRM.
### Table 3.9: Interactions between stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAKEHOLDERS</th>
<th>DONORS</th>
<th>CBNRM FORUM</th>
<th>BOCOBONET</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>CBOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CBOs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Linkages based on funding arrangements. In some cases funding is given directly to CBOs (resulting in close linkages) and in others it is done through intermediaries. Co-operation in areas where donor and CBO stakeholders’ mandates and objectives related to poverty alleviation, sustainable resource use and conservation are aligned. Provision of technical support through the placement of development workers/advisors/consultants and NGOs.</td>
<td>Linkages primarily through BOCOBONET, which is an active member of the Forum. Relationship characterised by cooperation through information sharing and exchange, documentation of CBO CBNRM experiences. Subtle conflict as BOCOBONET is concerned that the Forum could take over some of the responsibilities of the association.</td>
<td>Majority of CBOs are members of the association. CBO perceptions of BOCOBONET are mixed. Co-operation in terms of networking, exchanges, training, advocacy and lobbying. Conflicts with some CBOs who feel the association does not support them effectively. Strong linkages based on governments key role in the implementation of policy and regulations, training and capacity building, conflict resolution and ex-officio membership on CBO Boards. Conflicts on policy and regulatory environment specifically around quota setting. Perception that government wants to see CBOs fail in the implementation of CBNRM.</td>
<td>Co-operation and mutual benefit through support interventions and fundraising Few instances of serious conflict where relations between CBOs and NGOs have soured.</td>
<td>Сtrong linkages based on government’s key role in implementing CBNRM.</td>
<td>Weak linkages. Perceptions that the private sector benefits the most from CBNRM projects. CBOs have an interest in “taking over” CBNRM projects and doing away with the private sector while the private sector wishes to be involved in CBNRM projects for extended periods to make their investments worthwhile. Misconceptions and mistrust. Perception that the private sector benefits the most from CBNRM projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE SECTOR</strong></td>
<td>Do not appear to have any linkages/co-operation</td>
<td>Private sector involved through BWMA’s active participation in the CBNRM Forum. Interaction occurs primarily through BOCOBONET’s membership to HATAB. BOCOBONET has played a mediation role in some misunderstandings between CBOs and the private sector.</td>
<td>Interaction occurs primarily through BOCOBONET’s membership to HATAB. BOCOBONET has played a mediation role in some misunderstandings between CBOs and the private sector. Weak linkages. Interactions mainly in negotiation/mediation between CBOs and private sector. Weak linkages. Mainly occurs through policy implementation, monitoring. Interaction occurs through sitting in forums such as the CBNRM Forum structures. (national and district level)</td>
<td>Weak linkages.</td>
<td>HATAB and BWMA</td>
<td>See CBO-private sector interactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CBOs</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>Joint funding programmes such as the EU funded CBNRM support mechanisms</td>
<td>Government departments well represented and active in National CBNRM Forum</td>
<td>Co-operation through consultation in policy development</td>
<td>Co-operation through the TAC structures Conflict in terms of CBNRM funding being concentrated in DWNP</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Strong linkages based on direct and indirect funding relationships and common development objectives. Donors concerned primarily with short-term project outputs while NGOs value participation and empowerment, which are long-term. Donors have a short-term project-based funding approach while NGOs desire long-term funding relationships (including support to recurrent costs)</td>
<td>Strong linkages and environment and conservation NGOs are active members of the Forum Although there are patterns of cooperation between the two stakeholders in specific projects, generally relations are characterised by conflict and competition. The major cause of the conflict is that both stakeholders have the same development constituency, CBOs. Competition donor money BOCOBONET concerned that some NGOs benefit more from CBNRM development funding than the CBOs themselves.</td>
<td>Co-operation through the BOCONGO especially on lobbying and advocacy work Some limited joint programming Competition for communities and NRM based products Competition for resources and markets</td>
<td>Government increasingly recognising NGOs as partners and engaging them in policy discussions, joint implementation of projects in a few cases. Competition and conflict especially at the district level when NGOs by-pass government structures or government extension consider themselves the only driving force in CBNRM development. Some TACs have requested NGOs to stop their activities in some CBNRM projects.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOCOBONET</td>
<td>Channel through which donors can support CBO networking, advocacy, training and capacity building</td>
<td>Co-operation through technical and historically financial support to the association.</td>
<td>Co-operation and conflict (see NGO-BOCOBONET interactions) See government – BOCOBONET interactions See private sector-BOCOBONET interactions</td>
<td>See CBO-BOCOBONET interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM FORUM</td>
<td>Forum through which donors can keep abreast of developments in CBNRM</td>
<td>See BOCOBONET-CBNRM Forum interactions</td>
<td>See NGOs-CBNRM Forum interactions See Government CBNRM Forum interactions See private sector-CBNRM Forum linkages</td>
<td>See CBO-CBNRM Forum linkages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONORS</td>
<td>See CBNRM Forum-Donor linkages</td>
<td>See BOCOBONET-Donor interactions</td>
<td>See NGO-Donor linkages See Government-CBNRM Forum interactions</td>
<td>See private sector—Donor linkages See CBO-Donor linkages</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER FOUR
ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CBNRM PROJECTS

4.1 Introduction

CBNRM is a typical African approach towards rural development and resource conservation. The approach aims to increase local socio-economic benefits of natural resources, which would then lead to a higher appreciation of resources by the local population and to greater resource conservation efforts by the local population. The increased benefits also offer opportunities to compensate the local community for the costs of living with natural resources such as wildlife. No family should be worse off because of the presence of natural resources.

In this chapter, the socio-economic impacts of CBNRM projects are reviewed. The impacts are reviewed at both the local (community and households; sections 4.2-4.4) and national level (section 4.5). A wide range of impacts is being considered, including material and non-material impacts, short and long term impacts, and direct and indirect impacts. The impacts of CBNRM projects on rural livelihoods and the opportunities for economic diversification and increasing benefits and revenues are also explored, as requested in the Terms of Reference.

The detailed assessment of CBNRM impacts is difficult, particularly the quantification of the impacts due to the lack of baseline data (e.g. prior to the CBNRM-project) and monitoring. Therefore, the assessment below is largely qualitative, based on fieldwork, literature review and opinions of key informants.

4.2 The generation of local benefits

The general perception is that CBNRM projects have increased the local benefits of natural resource use, but that the benefits are still limited. At present, the most important direct, short-term, community benefits are the financial revenues and employment creation. The acquisition of assets (e.g. natural resources, physical capital and human resources) is another important CBNRM benefit that strengthens the longer-term income generating capacity of the community and its members. The achievements of the four case study CBOs in these areas have been summarised in Table 4.1.

The performance of the four CBOs differs widely. Financial revenues are volatile, but substantial for at least three of the four CBOs. KyT’s highest revenues were realised in the late 1990s due to donor support, and the CBO has been hard hit by decreased donor support. In contrast, STMT saw a rapid increase in financial revenues with the new JVA, while the KDT revenues tend to be high, but extremely volatile. Only STMT could be labelled financially independent as its own revenues exceed recurrent expenditures, and there is a substantial financial buffer. STMT also performs best in terms of employment and asset formation. However, if the part-time employment of KyT members is considered, KyT probably makes the most significant employment impact. The Tawana Land Board donated three well-established lodges to two CBOs (KDT and STMT).
Table 4.1: Details of income and employment generation by case study CBO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>STMT (NG 34)</th>
<th>KyT</th>
<th>KDT (NG 19)</th>
<th>NKXT (KD1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Financial revenues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>Range from P 216 000 to P 1.5 million.</td>
<td>Range from P 399 000 to P 994 000 per annum in period 1998-2003</td>
<td>Range from P 600 000 to P 1.3 million in period 2000-02; in 2003, P 441 000 from auction.</td>
<td>From P 66 000 to P 312 000 in period 1999-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>Fairly stable until 2001 followed by a huge increase</td>
<td>Volatile dependent on donors; recent increase in own revenues from own products</td>
<td>Volatile</td>
<td>Increase until 2000 followed by a decrease, mostly due to lower JVA revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>JVA income normally over 90% with other income less than 10%. In 2001, JVA income was 51.5% due to legal wrangle about the tender allocation</td>
<td>Income from own products increased from 2.2% in 1998 to 23.2% in 2003</td>
<td>Donor income volatile but declining.</td>
<td>Virtually all revenues from auctioning hunting rights; No record of own income generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Financial sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues - expenditures</td>
<td>Positive in 4 out of 5 years (1998-2002)</td>
<td>Positive in 5 out of 6 years in 1998-2003</td>
<td>No data available</td>
<td>Positive (data for two years only); situation has considerably deteriorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own revenues-recurrent expenditures</td>
<td>Positive in 4 out of 5 years (1998-2002)</td>
<td>Negative throughout 1998-2003</td>
<td>No data available</td>
<td>One year positive; one year negative (data for two years only; situation has considerably deteriorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Employment</td>
<td>Total of 95</td>
<td>14 full time</td>
<td>0 during fieldwork</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust employment</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14 at present</td>
<td>Currently no employment; in the past, 22 people to run camps</td>
<td>5 at present; peak in 2001 with 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment with Private sector company</td>
<td>56 (not all needed)</td>
<td>Almost 1000 members are part-time employed in harvesting and processing of natural resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 compared to 45 in JVA agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Asset formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural resources</th>
<th>Exclusive hunting and photo safari rights in NG34</th>
<th>No special privileges or rights</th>
<th>Exclusive hunting and photo safari rights in NG19. Quota suspended in 2003; later released</th>
<th>Exclusive hunting and photo safari rights in KD1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial assets</td>
<td>Substantial bank balance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Debts</td>
<td>Low with debts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical assets</td>
<td>Build cultural village and camp site; plans to renovate Donation of Santawani Lodge Headquarters Community hall Toilets</td>
<td>Main office in Lerala with morula oil processing factory and cold storage room Plans for offices in 31 centres.</td>
<td>One camp, and a half complete camp Two Lodges donated by the Land Board (Tsaro and Machaba)</td>
<td>Headquarters and Kaa camp Three camp sites One de-funct craft shop One non-operational tannery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human assets</td>
<td>Seven scholarships in 2003</td>
<td>Training of members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that the material benefits of CBOs depend strongly on the benefits from joint venture agreement. Donor benefits are limited and have been decreasing, while the benefit generating capacity of CBOs is still very limited. Only Kgetsi ya Tsie (KyT) has shown the ability to raise a growing portion of own revenues in a brief period, even though it remains dependent on external funding (figure 4.1).

*Figure 4.1: Sources of revenues from Kgetsi ya Tsie*

![Sources of KyT revenues](image)

Source: KyT files.

*Table 4.2: Projects initiated by case study CBOs*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STMT (NG34)</td>
<td>Campsite and restaurant</td>
<td>Operational, and appears to make profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural village</td>
<td>Closed after it made losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santawani Lodge renovations</td>
<td>To start soon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDT (NG 19)</td>
<td>Zou camp</td>
<td>Ready, but not operational in July 2003 due to financial trouble of Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tsaro Lodge and Machaba Lodge</td>
<td>Plans for renovations and re-opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two campsites without facilities</td>
<td>Operation and profitability unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKXT (KD 1)</td>
<td>Three campsites</td>
<td>Operational, but do not appear to make money (P 182/ month in Ngwatle camp site for the period October 2002-April 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Craft shop</td>
<td>Seems closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tannery</td>
<td>Building complete. No equipment and not operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KyT</td>
<td>Marula oil processing factory</td>
<td>Operational and generating increasing revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small rooms in Centres for processing veld products</td>
<td>Operational; growing sales from Centres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldwork 2003 (June-August)

Wildlife-based CBOs only raise a small part of extra income from interest and other productive activities. This makes CBOs vulnerable for changes in hunting quota and the tourism market, and the attitude of the JVA company. This became painfully clear after the suspension of the hunting quotas of KDT, which effectively led to closure of the Trust operations, as there were no other income sources. Productive projects often fail, or work inefficiently and from the four case study CBOs only two had one successful productive project each (Kasikini camp site and morula oil factory). Others had failed, or are not yet operational (Table 4.2). This poor record calls into question the ability of CBOs and their support organisations to identify and manage productive projects. It appears odd that the CBNRM-stakeholder with most business acumen (i.e. private sector) is currently not involved in the establishment of productive activities.

Other CBOs have invested in craft shops, bottle stores, camp sites, vegetable plots and guest houses (cf. Jones, 2002; Mbawai, 2002). However, most CBOs are as yet hardly benefiting from hunting and tourism support activities such as crafts, accommodation, and food supply. STMT is one of the few CBOs that have developed an income generating productive activity (Kasakini campsite), and it took the decision to close its cultural village when it proved to make losses.

The District workshops endorsed the view that the overall socio-economic performance of CBOs appears to be haphazard and volatile and that there is no significant upward trend in performance as yet. This suggests that most CBOs have not yet reached maturity, and that internal processes as well as external ‘shocks’ have an important impact on the overall performance of CBOs. External events that influence CBO performance include:

- Financial assistance from donors and/ or government;
- Technical assistance with the management of the Trust and its projects. On-site assistance proved to be virtually indispensable for the case study CBOs. The
example of NKXT shows that the departure of external support (SNV and TL) can lead to serious problems in a year;

- Changes in wildlife quota;
- Changes in exchange rates and the global tourism market affect the JVA; and performance, and private companies often seek to share these risks with CBOs by adjusting payments to communities.

4.2.1 Financial benefits

Benefits are highest in areas with rich wildlife resources, particularly those near Parks and Reserves, and with low population density. Remoteness such as for CBNRM projects in the Kgalagadi, leads to higher operational costs and lower revenues for CBOs and JVA companies. CBOs that depend on veld products generate much lower revenues. For wildlife based CBOs, there is no link between the level of revenues and the inputs and efficiency of CBOs. Particularly where such CBOs make substantial amounts of money, emphasis falls on the use of these revenues rather than on increasing and diversifying revenue sources. Consequently, there is currently little incentive to perform well. The link would become stronger when CBOs manage to raise more revenues themselves from other sources than the Joint venture agreements.

Comparing four CBOs in Ngamiland and Chobe districts, Mvimi (2000) concludes that financial revenues are a function of the maturity of CBOs. Well-established CBOs tend to have a better marketing strategy, and their tendering tends to be more competitive, pushing up CBO-revenues. She uses the example of CECT that markets its elephants separately and has reserve prices, leading to higher Trust revenues.

The financial revenues have risen substantially during the 1990s, particularly for wildlife-based CBOs involved in joint venture agreements. Joint venture agreements are at present by far the largest source of revenues of CBOs. The average revenue from the joint venture agreement per resident is around P 850 per annum (2001). Assuming that CBOs generate another 25% extra, the total average financial benefit would be around P 1 050 per annum per person. This is significant in view of the extremely low incomes in most of the CBNRM villages.

Community payments (land rentals and salaries) constitute an important expenditure component of private companies involved in JVA. Data provided by one of the operators suggest that community payments constitute 40.9% of the total expenditures; 13.4% are government payments and the remainder are expenditures for services and goods, capital and management remuneration. Compared with the average for the private hunting sector, this is a very high level of community payment (average is 15.7%; ULG, 2000).

4.2.2 Employment

CBNRM creates community jobs within the CBOs and with the joint venture partners. Total CBO employment is less than 1 000 jobs, mostly in administration, management and escort guide services. To maximise community benefits, CBOs tend to recruit from
their village(s) only. Several CBOs have had to retrench due to decreasing revenues and rising costs. Joint venture companies may employ another 200 to 500 persons, bringing total CBNRM employment in the order of 1200 to 1500, or 15 to 30 jobs per CBO. While employment figures seem low, there is virtually no other formal employment in these villages outside government. Therefore, the few jobs are very important to the communities. Two cautionary observations emerged from the fieldwork. Firstly, private sector companies often offer too many jobs in their bid, and consequently cannot meet their promises and community expectations (for example KD1) or accept over-employment (for example NG 32). The former is often a source of conflicts with the community and the latter is not sustainable on the long term. Employment levels tend to be lower than those reported in the CBNRM Status Reports. Secondly, CBOs seem to hire staff too easily, not sufficiently taking into account the consequences for the recurrent expenditures. Significant retrenchments follow when CBO revenues decrease (e.g. KDT and KD1). This practice affects workers as well as the CBO operations.

4.2.3 Asset formation

More assets and greater control over assets is normally empowering communities and enhance their ability to generate income in future. The actual empowerment and income generating impact is determined by conditions that may be attached to the asset rights.

The exclusive user rights of CBOs are conditional on meeting certain requirements (cf. chapter 2) and their value is uncertain as the wildlife quotas are annually determined by DWNP. Therefore, the resource rights are rather insecure and volatile and this has implications for both revenues and the management of the CBOs. On the positive side, the rights can be sub- (and sub-sub) leased, and the resulting marketability of the lease rights enhances its value. The following other natural resource asset problems appeared during fieldwork:

- The lease period of the resources is fifteen years, and sub-leases are usually five years. This may be sufficient for commercial hunting with low capital costs, but appears too short for photo safaris. The latter requires substantial investments, and has lower initial returns. The pay-back period for photo safari activities in KD1 was reported to be close to fifty years, and consequently the joint venture company has decided to hand back its photo safari rights;
- The legal battle around the allocation of the JVA in NG 34 led to a delay in starting activities and hence a loss of income for the Trust; and
- suspension of community quota because of failure to comply with the condition to submit audited accounts. This happened for the first time in 2003 with KDT, and caused loss of revenues to the community. The quotas have been released in August 2003 without the submission of audited accounts.

In addition, CBOs aim to build assets of the community and community members in different ways:

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9 This practice has the disadvantage of recruiting in-experienced, and poorly trained staff. Interestingly, most CBO staff with relevant experience has worked for private hunting or photo safari companies in the past.

10 This is a loss to the community and country. As this was probably known at the time of tendering, one could that the private company was never serious about developing photo safaris. Incidentally, this period corresponds with the recent lease agreement concluded between a South African community and a photo safari company.

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• Some CBOs have built community assets such as a community hall and toilets;
• Some CBOs have banked part of the revenues building up financial assets and generating interest. This CBO strategy can be compared with the government’s strategy towards its foreign reserve; and
• Some CBOs have invested in training and offer scholarships to community members. Specialists within CBO had often acquired tourism and escort guide expertise in the private sector, demonstrating that CBOs are able to attract staff.

As government provides most social infrastructure, the incentive for CBOs in Botswana to invest in social infrastructure is limited. In this respect, Botswana is markedly different from other southern African countries (e.g. Zimbabwe and Namibia; cf. chapter seven).

CBOs are short of human expertise in several key areas, particularly in enterprise development and management, financial management, tourism development and professional hunting.

4.2.4 Game meat and skins

JVA often stipulate that CBOs should receive part of the game meat from commercial hunting. This benefit may be substantial, but its exact value depends on the quota of the area. In KD1 meat was sold by the Trust for P 10/kg to community members. Currently, the meat is only available during the hunting season, but canning could make this benefit available throughout the year (as suggested by the JVA company in NG 32). This benefit is highly appreciated, particularly when it directly benefits community members (Mvimi, 2000).

Skins, ostrich eggs etc. are important for craftwork. The joint venture agreement normally stipulates the beneficiaries. Where skins do not go to the community, opportunities for establishment of village craft projects are inhibited (e.g. KD 1).

4.2.5 Improved access to services and markets

Many CBOs provide community members with assistance for insurance, funerals and transport. Some such as STMT built toilets in each village yard.

KyT offers market opportunities for commercial collection and processing of veldproducts, which are actively used by 980 members. Market opportunities also increase with wildlife-based CBOs, but most CBOs have so far been unable to capitalise on these. For example, in the case study CBOs, dancing, cultural activities and crafts are hardly sold to tourists. Market opportunities are restricted, but CBOs appear poor in exploiting the limited opportunities. For example, KDT’s dancing group no longer functions, and the Trust does not benefit from the tourists passing the village en route between Chobe National Park and Moremi Game Reserve. NKXT has no cultural activities or craft work, even though these are listed in the management plan, and the joint venture company has suggested to purchase crafts. Instead, residents sell directly to Ghanzi Craft without NKXT involvement.  

11 Ghanzi Craft appears to have a monopoly on craft purchases in the area.
Paid-up KyT members receive discounts on purchases from the Trust, and a higher price for their goods sold to the Trust than non-members.

4.2.6 Community funds

Recent joint venture agreements tend to have special community funds or a social responsibility programme. These constitute undertakings by the private company in support of the communities. Often they are responses to the Terms of Reference for the bid. They are additions to the land rental and quota fees, and their total value may be substantial.

While such funds may offer direct benefits to the community, there are several problems involved. Firstly, they can be a source of disappointment and frustration within the community when the promised benefits do not materialise or work out different as expected. The programmes get squeezed when market conditions become less favourable, and the private company cannot easily afford the costs of delivery. Secondly, private companies may not be the most suitable institutions to deliver such community benefits. Thirdly, companies tend to calculate the costs of the community benefits, and deduct these from their financial bid. Therefore, it is not certain that communities gain in the end. One safari company said to be favour a straight sub-lease without additional community requirements as companies are not equipped for that role and community development is seen as a government responsibility. Another one admitted that it found it difficult to communicate with communities, also because of the excessive time requirements (and time is money during the hunting season).

4.2.7 Access to private sector resources and expertise

Through JVAs, communities have the opportunity to gain access to resources and skills that they lack. In this way, JVAs allow communities to participate in projects that would otherwise not be possible. Unfortunately, the relationships between communities and joint venture companies are often strained, and consequently the full benefits of a true joint venture do not materialise. This limits the benefits that communities may reap in terms of gaining more business understanding and skills, accessing more capital, and development of (joint) productive projects.

4.2.8 Non-material benefits

CBNRM project have significant non-material benefits to communities and community members. The major benefits are:

- higher status of CBNRM members and villages. For example, In Tswapong hills members of Kgetsi ya Tsie are often elected into other village committees (e.g. VDC);
- Development of representative village level institutions that can be used for other development efforts as well;

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12 The common relationship between communities and private companies may be best described as ‘a marriage of inconvenience’. Joint venture companies need communities to access valuable land, and the communities need the companies for their revenues. Both parties would prefer to ‘go-it-alone’ if this were possible.
Strengthening of the village identity and culture. This is sometimes associated with the perceived ‘correction of historical injustices’ such as resettlement and restrictions of community wildlife rights through the unified license system;

Local empowerment, pride development and self confidence, and reduced dependency on government support;

Technology and product development and new economic opportunities for projects in tourism and hunting;

Exposure to private sector and business thinking and management;

Opportunities to benefit from private sector expertise;

Development of skills and increased accountability;

Development of better working relations with government and other support institutions;

Better relationships between communities and conservation institutions; and

Retaining educated and productive youth in rural areas. It was reported that CBNRM projects have attracted people back from major villages.

There are also negative impacts of CBNRM projects, particularly when problems arise and divide the communities. For example, opposing factions may emerge that strive to control the CBO.

4.3 Local benefit distribution

The distribution of benefits plays an important role in the perception about CBO benefits and performance (Mvimi, 2000). It is not sufficient to generate benefit, but it is essential to distribute them fairly and wisely from an economic, social and environmental perspective. The distribution of benefits is important as it determines the CBNRM impact on livelihoods, the appreciation of the CBNRM projects and the degree to which CBNRM projects offer an incentive for members and communities to conserve natural resources.

Benefits are distributed between the community Trust, community projects and community members. Benefits can be consumed, invested in productive projects and resource conservation and/or banked.

No Trust was found to have a benefit distribution strategy. Benefit distribution appears to be a haphazard event, mostly controlled by Boards and community gatherings. There is no provision for compensation of community members that have been affected by wildlife and other natural resources. Most Trusts have limited special support for local destitutes, particularly by providing free meat.

The bulk of the financial benefits accrue to the Trusts, and very little is directly distributed to community members. Two of the four case study CBOs (KyT and STMT) have increased cash payment to community members in recent years. While some constitutions or Deeds of Trusts have a ceiling for Trust expenditures, such ceilings do not seem to function well or escape mechanisms are used to fund growing trust expenditures. Major Trust expenditure categories include salaries, vehicles, travel and sitting allowances. Trusts such as NKXT currently spend almost all their revenues on Trust expenditures.

The limited direct distributions to community members has been prompted by the belief that such disbursements would be very small and make no significant impact on members’ livelihoods. It would therefore be better to invest the funds into community
projects. Fieldwork showed that direct household payments are not common, but highly appreciated, even if the amount appears small. For example, STMT has given its members P 250 in 2002, and in NKXT-members received once a sum of P 40. Both actions were much appreciated, and contributed to a sense of belonging to the Trust. In comparison, the average KyT member receives around P 100 directly from the Trust, and probably makes another P 100-200 from direct sales, leading to an estimated total income in the order of P 200-300 per annum.

Table 4.3 gives some information about the distribution of financial benefits among community members of the four case study CBOs.

**Table 4.3: Benefit distribution for four case study CBOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBO</th>
<th>STMT (NG 34)</th>
<th>KyT</th>
<th>KDT (NG 19)</th>
<th>NKXT (KD1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of expenditures</td>
<td>1999-2001: Trust exp.: 70 to 82%; Community benefits range from 4 to 14% Capital exp.: 10 to 24% Surplus is banked.</td>
<td>Most revenues spent on Trust operation</td>
<td>Revenues spend on Trust operations and invested in development of camps</td>
<td>Mostly spent on Trust (now close to 100% of revenues) Little on projects (mostly donations) and communities (only one cash payment in 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of community benefits</td>
<td>Some community facilities Scholarships Support for soccer team</td>
<td>Empowerment Training and organisational skill development</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Social responsibility programme run by private company. Few community benefits worked out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of community member benefits</td>
<td>Annual cash payment to members Contribution to funeral expenditures Support for poorest in village Free meat for poorest in village</td>
<td>In 2003, average payment to members was around P 100. With own direct sales, members could have raised P 200-300 Growing number of micro loans</td>
<td>None at present In the past: Free game meat for destitutes Subsidised transport to Maun</td>
<td>One cash payment of P 40/member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of game meat is important for members (Mvim, 2002). Usually, private companies and CBOs share the game meat according to the JVA. However, CBOs have increased the selling of meat in order to raise revenues, at the detriment of the poor in the communities, who cannot afford to buy.

Employment creation and rotation of Board members appear to be an important way of spreading CBO benefits within the communities. Most CBOs only employ residents from the villages, and Board members are frequently rotated. This increases the percentage of households that benefit from Trust expenditures, but does not necessarily increase efficiency and effective management.

Multiple village CBOs usually split the benefits equally between villages, or weighed according to the population size. Subsequently, each village committee decides upon further disbursement of the benefits within its village. This approach is fair and
transparent, but may constrain large Trust investments that benefit the entire CBNRM area.

4.4 Livelihood security and diversity

CBNRM may improve rural livelihoods through employment, income and game meat. It may increase the livelihood level or its security, for example by diversifying livelihood sources.

The impact of CBNRM projects on livelihood levels is generally small due to the benefit distribution. Only where benefits accrue to households, have changes taken place. Except for employees and those with access to allowances, CBNRM projects are at best an additional, but not a main, source of livelihood. CBNRM has probably made a stronger contribution towards improving livelihood security by diversifying livelihood sources. Firstly, CBNRM projects provide a limited source of income from sources that hitherto did not contribute to rural livelihoods, i.e. commercial use of wildlife and veld products. Secondly, CBOs provide non-material benefits that are important to rural livelihoods, e.g. transport, insurance and funeral assistance. Thirdly, it has reduced people’s dependency on drought-prone agriculture. Fourthly, CBNRM projects have empowered community members with assets that can support future livelihoods. These include natural resource use rights, financial assets and credit, physical assets and human skills. In this way, communities have the opportunity to reduce dependency on government handouts, and increase livelihood security.

Several factors have limited the livelihood contribution of CBNRM projects, including:
- Limited cash payments to community members;
- Limited economic diversification of revenue basis, and reliance on wildlife quota;
- Strong reduction in quota and quota dependent income (e.g. NKXT); and
- Absence of a strategy to assist community members to cope with droughts. This may be considered to be a government duty, but in other Southern African countries communities use revenues to compensate livelihood losses due to drought (see chapter seven).

The poverty reduction potential of CBNRM projects is well known as the community revenues from JVAs is often similar, and is some cases much higher than the monthly income of households (Arntzen, 2003). Assuming that all JVA-income would be directly distributed to households, the per capita income would range from just over P 200 in the Kgalagadi north (NKXT) to well over P 3 694.80 in Sankuyo (STMT; Table 4.4). The table shows the differences in financial benefits among CBOs as well as the rapid increase in revenues realised in STMT (NG 34).

Table 4.4: Per capita income from joint venture agreements (comm. revenues; 2000-02)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita joint venture income</th>
<th>STMT (NG 34)</th>
<th>KDT (NG 19)</th>
<th>NKXT (KD 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000</td>
<td>761.20</td>
<td>2750.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>574.36</td>
<td>1438.85</td>
<td>322.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>3694.80</td>
<td>2790.70</td>
<td>204.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: case studies-2003 fieldwork

In some cases, CBNRM projects may have adversely affected rural livelihoods. For example, most residents of KD1 benefited from special game licenses prior to the
establishment of NKXT. Under pressure to raise revenues, the trust is selling a growing part of the community quota to the private company, leaving very little for subsistence hunting. During the period 2001 and 2003, NKXT lost 337 hunting quota (out of a total of 533!). This loss of quota mostly affected the communities as the private hunting company only lost 14 quota as compared to 224 lost by the community).

This affects livelihoods as most game meat is sold. Community members would currently be better off if the community quotas are entirely used for subsistence hunting than the present one.

4.5 Alternatives for CBNRM

CBNRM offers a balanced social, economic and environmental approach towards sustainable rural development. It is based on the premise that local natural resources offer comparative advantages that need to be exploited to the benefit of the local communities, either by the communities themselves or on behalf of the communities (e.g. sub-lease).

There appear to be few alternative development and conservation approaches. Social welfare approaches and RADP mostly provide handouts, and have not been successful in empowering communities (BIDPA, 2003). The limits of traditional conservation approaches (e.g. Parks and quota management) have become evident over the last twenty years, and it is realised that:

- Government does not have the capacity to effectively conserve all natural resources;
- Parks and Reserves are not sufficient to sustain the country’s wildlife resources;
- Communities deserve compensation for the costs of living with natural resources such as wildlife;

With respect to alternative sources of livelihoods, the situation differs substantially between eastern and western/northern Botswana. Most CBNRM projects operate in remote parts of western and northern Botswana where the agricultural potential is marginal and other economic opportunities are extremely difficult. Few have crop production and livestock is fairly limited. Livestock production appears the only alternative productive activity at present. Goats (Ncaang), donkeys (Ngwatle) and cattle (Ukhwi) were found in the KD 1 settlements, and numbers are reported to be increasing. As provided in the land management plan, residents want a 20 km radius for livestock production\textsuperscript{13}, and be able to acquire water points.

In terms of management, government-led development and conservation as well as private sector-led development and conservation do not appear to offer the same balanced social, economic and environmental compromise in the communal areas that CBNRM projects. The CPP model (community-private sector partnership) appears most promising, provided that the partnership can evolve into a more constructive and innovative one.

\textsuperscript{13} It was strongly felt that only residents should use these village-grazing areas. Fears were expressed that the grazing areas would be open to outsiders.
4.6 National benefits of CBNRM projects

Although the magnitude of the CBNRM projects is small in terms of generated income and employment, the projects are significant for Botswana’s future, particularly for the development of western and northern Botswana. CBNRM projects exploit comparative advantages in areas with few alternative development opportunities, and they reduce the country’s reliance on the mining sector.

The projects have several important benefits to the national economy. Firstly, they offer growth opportunities for commercial hunting, tourism and commercial use of veld products. This offers additional incentives for foreign investments as the case of HCH’s involvement in NG 34 shows. Hitherto, the commercial sector was concentrated on private and State land. As communal areas constitute a large part of the country, the CBNRM projects offer substantial economic growth potential. The importance of the commercial hunting has been assessed in 2000. The sector generates and estimated US$ 12.5 million per annum, mostly from elephants, buffalo, leopards and lion hunting (Table 4.5). The sector makes a significant contribution to the local economy (half of the expenditures), but the sector depends strongly on a few wildlife species, particularly elephants.

Table 4.5: Economic importance of the commercial hunting sector

- The commercial hunting sector generated a gross income of US$ 6 million in 2000;
- Daily rates and trophy fees are the main sources of revenues (46.6% and 34.9% respectively);
- Revenues from elephant hunting account for over half of the license and trophy income (56.2); other important species: buffalo (6.5%), leopard (6.6%) and lion (4.7%);
- Main expenditures are agent’s commission (23%), payment for services and goods (22.9%), government payments (15.7%) and payments to communities (15.7%);
- Almost half of the expenditures benefit the local economy (49.5%). The rest is spent almost equally abroad (24.8%) and elsewhere in Botswana (25.7%);
- The ban on lion hunting costs the sector an estimated US$ 1.3 million. Restrictions on elephant hunting in some areas US$ 1.6 million. Any change in elephant quota will have major economic impacts on the hunting sector and CBOs.


Unfortunately, similar data are not available for the commercial photographic sector. Due to its greater labour and capital requirements, benefits to the local economy and increased investments are expected to be significant. Secondly, CBNRM projects bring together private sector and community resources, and this form of resource pooling could relieve development constraints of the communities, and hence accelerate community development and growth. CBNRM and private sector-community partnerships could benefit other areas of development too (e.g. village water reticulation in Namibia; cf. chapter seven). Thirdly, CBNRM projects exploit comparative advantages such as the wilderness without fences and resource abundance and variety (cf. Table 2.1). While there may be some CBNRM-competition with neighbouring countries, Botswana’s CBNRM projects are unique through the large communal areas and wilderness experience. Private companies recognise this special niche, and are keen to add communal areas to their concession areas. Fourthly, unlike most other projects CBNRM projects continue to attract donor assistance to the benefit of individual projects.
and the country at large. Table 4.5 shows the level of financial assistance offered by some of the international donor agencies\textsuperscript{14}. The inputs of the four donors amount to around P 24.5 million since 1995 in the form of grants and technical assistance. Annual donor support is probably in the range of P 2 to 4 million. This is substantial in view of the annual CBO-revenues generated from CBNRM projects. While most donors have withdrawn, or will soon do so, others such as ADF and WUSC appear to become more active. ADF funds are matched by government, and therefore have an increased funding impact on CBNRM projects. A recent review of the EU-funded Third Micro Projects Programme (Land, 2002) observes that only a few MPP projects are associated with natural resource management, and recommends that the MPP programme:

- Should make itself better known to NGOs and CBOs;
- Get more involved in non-wildlife based CBNRM activities, particularly veld products; and:
- Identifies partner organisations and individuals that can offer technical guidance.

This brief discussion of donors leads to the conclusion that CBNRM funding is unlikely to dry up in future.

\textit{Table 4.6: CBNRM-Support of selected international donors}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & SNV & GEF & ADF & Canadian support (WUSC/ SIDA) \\
\hline
Support to CBOs & 9 137 500; 4 Kgalagadi CBOs benefit & 1 345 95; 8 CBOs benefit & 2 819 898 & 70 000 + 2 TAs; 2 CBOs benefit \\
\hline
Support to NGOs & 3 450 000; 5 NGOs benefit & 267 421 & 1 478 540 & 152 739 + 3 TAs; 5 NGOs benefit \\
\hline
Support to other CBNR institutions & 5 325 000, incl. Support programme and SNV project costs & 0 & 0 & 135 174; benefits to 9 organisations \\
\hline
Total CBNRM related support & 17 990 278 & 1 613 416 & 4 298 438 & 357 913+ 5 TAs; \\
\hline
Average annual support & 1 990 278 & 403 354 & 1 074 609 & Difficult to calculate \\
\hline
\hline
Comment & Grants and TA. SNV support ends in 2003. & Grants: 1 capacity building project & ADF support is co-funded by government (50: 50). Total CBNRM support is therefore double. Probably, grants will be offered to at least another 3 CBOs. & CBO support since 2001; mostly small grants and/or TA. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Sources: based on data supplied by donors.

\textsuperscript{14} These are the donors that responded to our request for information about CBNRM funding.
Fifthly, CBNRM projects empower communities, and have the potential to reduce dependency on government handouts from welfare programmes, drought relief and remote area development programme. In other words, properly managed CBNRM projects could lead to reduce government expenditures in these areas. Sixthly, community empowerment, self-identity and confidence are key component of Botswana’s Vision 2016. Therefore, CBNRM projects appear to contribute towards the implementation of Vision 2016. Seventh, CBNRM activities generate government revenues through taxation and district royalties (4% of gross income of private companies goes to District Council). Total government revenues from private hunting companies is estimated to be US$ 0.9 million per annum (see Table 4.5). Finally, CBNRM projects are credited with retaining younger, better-educated and more productive people in rural areas, and offer an alternative for urbanisation. Some even argue that people have resettled from major villages into small CBNRM-villages. Fieldwork clearly showed that Trust employees are usually younger persons, who might have otherwise moved to urban areas.

It is clear from the review of impacts that the CBNRM projects do not yet fully exploit their potential. Currently identified constraints of national importance include the following:

- Commercial hunting generates most revenues. The case studies showed that the potential for commercial tourism is under-utilised both by communities and private companies. The current lease period is too short to earn back the necessary tourism investment. Moreover, most private companies currently involved in JVA are specialised in hunting. They lack the drive and skills to develop photographic safaris.
- The handing over of commercial lodges to CBOs was not planned and therefore led to their collapse. The lost tourism has been an economic costs to the country and the private sector, and did not help communities either. The lodges are slowly brought back in operation, but it is doubtful whether communities possess the resources to efficiently run these lodges. Partnership with specialised tourism companies seems more prudent, and will probably bring more longer term benefits to the communities (see Table 4.7 for a South African example);
- Strained relationships between private companies and communities as well as inadequate role of the private sector in CBNRM support.
- CBNRM has given a value to wildlife resources in communal areas. Therefore, changes in wildlife use rights have to be carefully made and justified. For example, the lion-hunting ban has caused substantial economic losses to communities and private companies. Suspension of wildlife rights caused by non-compliance of communities leads to similar economic losses to communities, private sector and the country at large. It is recommended to explore alternatives for full stop suspension. Income losses make it more difficult for communities to put their house in order. An alternative could be to temporarily appoint an administrator, who administers the quota on behalf of the quota and ensures that the community has puts its house in order within a given time period. Failure to do so would lead to permanent withdrawal of the community.
Table 4.7: Example of a switch from hunting to tourism safaris in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Makuleke Community in South Africa has formed a Communal Property Association with ownership of around 24 000 ha of the Kruger Park (northern part). The CPA announced in 2000 its intention to start hunting elephants and buffaloes to raise revenues.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In 2003, the CPA signed a Rand 45 million deal with an international company for up-market tourism. The deal involves the following benefits for the CPA:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Construction of three lodges;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CPA will earn around 8% of the turn-over;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Employment of around 80 people and skill development; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The CPA will own the lodges after 45 years (= duration of contract).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CPA signed an earlier contract with another tourism company that build and operates one lodge in the CPA area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CPA estimated the potential hunting income at Rand 2.8 million p.a. The company expects to beat that amount within three to four years. The deal also resolves the conflicts between a hunting ban inside National Parks and the hunting rights of the community that owns land inside the Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible lessons for Botswana:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Photo safaris may be more profitable and sustainable on the longer term than hunting;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-existence of Parks and CBNRM offer additional development and conservation opportunities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Photo safaris require a long lease period, and joint venture agreements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It may not be necessary to stick to one tourism partner in areas with many distinct beautiful sites.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.7 Concluding remarks

The socio-economic impacts of CBNRM projects are generally positive, particularly with respect to revenue generation through joint venture agreements and non-material benefits. The main local benefits include: revenue generation, employment creation and accumulation of assets (both at community and household level). Other benefits include game meat and improved access to services and market. While the community funds or social responsibility programmes do bring benefits to the communities, they rarely live up to the expectations and it is doubted whether the private companies are the most suitable partner for addressing the community needs. It may be better to seek assistance from elsewhere. Finally, CBNRM projects yield important national benefits, including employment creation, economic diversification, more room for the commercial tourism industry, a ray of hope and support for rural development in areas with few viable alternatives, reduced dependency on government hand-outs and scope for self empowerment, and decrease in welfare programmes and expenditures. The CBNRM projects help to keep (some) youth in rural areas, and contribute towards Vision 2016.

Several areas of concern emerged from the assessment. Firstly, at present most CBOs seem unable to establish and successfully run projects (with a few exceptions). This severely limits their income raising potential (non-rent/ fee based). Market opportunities are limited in most villages, but the current Trusts do not fully exploit existing opportunities (e.g. crafts, cultural performances). With the departure of donors, this leaves a highly vulnerable revenue basis, mostly dependent on hunting revenues. Secondly, financial planning and expenditure control is generally weak (again with some exceptions), and can deteriorate quickly without external assistance. Most Trust
experience difficulties controlling their expenditures on vehicles, wages and allowances (except KyT that was forced to curb expenditure due to drying up of donor funds). This is particularly risky, as Trust revenues have proven to be volatile and fragile. A healthy financial situation can turn very quickly in a difficult one. Two of the four case study Trusts experience serious financial difficulties at the moment (Table 4.1). Thirdly, the benefit distribution is weak and ad-hoc. CBOs do not have a benefit distribution strategy, and community members benefit little. Often, Trust expenditures take up a large and growing part of the revenues, leaving little funds for distribution among members, for investment and for natural resource management. The current benefit distribution restricts the current and future livelihood impacts of CBNRM projects, and makes Trusts dependent on external financial support for investments and resource conservation. This path is not sustainable. Fourthly, the opportunities of community-private sector partnership are under-utilised at the detriment of both communities and private companies. Private companies could assist communities with enterprise development and financial management, and identify financial assistance (e.g. lodges). Fifthly, CBNRM projects need to consider alternative livelihood sources, including agriculture, and integrate these into their management plans. There is little evidence that this is happening. Sixthly, the handing over of commercial lodges to CBOs was not properly done as CBOs were ill prepared and lacked the capacity to operate the lodges.

There is great diversity in CBNRM projects and in their performance. Generally, the older CBOs (STMT and KyT) perform better than the recently established ones (KDT and NKXT), suggesting that the time and learning factor is important. While KyT has problems adjusting to less donor funds, it has been successful in selling products and curbing expenditures. Clearly, STMT has had the most significant socio-economic impacts; mostly because of the ‘JVA windfall revenues’ that sharply increased with the new joint venture company HCH. However, it also shows some ability to run projects, and distributes more revenues to community members than most other CBOs. NKXT as well as KDT do not perform well at present. NKXT performed surprisingly well in 2000; its recent poor recent performance results from over-reliance on external support, (leading to a rapid decline in Trust management and systems after the support was withdrawn), marginal natural resources and high costs of operations. KDT is located in one of the best wildlife areas in the country, but it has had serious management problems that landed the Trust into debts, and forced retrenchment of all staff. Poor management, lack of transparency and accountability, and inability of the community to take action are among the underlying causes.
CHAPTER FIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

5.1 Introduction

Resource conservation is a major objective of CBNRM projects, and it is therefore important to assess the environmental impacts of CBNRM projects in Botswana.

For most projects, no environmental baseline data exist, and environmental impacts are not regularly monitored, other than through resource sightings by community escort guides (CEG). It was therefore impossible for this review to assess the environmental impacts in detail and quantitatively. The impact of CBNRM on resource sustainability can therefore not be assessed. The findings in this chapter are based on a literature review, interviews with key persons and perceptions about environmental impacts expressed during the focus group discussions and the district workshops.

At present, most CBNRM projects depend on wildlife resources; some such as KyT also make use of veldproducts. The CBNRM approach can be generalised to other resources such as fisheries and wood resources (cf. Malawi’s CBNRM; chapter seven).

The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, the main general environmental issues are discussed, followed by environmental issues related to wildlife in section 5.3. Section 5.4 deals with veldproducts and section 5.4 with other environmental issues emerging from CBNRM projects.

CBNRM projects are part of complex ecosystems, where an intricate balance between the different components of the system is required, for the long-term sustainability of such projects and ecosystems. This therefore calls for active resource management by communities that balances resource utilisation and conservation. Few CBOs appear to adopt and implement a holistic approach towards NRM, and focus on resource utilisation and limited monitoring.

5.2 Common environmental issues

5.2.1 Holistic approach towards NRM

At present, few people feel really involved in local natural resource management despite the CEGs (Mbaiwa, 1999). Active natural resource management involves monitoring of whole systems, whereby indicator variables that can reflect the health of the ecosystem at any point in time, are identified and monitored. Interventions (where necessary) by communities to maintain or improve the status of the ecosystem should be encouraged. For instance, drilling of water points may assist to retain wildlife resources in a particular CBNRM area (e.g. NG 34), but the water point may have implication for wildlife mobility and hence wildlife resources in other CBNRM areas and Game Reserves. CBNRM communities could also under this active resource management approach re-introduce animal species that have been decimated in their areas. This has been successfully done in some CAMFIRE Districts.

In the current system, the only monitoring that takes place within CBNRM is that of wildlife species. In the active environmental management approach, communities would actively monitor resources themselves, and could even financially contribute towards the
costs of aerial surveys. Monitoring within the active resource management approach would require the identification of indicator variables (that could reflect the health of the ecosystem at any point in time) and baseline information on the indicator variables.

The holistic approach would lead to the determination of sustainable quota, and balance short and long-term interests. It would also contribute to greater economic sustainability as:

- Economic opportunities of both wildlife and veldproduct resources will be reviewed, and the best ones exploited; and
- Consumptive as well as non-consumptive use of wildlife resources will be reviewed, and exploited in a more balanced way than at present. The case studies showed clearly that the photo safari potential of wildlife resources is currently under-utilised in favour of hunting.

5.2.2 Growing appreciation of natural resources

Despite the limited direct benefits of natural resources for the local population, their attitude towards wildlife resources and veld products is positive, seemingly based on a better understanding of the resource user opportunities. Most people expressed no fear of living with wildlife resources, and in Kgetsi ya Tse communities indicated that they had learned new ways of using local veldproducts.

Related to this positive resource attitude, is the fact that CBOs express appreciation for the role of DWNP, even despite the fact that some had their quota suspended. This is an important intangible benefit that offers a good basis for closer collaboration and partnership between DWNP and communities.

5.2.3 Reduced pressure on rural agriculture

CBNRM projects curb agricultural transformation, which otherwise would have occurred. Therefore, CBNRM projects prevent the penetration of agriculture into areas with a marginal agricultural potential, thus protecting such areas against environmental problems such as land degradation and bush encroachment.

5.2.4 Reduced demand for outreach programme of National Parks and Game Reserves

In Eastern Africa, communities are benefiting from Park outreach programmes. Due to the CBNRM-opportunities in communal areas in southern Africa, there appears to be less demand for Park outreach programmes. This was demonstrated by the case studies. However, there is need to fully integrate opportunities offered by nearby Parks into the CBNRM projects (e.g. Khwai and KD1), primarily through the promotion of photographic safaris and support services (crafts, cultural activities).
5.3 Wildlife resources

5.3.1 Introduction

Wildlife resources are not evenly spread over the country. Most wildlife resources are found in western and northern Botswana, with high densities around the Okavango and Chobe. The fieldwork clearly showed the spatial differences in wildlife resources numbers and variety:

- None sited in Tswapong hills for KyT study;
- Sankuyo: groups of giraffes and impalas were sited daily. In addition, zebra, steenbok, duiker as well as several big bird species were spotted;
- In Khwai, elephants, lechwe, impala, warthog, hyena, zebra, waterbuck and giraffes were spotted. Sounds of lions and hippo were heard at night.
- In KD1, animals that were sighted included hartebeest, duiker, ostriches and a jackal, mostly in small groups.

Wildlife resources in CBNRM areas are closely intertwined with those in National Parks and Game Reserves such as Moremi Game Reserve, Chobe National Park and Gemsbok Transfrontier Park. CBNRM areas are rightfully considered wildlife corridors between existing National Parks (e.g. Moremi Game Reserve, Kgalagadi Transfrontier National Park), and thus contributing to the protection of genetic diversity of wildlife species.

The current national wildlife population levels and trends from 1987 show that most species have remained stable, whilst steenbok, impala and elephant numbers show increases by up to 5%. Water dependent species: buffalo; lechwe; hippo; and sitatunga substantially declined, probably due to contracting surface water sources in recent years around the Okavango and the surrounding areas that substantially restricted the amount of suitable habitat and forage available to these species. Destruction of the habitats of these species (especially sitatunga) by widespread burning of Papyrus beds in the Okavango Panhandle has also occurred (ULG Consultants, 1993)

The factors operating at a national level and patterns observed in national populations may not necessarily apply to particular CBNRM projects. For instance the national zebra and buffalo populations have been stable since 1994, but zebra sub-populations in the Savuti ecosystem and buffalo populations in the Okavango system are still declining. Populations of impala (in Northern Botswana-especially Chobe), sable in the agricultural areas east of Chobe National Park, wildebeest and springbok in Kgalagadi District, eland in western Ngamiland, tsessebe in the Okavango Delta, warthog in the Linyati/Kwando river system, gemsbok in Northern Kgalagadi and Ghanzi, steenbok in Chobe National Park and Moremi Game Reserve are on the decline. However increases in populations of wildebeest in Central Kalahari, Moremi Game Reserve and Tuli Block, kudu in Central Kalahari and Makgadikgadi are evident. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show wildlife populations and trends for the Kgalagadi and Ngamiland Districts where the wildlife-based CBNRM projects (case studies) are located.

Final report of the CBNRM Review Study
### Table 5.1: Estimated wildlife resources in Kgalagadi (1987-2001)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baboon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bat-eared fox</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown hyena</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>4,003</td>
<td>8,703</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gemsbok</td>
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<td>366</td>
<td>1402</td>
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<td>58,299</td>
<td>70,407</td>
<td>72,086</td>
<td>75,588</td>
<td>55,646</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hartebeest</td>
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<td>16,709</td>
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<td>17,341</td>
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<td>Jackal</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>209</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>148</td>
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<td>Ostrich</td>
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<td>615</td>
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<td>Sheep $ Goats</td>
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<td>54,861</td>
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<td>53,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steenbok</td>
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<td>893</td>
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<td>Warthog</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wildebeest</td>
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<td>139</td>
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<td>6,263</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>7459</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>6,679</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: DWNP (Gaborone)

### Table 5.2: Estimated wildlife resources in Ngamiland District (1987-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1,517</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>3,509</td>
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<td>5,616</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown hyena</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,881</td>
<td>47,811</td>
<td>60,614</td>
<td>41,612</td>
<td>24,643</td>
<td>19,162</td>
<td>33,209</td>
<td>80,440</td>
<td>72,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush pig</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>15,565</td>
<td>8,848</td>
<td>8,739</td>
<td>286,708</td>
<td>229,321</td>
<td>220,178</td>
<td>212,967</td>
<td>20490</td>
<td>136,962</td>
<td>122572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crocodile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>21,045</td>
<td>17,109</td>
<td>13,505</td>
<td>20,147</td>
<td>22,943</td>
<td>22,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duiker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eland</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elephant</td>
<td>31,079</td>
<td>41,280</td>
<td>35,534</td>
<td>30,867</td>
<td>53,652</td>
<td>49,095</td>
<td>56,744</td>
<td>77,003</td>
<td>67,568</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemsbok</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>7,869</td>
<td>10,876</td>
<td>10,408</td>
<td>14,412</td>
<td>14,466</td>
<td>16,312</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giraffe</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>4,437</td>
<td>7,299</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>10,179</td>
<td>7,933</td>
<td>10,109</td>
<td>9,511</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartebeest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hippo</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>2,398</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>13,613</td>
<td>9,060</td>
<td>8,954</td>
<td>11,366</td>
<td>10,065</td>
<td>11,950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>21,391</td>
<td>20991</td>
<td>34,724</td>
<td>22,631</td>
<td>42,601</td>
<td>49,876</td>
<td>57,014</td>
<td>45,006</td>
<td>21,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DWNP (Gaborone)
Issues related to wildlife-based CBNRM projects are discussed below.

5.3.2 Determination of hunting quota

Resource monitoring can be done by aerial surveys and by ground surveys. Aerial surveys are the main monitoring tool in Botswana.

The DWNP uses aerial surveys to monitor wildlife resources throughout the country. Aerial survey techniques are considered reliable for counting large game and livestock, provided that the animal species are evenly distributed, reasonably common and occur in groups of five or more (ULG Consultants, 1993). Small animal species that are solitary and well camouflaged are usually substantially underestimated, and therefore correction factors need to be applied to the raw data to provide acceptable wildlife resource estimates. Aerial surveys are unreliable for small CBNRM areas if the survey strategy is designed for much large areas. The general consensus is that the population estimates from aerial surveys are useful to monitor wildlife resources, particularly to determine long-term trends. The emphasis by such estimates is on the relative rather than absolute differences between numbers.

Aerial surveys are technically and logistically complex and extremely expensive. It is very costly to carry out annual aerial surveys in all parts of the country. Therefore, aerial surveys may be done selectively (for specific species or areas) and not annually. For instance in Zimbabwe, WWF conducts aerial surveys every two years for areas where elephant populations are relatively high but once every five years for other districts. In that event, aerial surveys have to be supplemented by low cost, local ground survey techniques.

Ground surveys often supplement aerial surveys. For instance, in CAMPFIRE of Zimbabwe, the experience and information from professional hunters and safari operators is used to supplement the aerial surveys. In addition, information from CBOs could be used. In Botswana for instance CBNRM (e.g. STMT) employ Community Escort Guides (CEGs) who monitor hunting activities of the operators. The CEGs should also collect data on wildlife numbers and mortalities, although such records were not available during field surveys. It appears that the activities of the CEGs are not systematic and well coordinated. For example it is not very clear how the counting by CEGs is done, and records (if any) are poorly kept. It is also unclear how their records have contributed towards the setting of annual quota by the DWNP. The use of CBO monitoring data would improve the awareness of the CBO about the resource status, and reduce the overall costs of wildlife monitoring.

Ground information has proven invaluable for estimating smaller wildlife species that occur in moderate numbers. Ground surveys are much cheaper, and can therefore be carried out more frequently. A potential problem is that safari operators and/or CBO may tend to exaggerate numbers of wildlife species encountered for short term benefits that may not be ecological sustainable.

The following are some of the low cost community methods that have been successfully implemented in the CAMPFIRE of Zimbabwe: village mapping, pooling information from

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15 A brief pilot project to assist CBOs with resource monitoring and recording has not been followed-up, and did not root in CBOs (pers. Comm.: Rozemeijer)
different experts and sharing of information through workshops and derivation of resource estimates by district

The Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) monitors wildlife populations for purposes of setting sustainable quotas. Once individual wildlife species populations are estimated, sustainable harvesting quotas are set, normally as a conservative off-take percentage of the estimated wildlife resources. Determination of quota for local conditions is carried out bearing in mind the following:

- The carrying capacity of the local environment;
- Uses of wildlife species for different purposes; and
- Population dynamics vis-à-vis use of the species.

In community areas, communities are consulted about the draft quotas, but CBOs feel that their comments are never considered, hence consider their input as fruitless. The case studies showed that perceptions differ between DWNP and communities as to the wildlife resources. Most communities believed that wildlife resources were stable or increasing, and hence did not understand decreases in their quota.

5.3.3 Monitoring of wildlife off-take

Off-take refers to the number of animals per species removed through hunting, selling or disease. Several methods have been used to monitor wildlife off-take in CBNRM projects, including:

- Safari operators must keep records of trophy quality. These records show the lengths of horns for trophy animals, body length for carnivore species and tusk weight for elephants. The records kept by safari operators would reflect the deteriorating quality of harvested species, and quotas could be adjusted accordingly. Table 5.3 shows the actual off-take and quota for KD1. As off-take was lower than the recommended quota, over-harvesting is unlikely to occur.
- Detailed records of game animals used for cropping, problem animal control, live sales or any other use must be kept;
- Game counts, aerial surveys and wildlife sightings provide information on wildlife species numbers, essential to monitoring sustainable off-take; and
- Local guides (CEGs) and DWNP accompany the trophy hunters to make sure that what is licensed is actually what is harvested.

Table 5.3: Hunting off take and quotas in KD 1 by settlement (1999-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Gemsbok</th>
<th>Sprinbok</th>
<th>Kudu</th>
<th>Duiker</th>
<th>steenbok</th>
<th>Ostrich</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>killed</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>killed</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukwi</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ncaang</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwatle</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Final report of the CBNRM Review Study
Total off-take is sometimes argued to be probably still well in excess of the formally permitted levels. This is either through outright poaching or through the fatal wounding of large numbers of animals during shooting (reportedly as much as five wounded for every one kill for some species) by less skilled hunters (ULG Consultants, 1993).

5.3.4 Wildlife regeneration

At a general level, the wildlife trends are subject to the boom and bust cycles that are characteristic of the semi-arid savannas. These wildlife cycles are associated with rainfall cycles and variability\(^\text{16}\). As there is a basic correlation between primary biomass and annual rainfall in semi-arid savannas (Coe et al., 1976), wildlife numbers drop dramatically during droughts such as the 1980s drought. Animal species hard hit were the wildebeest, hartebeest, zebra and buffalo, which decreased by between 50-90% from their baseline surveys (ULG Consultants, 1993).

The effect of drought on wildlife populations has been exacerbated by human factors. Restriction of movement imposed by veterinary cordon fences, excessive hunting and expansion of livestock grazing adversely affected wildlife populations in the country (ULG Consultants, 1993).

5.3.5 Poaching

CBOs, private sector companies and government staff agree that poaching is low in CBNRM areas, and seem to have decreased. However, there is no conclusive quantitative evidence to support this view. Figures for Ngamiland show that the poaching mostly takes place outside CBNRM areas (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Reported poaching cases in Ngamiland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{16}\) Tyson’s quasi-18 year oscillation of annual rainfall in the Kalahari is characterised by nine good years followed by nine bad within which a typical succession of 3-4 good or bad years is typical
The private sector company mentioned two cases of poaching in NG 34. In KD1, poaching has decreased, but continues on a small scale. Data provided by DWNP-Hukuntsi recorded one case of poaching inside KD1. Poaching in KD2 is more common, and demonstrates that CBNRM in itself is not sufficient to eradicate poaching, particularly if the direct benefits to households are limited. The decrease in quotas available to community members in KD1 increases the risks of resumption of poaching in this area.

Three notes of caution were raised during the district workshops. Firstly, poaching may increase outside CBNRM areas\(^\text{17}\), and could even involve CBO-members. Secondly, the reported poaching cases are an underestimate, and the true level of poaching is not known. Thirdly, poaching may be low due to other factors such as anti-poaching efforts and substantial government support.

### 5.3.5 Landscape preservation

CBNRM is a form of land use that encourages the conservation of biodiversity, and that contributes to the preservation of open grassy dominated shrub lands of the Kalahari (e.g. KD1). Research in the Kalahari shows that thorny woody vegetation has replaced grass-dominated plant communities in the vicinity of pans that are used for livestock watering (Moleele and Mainah, 2003). Moleele and Chanda (2003) have shown for the Kgalagadi North Sub-District that bush encroachment is common within the communal livestock grazing areas and TGLP ranches as compared to Wildlife Management Areas (WMA).

### 5.4 Veld products

Veld products are rangeland resources that broadly include plants, insects and various mineralised and clay soils. These products may either be for consumption, medicinal or decorative purposes. Of the four CBNRM case studies, veld products play a major role in Kgetsi ya Tsie, and to a lesser extent in NKXT. The main veldproducts involved are summarised in Table 5.5.

### Table 5.5: Main veld products harvested by Kgetsi ya Tsie and Ngwaa Khobee Xeya Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kgetsi ya Tsie</th>
<th>Ngwaa Khobee Xeya Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phane: edible caterpillar that feed on the mopane tree. No longer bought by KyT as sufficient middlemen exist.</td>
<td>Natural teas– <em>Lippia javanica</em> (Mosokujane), <em>Lippia Scaberrinia</em> (Mosukudu) and <em>Artemisia afra</em> (Lengana). Propagation discontinued.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{17}\) The Ngamiland figures do, however, not show an increase in poaching elsewhere.
Morogo: indigenous spinach

Grapple plant occurs, but is currently not actively harvested and sold to NKXT or TL. Other products with a potential may include the morama bean

Mosata: high protein meat substitute made from the fruits of mosata tree

Morula jelly: jelly made from morula tree fruit

Morula oil: oil made from pressed morula tree fruit nut. The most important veld product at the moment

Morula soap: soap made from morula oil and coconut oil

Lerotse jam: jam made from the locally grown melons

Monepenepe: traditional herbal remedy for blood cleaning and relief of menstruation pains

Letsoku: natural face powder

Gala le Tshwene: traditional herbal remedy for strokes, high blood pressure and headaches

Khwai Development Trust had initially a thatching grass group, but this group has collapsed. No funds are available to revive the group, but collection of thatching grass remains important for families. During fieldwork, almost the entire village was out to collect grass (and sell it at P10/bundle\(^{18}\)), demonstrating the potential to re-activate this veld product activity.

5.4.1 Veld product regeneration and propagation

Regeneration of veld products is determined by several factors such as droughts, other land uses, grazing pressure by livestock and wildlife, veld fires and natural hazards such as frosts and hail storms.

Over harvesting can affect the regeneration of veld products, and the commercialisation of veld products within CBNRM projects increases the risks of over-harvesting for short-term gains. The fieldwork for KyT suggested that KyT does not have major adverse environmental impacts due to several factors: abundance of indigenous trees, part of the plant or tree used (e.g. fruit instead of roots), limited harvesting and harvesting techniques (e.g. picking mostly fruits, not harvesting phane until its propor reaches its fifth stage of growth, taking side roots not tap roots). The project has potentially increased morula tree resources by planting 1500 seedlings and training eight members from each village in grafting techniques. While members have substantial knowledge of the local environment, they do not monitor resources, and determine the potential for harvesting and the long-term resource trends. A committee was set up to look at any misuse of the natural resources and to examine the base for each resource. Resource monitoring needs to be incorporated in the regular project activities as resource sustainability determines the long-term sustainability of the project.

\(^{18}\) Consequently, focus group discussions were held outside the village (up to 35 km. distance). Villagers were uncertain about the market prospects of the collected grass.
Where CBNRM projects are a substitute for livestock grazing such as in the Kgalagadi, the lower grazing pressure is expected to have a positive impact on the regeneration of veldproducts.

5.4.2 Identification of veldproducts with a commercial potential

Case studies such as NKXT show that CBOs may plant and cultivate veldproducts without prior investigation of their ecological and commercial potential is properly assessed. This leads to disappointment within the communities and is inefficient use of project resources. In Ukwi and Ncaang two veld products demonstration plots were established with the aim of demonstrating the viability of veld products propagation. The Herbal Tea Project was initiated with the view of diversifying veld products in KD1. However, the project was not a success due to shortage of water, unsuitable physical characteristics of the Kalahari environment and destruction by rodents.

In KyT, mophane sales were scaled down after an assessment was made of the costs involved for the Trust, and the price it could offer its members. The price would not be attractive for members and therefore members sell mophane directly to trades without Trust involvement.

The mophane worm has the potential for use as phane silk cocoons (Molebatsi and Athopheng, 1998). The viability of such a project has however never been explored in Botswana. Currently CSIR of South Africa provides the most lucrative market for the cocoons. Molebatsi and Athopheng (1998) point out that Phane silk is rare and costs about P350/kg before spinning. On average, a finished garment (depending on how much silk was used) would cost about P250.00. This is an industry with a lot of potential and needs to be further explored in the country.

In Ngamiland, Trusts have suggested to barter veldproducts to enhance each other’s productive potential. For example, a CBNRM area with large thatching grass resources could allow other CBOs to harvest part of it in exchange for the mokola palm, which was scarce in that particular CBNRM area.

In brief, veldproducts are an under-researched area, whose potential for CBNRM is not sufficiently known. Mistakes such as the introduction of veldproducts from other parts of the country need to be avoided. KyT demonstrates that ecological as well as economic market considerations should be investigated right at the beginning.

5.5 Tourism-related environmental issues

Although the current emphasis of CBNRM projects lies with hunting, tourism activities such as lodges and campsites generate their own type of environmental issues that need to be considered. The most important ones are discussed below.

**Illegal roads and campsites in environmental sensitive areas**

Tourists may open illegal roads/routes in environmental sensitive areas. Such roads reduce the scenic beauty of the area, and may disturb wildlife resources. Some of such tracks were found in NG 19.
Campsites should be planned in such a way that the tourism carrying capacity level is not exceeded. For example, the radius between each tourist facility (campsites and lodges) should recognise the ecological impacts of such facilities on the environment (Mbaiwa, 2002).

**Feeding of wildlife**

Mbaiwa (2002) found that some tour operators feed animals such as baboons, fish and crocodiles to attract wildlife to specific areas for better viewing by tourists. Feeding animals is illegal, as this encourages animals to become troublesome, hence calling for problem animal control measures.

**Bushfires**

Bushfires have ravaged some important habitats for wildlife such as the Papyrus beds in the Okavango Panhandle, which are favoured by Sitatunga. Both natural and anthropogenic factors are held responsible for these fires. Mbaiwa (2002) argues that some safari companies set fires to attract wildlife species, once the green herbaceous layer emerges. Tacheba (2002) found that fires in and around the Okavango Delta occur in the dry season (August-October), and cannot therefore be associated with natural causes. It is therefore likely that human activities start such bushfires.

**Littering at campsites**

Solid waste is generated by tourists, and may pose problems, including reduced scenic beauty, if the waste is not properly discharged off. Mismanagement of litter waste is associated with human and animal health risks. Litter is likely to give tourists a wrong impression and negative publicity about Botswana, especially in overseas countries (Mbaiwa, 2002).

Waste hazards can be reduced by public education, sensitisation of local people and tourists. The strategies of waste reuse, recycling, reduction and ability to refuse must be an integral part of the education and environmental awareness. In addition, proper collection points need to be established at campsites and lodges, and the points need to be regularly emptied.

During fieldwork, no significant littering was encountered, but one refuse collection point was overfull.

### 5.6 Conclusions

The chapter considered environmental issues related to both wildlife and veld products resources in the CBNRM system of Botswana, using four case studies (Khwai Development Trust; Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust, Kgetsi ya Tsie, and Nqwaa Khobee Xeya Trust). The following summary points emerge from the discussion:

- The aerial survey technique has been the major tool used for setting wildlife species quota within CBNRM. Surveys are considered reliable especially for big game and livestock. A series of estimates from the surveys are likely to give a satisfactory indication of trends for most species, even if numbers are over- or under-estimated. The emphasis by such surveys is on relative rather than absolute differences between species numbers. It may however, not be possible to carry out aerial surveys on an annual basis for the rest of the country due to
the cost and complexity (technically and logistically) associated with surveys. At times therefore, surveys tend to concentrate on biologically rich areas only;

- Community participation could enhance the quality of aerial surveys, for example village mapping by CBOs, VDCs, safari operators and professional trophy hunters. Community participation has two additional advantages: it is much cheaper than aerial surveys, and it stimulates more active community natural resource management. A risk may be the chance of over-counting of species by local communities. Therefore, DWNP should always be part of the wildlife counts and setting of quota within CBNRM;

- Wildlife off-take within CBNRM should be monitored against set quota. Safari operators should keep records of trophy quality giving details to the lengths of horns of trophy animals, body lengths for carnivore species and tusk weight for elephants. This is necessary so as to detect over-harvesting (if any);

- Poaching is widespread in the country, but levels are falling within CBNRM, where communities or safari operators manage the hunting. Despite the falling levels of poaching, total off-take in most CBNRM is argued to be still well in excess of the formally permitted levels. This is either due to outright poaching or through fatal wounding of large numbers of animals during hunting by less-experienced hunters;

- Problem Animal Control (PAC) of trophy species could be incorporated into the hunting quota within CBNRM. However, this has remained difficult to implement in Botswana due to the perceived slow response time of the hunting safari operators and necessary legislative changes that need to be effected in relation to PAC;

- Wildlife-based CBNRM encourages the conservation of biodiversity and has the potential to maintain or preserve the open grassy savannas of the Kalahari. This is in contrast with livestock dominated savannas, which have been transformed into thick bush (bush encroachment);

- A holistic approach to natural resources monitoring within the CBNRM is required. Indicator variables that could be used to reflect on the health of the ecosystem as a whole need to be identified and monitored from baseline levels. The current monitoring system seems to focus only on wildlife species populations through surveys and sightings;

- Several factors have been identified as major contributors to veld product depletion within CBNRM: over-harvesting; prolonged droughts; expansion of other land uses; grazing pressure from livestock; veld fires; natural hazards and grazing by wildlife. However, several factors that promote their regeneration have also been identified;

- Phane harvesting has been associated with a range of environmental impacts: interference with the life cycle of phane worm by harvesting young and pupating phane; uprooting of trees for purposes of cooking phane; veld fires and littering of solid waste. Possible solutions to the above problems include: alternative sources of energy to save the trees; cultivation of new trees; common spaces for cooking phane and environmental education; and

- Photographic tourism may result in several environmental impacts that include creation of illegal road networks, feeding of wildlife, bush fires, littering at campsites.

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CHAPTER SIX
POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT OF CBNRM

6.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the national policy and legislative mechanisms on community based natural resources management in Botswana. The discussion examines any inconsistencies and gaps in the legal and policy framework, and suggests possible ways and options of ensuring proper management of these resources.

The chapter also investigates whether or not the various legislative instruments provide for any institutional mechanisms for the proper and effective conservation and management of CBNRM and how these institutions can be improved. This includes the issue of entitlements and responsibilities of CBOs and private operators involved in lease agreements; the natural resources covered under CBNRM policies especially those resources that fall under the control of communities, whether user rights should be allocated to communities or directly to individuals within the communities.

6.2 Policy framework of CBNRM

Government has adopted a number of policies and strategies aimed at promoting economic growth and development as well as the efficient conservation and management of the community-based natural resources. Most of the policies relate generally to development and the environment, and just a few of them refer directly to community-based development and natural resources. The discussion that follows briefly examines these policies.

Vision 2016
Vision 2016 is a document that lays down the vision of the country for up to the year 2016. One of the guiding principles of the Vision is the protection and conservation of the country’s environment and natural resources at a general level. Ambitious targets are set for poverty alleviation and economic growth. Therefore, rapid development and the protection and conservation of natural resources are pivotal to the principles and objectives of Vision 2016. The Vision principles are broadly defined; it does not set out clearly and specifically how these principles are to be achieved. It is ambitious and the challenge lies in its implementation.

National Development Plan 9
The current National Development Plan (NDP) like previous National Development Plans emphasises the need for rapid economic growth and sustainable utilisation, conservation and management of the environment and natural resources. It strives to ensure that within the national developmental processes the protection of the environment including community-based natural resources should be given priority. The NDP outline general programmes and projects, but it does not detail how sustainable utilisation, conservation and management of the environment and natural resources are to be realised.

National Policy on Natural Resources Conservation and Development 1990
The strategy (popularly known as the National Conservation Strategy) aims at introducing new and strategic approaches to achieve the integration of conservation of natural resources into development process. It aims to enhance and manage the use of natural resources and maximise the beneficial interactions and minimise the harmful environmental side effects. Since the approval of the strategy, two bodies have been set up to coordinate its implementation. These are the National Conservation Strategy...
Advisory Board (NCSA Board) and the National Conservation Strategy (Coordinating) Agency (NCSA). The Policy also provides for the designation of Environmental Liaison Officers within each of the Central and Local Government Ministries/Departments to be responsible for ensuring that their organisation comply with the NCS Act, once promulgated, and for liaising closely with the NCSA. Since its adoption, there is no evidence that the strategy has achieved its purposes. In fact, the NCS Board and the NCSA have been ineffectual in monitoring the environment in the country. This is due, in part, to the fact that these bodies are not backed by any legislation, as they operate under a policy. Thus they have no legal muscle to enforce their decisions.

National Policy on Agricultural Development of 1991
This policy seeks to ensure sustainable development of the agricultural sector and increase productivity to acceptable levels with minimum adverse effects on natural resources and the environment. It offers groups, communities and individuals the opportunity to gain exclusive land rights for agricultural purposes (arable or livestock). This policy has the potential to improve agriculture if effectively implemented, but until now the implementation has been slow, partly because of difficulties to identify areas for and implement exclusive resource rights at the local level.

Tourism Policy 1990
The policy is intended to provide local communities with direct and indirect benefits from tourism to enable them to receive and recognise the value of wildlife and its conservation through participation in wildlife based industries such as tourism. It also aims at generating employment mainly in rural areas. The policy provides for the acquisition of exclusive tourism concessions for communities and private enterprises for fifteen years. The government has stressed the importance of tourism especially its ability to enhance economic growth and rural job creation, and has recently added the eco-tourism strategy.

Wildlife Conservation Policy 1986
This policy aims at encouraging development of long-term viable commercial wildlife industries by ensuring sustainable resources management and utilisation. It also aims at increasing participation of Batswana in conservation of wildlife resources. The Policy created the concept of wildlife management areas (WMAs), in which wildlife utilisation would be the primary form of land use and livelihoods. WMAs are mostly found in western and northern Botswana.

National Settlement Policy 1998
This policy aims at the protection of the environment through sustainable land use planning. Planning of land use should be done in such a way that it pays regard to the conservation of community-based natural resources.

Community Based Strategy for Rural Development 1997
This strategy recognises the need to increase community involvement in initiating, development and implementation of rural development projects to be achieved mainly through decentralising decision-making processes.

CBNRM Policy (draft March 2003)
This draft policy is meant to set an enabling environment for CBNRM activities. The policy objectives include, inter alia, establishing a framework that encourages investments in communities, benefit distribution, conserves natural resources and links
conservation with rural development. The Policy intends to offer clearer, consistent and broader CBNRM framework and approach that would include veldproducts, fisheries, wood resources and community benefits from National Parks and Game Reserves. The policy also regulates intellectual property rights in terms of which the Government undertakes to assist communities and individuals to maximise benefits from the exploration of traditional knowledge of practical uses of natural resources. Moreover, it recognises the need to build capacities of communities in order to successfully implement CBNRM. It further addresses the issue of community access to CBNR, leasing guidelines, marketing, the role of cooperatives to assist CBOs to develop marketing cooperatives and financing (grants, low interest credit and venture capital programs) for development of CBNRM. Importantly, the policy aims to provide a holistic institutional mechanism for the implementation of CBNR and the undertaking by the Government to develop institutional capability to provide support and regulatory guidance to communities concerning CBNRM. The draft policy list different CBNRM instruments, including granting of exclusive wildlife use rights to communities, possible establishment of community-based wood and fisheries management areas, and provision of harvesting permits for veldproducts to groups and individuals.

The current draft appears to be a collation of existing pieces of legislation, particularly for agricultural resources, added on to wildlife based CBNRM policies. Some of the procedures appear cumbersome and expensive (e.g. fishing); veld products are not clearly defined. There is no harmonised and transparent CBNRM approach and set of instruments for different resources. A variety of existing institutions would be involved, causing fragmentation and co-ordination problems. No new institutions are envisaged and the current institutional set-up makes it cumbersome and difficult for CBOs to acquire similar comprehensive resource rights and to benefit from support. A properly designed CBNRM policy has the potential not only to facilitate conservation of natural resources but also to improve the lives of rural communities. The current draft needs extensive review and revision.


This policy intends to guide and co-ordinate the cross-sectional rural development issues and various programmes in place and calls for its harmonisation with Vision 2016. It aims for a more integrated and diversified approach to rural development incorporating other areas of comparative advantage besides agriculture. Its primary goal is to enhance the quality of life of Botswana’s rural communities. In line with this primary goal, its specific objectives are to reduce rural poverty, promote sustainable livelihoods, establishment of viable rural commercial structure, stimulate rural employment, maintain and improve rural capital in the form of skilled labour, economic infrastructure and exploitation of natural resources, reduce dependency on Government, promote participatory rural development process and develop an integrated approach towards the reduction of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The policy also provides mechanisms for implementation, monitoring and reporting. This policy has lofty ideas, which, if properly implemented in conjunction with the 1997 Community-Based Rural Development Strategy, can accelerate community development and improve rural livelihoods and the economy of the country.

National Forest Policy (draft)

The specific objectives of the policy are, inter alia, to strengthen the role of forestry in alleviating poverty and increasing equity in forest resource and forest land management and utilisation, promote economic development in meeting demand for forests products,
enhance environmental functions including soil and water conservation, biodiversity, recreation, habitats for wildlife, carbon dioxide fixation and other services, and create enabling legal and institutional environment so as to effectively implement the policy.

Botswana National Ecotourism Strategy 2002
This policy is specifically geared towards ecotourism. Its objectives are to make tourism development sustainable, to make tourism a viable business activity, increase the involvement of Batswana, to market and promote tourism, to raise awareness about and understanding of ecotourism and to encourage the development of infrastructure as well as industry standards. The policy notes that CBNRM projects are often supply and not demand driven, that CBOs may lack the understanding of tourism enterprises and that participatory grass-root models such as CBOs may find it difficult to compete with profit driven, commercial enterprises run by individuals. The policy therefore aims to stimulate mutually beneficial relationships within and between ecotourism stakeholder groups, the establishment of CBNRM Fora at district level and education about the advantages of stakeholder collaboration. As stated earlier on, tourism can create jobs and improve the economy. Again, its implementation will gauge its impact in achieving its aims.

Assessment of policies
Government has adopted a plethora of development and environmental policies that have been adopted in the past two decades dealing directly and indirectly with natural resources and (rural) development in the country. These policies are tools to utilise, protect and conserve natural resources. In fact, the policies constitute the backdrop against which legislation can be enacted or amended to effectively protect community-based natural resources.

The policies can be used to complement legislation since they have the advantage of flexibility not always associated with legislation. Although they do not impose legal obligations and cannot compel individuals or communities not to harm the environment in terms of legal prescriptions, nonetheless they can be used to influence behavioural change in favour of protection of the environment, including community based natural resources.

Several points emerge from the brief policy review. First, there is no comprehensive, integrated CBNRM policy as yet. The draft policy has existed since 1998, but has not yet been finalised. This leaves room for confusion, resource management gaps and inconsistencies. Without such a policy, it is unlikely to have an enabling CBNRM environment. Secondly, there is no evidence that the monitoring mechanisms under these policies are used and how effective they have been in the monitoring process. The enforcement mechanisms appear weak, unregulated and unsupervised and indeed very fragmented.

6.3 Legislative framework of CBNRM
At present, there is no umbrella legislative instrument that regulates community-managed natural resources in Botswana. The country also does not possess an umbrella environmental management act and a legal environmental impact assessment instrument. Community-managed natural resources are currently regulated by a series of enactments scattered around various statute books. This part examines the various legislative instruments and related regulations that directly or indirectly deal with
community-based natural resources in order to determine whether or not adequate provision has been made for the protection of community-based natural resources.

6.3.1 Constitutional protection

Section 8 of the Constitution of Botswana deals with protection from deprivation of property. Sub-section (1) thereof empowers the Government or a public authority to acquire a person’s property against his consent if it is in the public interest to do so and provided that the owner is promptly and adequately compensated. However, sub-section (5) provides as follows:

> “Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this section---- (a) to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or acquisition of any property---- (vii) for so long as may be necessary for the purposes of any examination, investigation, trial, inquiry or, in the case of land, for the purposes of the carrying out thereon of work of soil conservation or the conservation of other natural resources or work relating to agricultural development or improvement (being work relating to such development or improvement that the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and has without reasonable excuse refused or failed, to carry out). . .” (emphasis added).

This is the only clause in the Constitution of Botswana that mentions natural resources conservation. It empowers the Government to compulsorily acquire or expropriate property for the purposes of the carrying out thereon of work of soil conservation or the conservation of other natural resources including community-based natural resources.

6.3.2 Statutory protection

There are a number of pieces of legislation that are aimed at the protection of community-based natural resources. This legislation is examined hereunder.

*Agricultural Resources Conservation Act Cap. 35:06*

This Act was promulgated with the main aim of controlling and conserving agricultural resources in Botswana. Section 2 of the Act broadly defines agricultural resources to include animals, birds, plants, waters, soils, vegetation and vegetation products, fish, insects and such other similar thing which the Minister may declare to be an agricultural resource. The Act then sets up the Agricultural Resources Board as the institution charged with the implementation of its provisions and whose other functions are to advise the Minister of Agriculture on the nature of legislation necessary to secure or promote the proper conservation, use and improvement of agricultural resources. Thus the Board has the power to control the exploitation and utilisation of the various community-based natural resources mentioned in the Act. It can issue licenses or permits authorising individuals to take or harvest the species. The Act has the potential of being used as a legal tool for the conservation and protection of community-based natural resources. However, its impact has been small, as the Act concentrates mainly on administrative issues and it has proven difficult to implement many aspects of the Act.

*Fish Protection Act Cap.38:05*

This Act, *ex facie*, supposed to secure or promote the protection and sustainable management of fish resources. Although this Act has failed to protect fish resources in
Botswana’s rivers, it seeks to ensure conservation of one aspect of community-based natural resources in the country: fish and fish resources. Its enforcement mechanisms need improvement to make it workable.

**Forest Act Cap. 38:04**
The aims of the Act are to regulate and protect forests and forest produce in the country. This Act is confined to forest reserves and leaves out community-managed wood resources outside the reserves to the mercy of the users. However, it has a number of protective measures such as prevention of felling, cutting and burning of forest and forest produce, and *in situ* and *ex situ* removal of these produce. Also, violation of its protective clauses is an offence punishable by a fine or prison term.

**The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act No. 28/1992**
This legislation is designed to protect and conserve the country’s wildlife resources. This Act repealed the Fauna Conservation and National Parks Acts and its main objectives are to regulate the conservation, management and protection of wildlife resources. Although the Act does define wildlife, it is important that the term be accorded a broader definition to include all wild animals and game, which fall within the parameters of the Act. The Act establishes National Parks, Game Reserves, Wildlife Management Areas and Controlled Hunting Areas. The Minister controls activities in these areas. Furthermore, the Act incorporates CITES into the national law of Botswana. This legislation protects one of the most important CNBR in the country: wildlife. In fact, it has registered some success in protecting wildlife.

**The Noxious Weeds Act 35:04**
This Act provides for the control of arable and aquatic weeds by making landowners or occupiers thereof responsible for their destruction. Importantly, it calls for the conservation of weeds that occur mainly in wetlands areas.

**State Land Act Cap: 32:01**
The aim of this Act is to regulate the utilisation of state land and its resources. These resources include community-based natural resources for there are some communities that live in areas designated as state land.

**Tourism Act No. 22/1992**
This piece of legislation is aimed at regulating tourism activity in Botswana. This activity may be undertaken in areas wherein there are natural resources that fall under community-based natural resources and in areas occupied by rural communities such as Chobe, Ngamiland, Ghanzi and Kgalagadi.

**Town and Regional Planning Act, Cap.32:09**
This Act seeks to ensure the orderly development of settlements. It also deals with, albeit implicitly, the protection of environment in Botswana and is similarly relevant to conservation and management of community-based natural resources.

6.3.3 Assessment of legislation

*Final report of the CBNRM Review Study*
The utilisation and conservation of community-managed natural resources is very important not only for rural communities but also for the entire country. At present these resources are protected by a variety of legislation as discussed above.

Several points are in order. First, there are major legislative gaps, and the gaps are larger than with respect to policies. There is no CBNRM Act, but general environmental legislation is also missing (Environmental Management Act and Environmental Impact Assessment regulations). This creates opportunities for gaps and inconsistencies in approaches towards CBNRM resources. CBNRM legislation needs to be enacted containing, inter alia, the following aspects:

- General principles on CBNRM – sustainable utilisation, precautionary principles, preventive principles;
- Definition of Community-based natural resources;
- Main targets (both utilisation, livelihoods and conservation) and instruments (e.g. head-lease; tourism concessions, lease conditions);
- Entitlements – ownership, user and/or development rights over resources;
- Length of head-lease; possibilities for sub-leasing;
- Role, duties and responsibilities of CBOs:
- Role, duties, entitlements and responsibilities of joint venture partners;
- Checks and balances for all direct stakeholders;
- Outline of support structure, and roles of Government, NGOs and private sector. This structure should be kept as simple as possible to facilitate CBO access and use. It should also outline the government departments, institutions and unit, responsible for CBNRM policy development, including the earmarking of key or lead units;
- Licenses/permits to use CBNRM resources;
- Finality clauses – the power to make regulations, byelaws etc. The policy should make provision to easily recover debts from individuals, and to put CBOs that do not comply with the lease conditions under temporary curator ship (see chapter eight).

Second, the existing fragmented pieces of legislation do not reflect current understanding and appreciation of environmental issues including conservation of community-based natural resources having been adopted at the time when the subject was not accorded the attention it has so far be given to them. Third, they are too general and as such weaken the protection regime. Fourth, as with policies, there is no evidence that the enforcement mechanisms are effective and this explains why there is continued environmental degradation despite their existence.

6.3.4 Legislation from other countries

There are other countries in Southern Africa that have adopted legislation which relate to CBNRM such as South Africa and Namibia. For instance, in South Africa, they initially had the Environment Act, 1978, which was replaced by the Environmental Conservation Act, 73/1989 meant generally for the conservation of the country’s environment. The Act created the Department of Environment Affairs headed by the Director-General of Environment Affairs and was made in charge of environmental affairs in the country. In 1994 the Government adopted a General Environmental Policy and the Director-General is to ensure compliance with the said policy. These various legislations and the policy
aim at improving land use, pollution control, conservation (of natural resources and cultural heritage), urban environment, economic instrument and research. Thus conservation of natural resources also includes CBNRM.

6.4 Resource rights

The above discussion showed that protected resources include fish and fish resources; trees, forests and forest produce; wildlife; and agricultural resources/vegetation. Additionally, the Draft CBNRM policy seeks to protect what it refers to as non-domesticated biological resources and leaves others to be governed by other relevant policies and legislation.

6.4.1 Nature of community resource rights

Questions abound as to who really owns community-based natural resources or whether or not communities have the right of ownership over resources situated in their areas. A closely related question is what is the legal nature of the right in question? A further inquiry is whether or not the right in question is limited or absolute? There is need for legal clarity on these and related issues.

A right is defined as a claim recognised by law (Finnis, 1980). It is an entitlement that has to be acknowledged, respected and protected by law. This means that CBNRM rights are claims that are recognised by law.

Basically, CBNRM rights are resource user rights granted to communities and to private companies by subleases. Ownership of resources remains unchanged. CBNRM rights are not land ownership rights (Jones, 2002).

The right of ownership would give communities absolute and ultimate control over the resource property and can thus deny other individual any use and exploitation of the property. The current CBNRM rights are usufructs, i.e. rights to use resources. The holder can only enjoy the fruits of the resources without becoming their owner. The right to use can be as result of a permit, lease or agreement. With respect to CBNRM projects, communities receive a fifteen-year head lease from the Land Boards after certain conditions have been met. Communities have the exclusive right to use the resources, specified in the lease. Subject to lease conditions, communities can sub-lease or transfer (part of) the rights to third parties without prior permission of the owner.

6.4.2 Types of land and the CBNRM rights

The claim that communities have over natural resources depends on the type of land in question and the legal regime regulating it. CBNRM projects are found on State Land and Tribal Land. State Land is not subject to individual ownership, and the State Land Act regulates its management. Cap. 32:01. When State Land is allocated to a community, the community enjoys the limited right of resource use and not ownership. Any payments due are made to Government. Tribal Land belongs to the tribes, and the Tribal Land Act Cap regulates its management and use. 32:01. Tribal Land is being administered by District Land Boards. Most CBNRM projects are located on Tribal Land. In terms of Act, the Land acquired in accordance with the Tribal Land Act gives the occupier thereof the customary right to use it. The occupier has customary rights to
exploit and use the land, subject to conditions of allocation. Any payments are made to the Land Boards.

6.5 CBNRM institutions

The CBNRM process involves a wide range of stakeholders, including direct stakeholders (communities and private companies involved in joint venture agreements), support organisations (NGOs and donors) and government. This section reviews the legal aspects of the institutional structures currently in use by stakeholders.

In order to qualify for a head lease, communities have to form a representative, accountable and legal entity. The trust form is most common among communities and NGOs. Private companies usually are (Pty) Ltds. Some are called Associations such as Forestry Association of Botswana.

6.5.1 The trust model

A trust entails a fiduciary relationship in which one person is a holder (trustee) of an interest in the property but is subject to an equitable obligation to use or keep the property for the benefit of another person (beneficiary) or for some specified purpose (Shindler and Hodkinson, 1995). Usually, there is a founder of the trust who provides resources (financial or property) for the benefit of individuals or institutions. The founder could be a donor, a group or contributors or communities themselves.

The aims and objectives of most community trusts indicate that the trusts are mainly for the benefit of the members or communities in a given area, which is in line with the Draft CBNRM Policy, 2003. For instance, the Tebelopele Community Trust Notarial Deed of Trust for Shorobe specifically declares, inter alia, to create and increase employment opportunities in the village, thereby decreasing poverty and crime. The Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust was created for similar purposes. While trusts are created differently, they contain the most important requirement for the creation of trusts: identification of beneficiaries. It is ultimately the community that is supposed to benefit from the trust.

The question that arises is whether trusts are the most viable way of CBO organisation or should other institutional forms be used? The use of trusts has several major advantages:

- Greater flexibility than in other institutional forms
- Trust are suitable to pursue education and training of communities;
- Trusts are a democratic way of managing these resources in that trustees work for the trust;

In comparison, the company model has limited guarantees and its operations take place in a very strict legal regime. Moreover, the company model is designed to make profit, and not necessarily serve the community. These factors make the company model less attractive for CBOs. It would, however, be possible to select the company model for individual productive activities, launched by the Trust.
6.5.2 Trust structure and decision-making

CBO Trusts have established Board of Trustees, sometimes Management Teams and Village Development Committees in multiple village CBNRM projects. Below, their role is reviewed.

For wildlife-based CBOs, Trust membership is usually defined to include all village adult residents who have been resident for at least five years. People do not formally apply, but some Trusts (e.g. NKXT in KD1) keep membership lists. The implicit assumption is that everyone is interested in becoming a Trust member, and is keen to contribute to and benefit from the Trust. For other CBOs such as KyT, membership may vary substantially and is basically defined in the Deeds of Trust. Residents of villages in Tswapong Hills covered by KyT have to form a group and apply for membership. People can also form new groups in Tswapong villages and join KyT.

Board of Trustees

Boards comprise trustees, who are invariably members of the organisation. The members elect board members, but office bearers (chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary and vice-secretary, and treasurer) are usually elected by the elected Trustees and not directly by members. The Board has overall authority over the activities and operation of the trust. It implements the decisions of the trust.

The fact that the operations of the trust are entrusted on the trustees who are members of the community itself has a negative effect. First, these organisations deal with technical environmental issues and the majority of these members may not have the required skills, training and education. Treasurers, coming as they do, from the communities most of whom having no training in record keeping further inhibits the operations in terms of accounting and keeping proper records of account.

There are two ways of decision-making process in the Board. The first way is that the Board makes and implements all decisions. From the various Trusts examined, members of the trusts also comprise officials in the village including chiefs or headmen and senior figures in the village. As argued above, these individuals have no training and necessary education. This means that their input in the implementation of decisions of the Board is almost minimal. Second, decision-making may rest with the members and get implemented by the Board. In fact, the Board will just rubber-stamp or endorse the decisions of the members. This obviously has the potential to create clashes between the Board and members, and it makes the Board, which is the executive machinery of the Trust to be meaningless.

6.5.3 Trust accountability

The issue of accountability emerges generally in the context of mismanagement and misadministration of the trusts but more specifically in relation to misuse of funds. There continues to be report of embezzlement of funds among the trusts. In some instance, it is not embezzlement per se. Rather, it is unregulated financial claims by members, e.g. for services rendered to the Trusts or for attending Board meetings. The question that arises is, what is the best possible way of arresting the problem so that the people administering the funds are made accountable and use the funds for the benefit of the communities? Existing options include:
• Reporting to bodies established to deal with these issues such as the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), the police;
• Establishment and enforcement of Code of Conduct or bye-laws of the Trusts requiring suspension of the rights and benefits of individuals involved in these activities;
• Establishment of an indemnity clause in these trusts requiring the beneficiaries to be indemnified for fraud, etc.; and
• Establishment and enforcement of penalties for lack of accountability such as suspension of the resource rights or placement of Trust under Protection.

All options can contribute to save Trust funds. Where it is a clear case of an offence having been committed the police will always be the ones to deal with the matter or where there is corruption or an economic crime has been committed, then the DCEC will be the appropriate body to deal with the matter. These mechanisms are mutually inclusive.

6.6 CBNRM leases

CBNRM Trusts are granted head leases that specify the rights and obligations both for the lessor and lessee with regard to the utilisation of community-managed natural resources in a given area. CBNRM Trusts are free to sub-lease their rights, and sub-lessees to further sub-lease their sub-leased rights, unless the lease agreement itself may restrict or even prohibit subleasing. Freedom to sub-lease increases the transferability and the value of these rights.

The main issue with respect to leases has revolved around the period of the leases, which runs for a period of fifteen years broken down into three renewable five-year periods. The question that arises is whether the five-year period of the lease is reasonable for lessees to effectively and efficiently exploit natural resources. This question is indeed pertinent since especially as regards community-based natural resources in very remote parts of the country the leases are conditional upon the lessees providing training and education to the members of the community. For instance, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT) and HCH Safaris (Pty) Ltd in addition to providing for the five year lease period also requires in clause 2(e) that the Trust will educate all users of the area, including village residents, as to the importance for the present and future generations, of the wise management of natural resources. Other trusts have similar provisions.

The current five-year lease period is unworkable for several reasons. First, this period is not commercially viable and attractive, particularly for photo safari operations. Lessees are companies who are profit driven, and they will normally only certain to engage in activities that are profit making within a five period. Private companies mentioned that photo safari operations normally require large investments with a pay back time of over 25 years. Secondly, it is common cause that the initial stages of the five years are basically used to kick-start the enterprise, recruit and train personnel etc. So at this stage the project is just beginning. If companies are uncertain about their future beyond five years, they are unlikely to invest during the years three to five. Thirdly, most joint ventures are capital intensive and really the early years of the lease period are focused on developing the reputation of the trust. Fourthly, the five year period encourages shortcuts and may invite wrong people who would do anything including violating the law.
in order to maximize their returns or profit within the said period. Sixth, when it comes to training the local people in these areas, it cannot realistically be achieved within the lease period. Thus the five-year period is counterproductive and ruins the very objectives of the leases or joint ventures.

6.7 Tendering process

The introduction of market forces in sub-leasing CBOs resources rights has increased community revenues. Most CBOs have opted for the tendering model; a few for the auctioning option. Market forces work best with competition among private companies, proper information exchange about market conditions and transparency. The CBNRM market does not meet the requirements of a perfect market, but efforts are needed to make it more competitive and transparent.

A common concern is that the tendering process with regard to the CBNRM projects is not sufficiently transparent and competitive. For example, companies that bid for tenders do that separately as distinct companies, even though they may have close links. Obviously, ‘competition’ between such companies is minimal. It is legally proper for a subsidiary company to freely compete and bid for any tenders with the parent company. To ensure that no company is unfairly treated in the process and communities are fully aware of the linkages between companies, the tendering procedures should require full disclosure by each tendering companies of information regarding ownership and linkages with other companies. It is within the discretion of the people administering the tender to set conditions on the tender. As Justice Kirby noted in *Ker & Downey (Botswana) (Pty) Ltd v. The Land Tribunal and Anor*. Civil appeal No. 36/1998 at p.26:

‘The Land Board is given the discretion by law to grant leases over land which is vested in it. In doing so, it is entitled to lay down conditions to be adhered to by persons wishing to apply for leases, whether by tender or otherwise.’

Tendering should be distinguished from auctioning which is a generally a sale by an agent called the auctioneer on behalf of the seller. It involves competitive bargaining where the thing sold goes to the highest bidder. However, a tender is not a sale. It is mechanism to render service to a third party, which is appropriate for CBNR projects.

6.8 Regulations and byelaws

A number of Deeds of Trust have provisions for regulations or byelaws to be made.

The description of byelaws and regulations in Deeds of Trust do not correspond with the common legal understanding of the phrases regulations and byelaws. Trust byelaws are not made by a Minister or Local Authority pursuant to an Act of Parliament. The term is used loosely in common parlance to refer to rules of conduct for the particular Trust, which members should abide by. They are merely rules of the Trust to regulate the conduct of members. In practice, no such bylaw seems to have been made by any of the CBNRM Trust.

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19 Legally speaking, regulations are rules of law made under the authority of an Act of Parliament by some person or body other than Parliament. The Act will provide for general principles and leave the details to be dealt with in regulations by the Minister or other person or in byelaws by a local authority such as a Town Council. As with the main Act violation of regulations is punishable by law.
6.9 Conclusions

The above analysis clearly reveals that there is policy and legislative framework for regulating CBNRM in Botswana. These instruments are supposed to provide the driving force for the conservation of these resources. Admittedly, these policies and legislation especially the latter should provide the more needed impetus to secure the maximum use of these resources and enable communities living in the areas where these resources are situated to benefit from these resources. Most importantly, it should be emphasised that to have this framework is not enough or a panacea to the problem faced by the resources but it is the efficient and proper enforcement of the instruments that goes all the way to protect the resources and ensure that they benefit intended beneficiaries. We have made several general and specific conclusions and recommendations. It is not intended to repeat them, especially the recommendations but the more salient ones are stressed.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CBNRM EXPERIENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

7.1 Introduction

Community-based natural resource management started in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, and has spread to several other southern African countries, notable Zambia, Malawi, Namibia and Botswana. South Africa has a diverse CBNRM programme. CBNRM is often seen as an African solution to natural resource management.

Details of the different country programmes are given in annex A (Zimbabwe), B (Namibia) and (other southern African countries). This chapter contains brief summaries of the most important CBNRM features and achievements of each country, focusing on Zimbabwe and Namibia. Table 7.1 indicates landmark events in different countries with a CBNRM programme.

7.2 Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme

7.2.1 Introduction

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is about the sustainable use of natural resources by rural communities. The community users may be a village, a ward or a group of wards depending on the type of natural resource being managed and the way in which it is distributed in a given geographical area. CAMPFIRE is a programme that is currently based on devolution of power from central government to district councils.

Through Section 95 of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 as amended in 1982, the Minister may gazette a district as having Appropriate Authority (AA). AA confers full rights for wildlife in the same manner as enjoyed by private landholders with some checks to ensure that these rights are not abused. A fundamental objective of CAMPFIRE is to train people in the wards and villages so that they become competent management authority, fully capable of managing their natural resources.

Between 1989 and 1997 the number of Rural District Councils that applied for and were granted Appropriate Authority status rose from two to twenty eight. CAMPFIRE now covers fifty-two Councils. In the wildlife producing districts, local communities have set aside large tracts of wild land and have adopted wildlife production systems, both consumptive and non-consumptive within their areas based on free ranging game. Most wildlife districts are located in the agriculturally marginal natural regions in the northern and southern lowveld regions of the country.

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20 Legally, wildlife belongs to no one unless they are held in captivity or enclosed in a game fence. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) does not own wildlife but is obliged by law to look after them and ensure that they are properly used and looked after. Similarly, a district council with AA does not own animals.
Table 7.1: Main events in CBNRM programmes in southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Establishment of districts as Appropriate Authority with full rights for wildlife</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zambia: launch of ADMADE programme</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Policy for Wildlife formalising CBNRM principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Start of participatory socio-ecological, community surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12 CAMPFIRE districts earning US$ 1.1 million</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Start of USAID funded LIFE programme</td>
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<td>Zambia: Wildlife policy promoting CBNRM</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Formation of National CAMPFIRE Association to promote wildlife interests of RDCs and to serve as producer wards CAMPFIRE spread to 25 districts</td>
<td>Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas’ Launch of NACOBTA (Namibia Community-Based Tourism Organisation)</td>
<td>South Africa: Communal Property Association Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Amended legislation approved (Nature Conservation Amendment Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>Malawi: Fisheries Conservation and Management Act and Forest Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>First conservancy gazetted (3 more followed in 1998) Launch of NACSO (Namibian Association of Support Organisations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5 more conservancies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Game Products Trust Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15 conservancies by end of year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Environmental Investment Fund Legislation approved CBNRM sub-division established within MET’s dep. of Parks and Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>52 districts have AA-status in 5 regions, mostly marginal agricultural areas Compensation/ insurance scheme for stock losses due to problem animals 29 conservancies in September 2003.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia: ADMADE operates in 26 game management areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CAMPFIRE approach works through three committees:

- District CAMPFIRE Coordinating Committees. These are sub-committees of the Rural District Councils’ Conservation Committees formed to strengthen communication between the RDCs and their CAMPFIRE wards. Their tasks include:
  - Monitoring the exploitation of natural resources in project areas;
  - Developing plans that are implemented by the district;
  - Overseeing management of CAMPFIRE assets including motorcycles, vehicles and other equipment;
• Identifying training needs that must be addressed by the RDCs' CAMPFIRE units;
• Drawing up annual budgets for the RDCs’ CAMPFIRE activities; and
• Coordinating quota setting for the entire district.

• Ward level CAMPFIRE Committees: These committees feed into District or Inter-ward CAMPFIRE Committees. They are democratically elected committees whose membership comes from village wildlife committees. Their task is to co-ordinate village wildlife committees, and to plan and implement ward projects. Wards are crucial structures for CAMPFIRE since villages would find it difficult to monitor and manage large fugitive animals that are particularly important for raising CAMPFIRE revenue. They coordinate vertical and horizontal management structures and systems for the effective administration of CAMPFIRE.

• Village CAMPFIRE Committees: These form the basic units for CAMPFIRE and natural resources management. All basic management issues like control of veld fires, apprehending poachers, Problem Animal Control, participating in of quota setting, are all centred at the village level and handled by the Village Committee.

7.2.2 Impacts of CAMPFIRE

Resource impacts

The CAMPFIRE programme has had significant positive impacts on the conservation of large and small wildlife especially on the “traditional” wildlife districts. Wildlife areas have been demarcated in most districts, often informally and sometimes with fences. The demarcated areas have by and large been maintained. As a result, elephant populations have increased steadily and buffalo populations were maintained since the late 1980s. The trophy quality was also largely maintained (CAMPFIRE Association, 2001).

After 1998 CAMPFIRE diversified its operational focus and its products to include a wide range of other natural resources besides wildlife. The number of districts participating in the programme increased from 36 in 1997 to the current membership of 52 Rural District Councils. New activities include promoting community-based eco-tourism, fisheries, community beekeeping, harvesting and processing mopane worms and fruits. In addition, poaching has been contained, the results being reduced levels of illegal off-take of wildlife populations and fish. There has also been a significant reduction in tree felling particularly where the Forestry Commission has encouraged adoption of the CAMPFIRE approach in the sharing of benefits from commercial exploitation of timber.

The CAMPFIRE programme is widely known as the “African solution to the African problem” because a lot of awareness activities have been done to make the programme acceptable and justifiable socially, economically, environmentally and politically. The programme made significant investments in awareness raising through the activities of Rural District Councils (RDCs), CAMPFIRE Service Providers and the CAMPFIRE Association itself. “Action Magazine” (part of Zimbabwe Trust) played a critical role in disseminating conservation awareness messages through schools and teachers training colleges countrywide. Through training producer communities are encouraged to undertake their own wildlife censuses. They later hold meetings with Parks Officers to compare their census results and determine sustainable off-take of wildlife.

CAMPFIRE has developed income-generating enterprises based on natural resources and these projects are linked to natural resource management strategies. Community actions and attitudes towards these resources have significantly changed. Strategies that have been embarked on by
communities include: formulation of by-laws that govern access to the resources, fencing the resource, establishment of village natural resource management committees that are responsible for monitoring use of resources, conducting Environmental Impact Assessments and periodic natural resource audits.

**Economic and social impacts**

At the national level, revenues from hunting in CAMPFIRE districts increased rapidly after 1995 and then maintained at USD1.5-2.0 million annually. In addition at least twelve high-end eco-tourism lodges are operational in or close to communal areas, and generating income. CAMPFIRE has a revenue distribution formula: at least half to the local communities and a maximum of 35% for natural resource management and 15% for RDCs.

The number of households benefiting from CAMPFIRE cash dividends increased from 7,861 in 1989 to over 80,000 in 2001. Gross revenue received by communities from 1989 to 1999 is just under 50% of total revenues, and reached ZW$ 51.4 million in 1999 (Table 7.2). This is an average of ZW$ of 537.41 per household per year (or US$14.02). Clearly, CAMPFIRE is at best a supplementary source of income (Bond, 2003).

**Table 7.2: Allocation of CAMPFIRE revenue to communities (1989 – 1999)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exchange Rate: USD to ZWD</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>No. of Wards</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>ZWS disbursed to communities</th>
<th>% of total disbursed to communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2.126</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7861</td>
<td>396 005</td>
<td>53.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.472</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22 084</td>
<td>509 994</td>
<td>37.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3.751</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52 456</td>
<td>1 203 673</td>
<td>41.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5.112</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70 311</td>
<td>3 074 278</td>
<td>49.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6.529</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90 475</td>
<td>5 560 958</td>
<td>57.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8.212</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>96 437</td>
<td>7 794 511</td>
<td>57.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8.724</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98 946</td>
<td>8 259 680</td>
<td>59.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>85 543</td>
<td>8 388 566</td>
<td>47.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12.444</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>93 605</td>
<td>10 681 392</td>
<td>46.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24.374</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>80 498</td>
<td>22 185 225</td>
<td>48.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>38.338</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>95 726</td>
<td>51 443 942</td>
<td>48.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>119 498 224</td>
<td>49.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** After 1995 some districts began to default in terms of sending revenue records to the CAMPFIRE Programme’s monitoring unit at WWF. Such districts wanted to avoid remitting levies to the CAMPFIRE Association. Some of these districts are the main culprits in failing to pay the agreed % to communities.

Many of these households made social investments and built small household businesses. Secondary benefits enjoyed by communities include schools, clinics and community grinding mill and shops funded by CAMPFIRE revenue. The programme has also enhanced employment creation at local levels around successful tourism projects. The Gairezi (Nyanga district) Gonono (Guruve district) and Vhimba (Chimanimani district) eco-tourism projects, for example, are fully operational and each employs not less than five individuals. In addition, districts participating in CAMPFIRE have set aside positions within their “CAMPFIRE units” (departments), which can only be filled by locals, with the exception of the unit manager/coordinator.

**Empowerment and capacity building**

CAMPFIRE has led to increased awareness of entitlements and rights and demand for these at village and ward levels (Chitsike, 2000). At least 16 Community Trusts were established at sub-district level and most of these have bank accounts, they regular meetings and they have paid employees. The idea of forming trusts was learned from Botswana after several district
representatives and some CAMPFIRE Service Providers had visited the country. Where trusts have been registered, payments of CAMPFIRE revenues are being made directly to sub-district level.

In many districts, officials in CAMPFIRE units strongly support devolution and are taking measures to implement it, however, there is generally less commitment by Councillors, with some notable exceptions. In 2002, CAMPFIRE Revenue Guidelines were developed to reinforce principles of administrative devolution whereby the Committees are given more decision-making powers to decide how revenues are utilised. Most RDCs accept that communities must have the right to make decisions to utilize income as they see fit.

Well over 100 village and ward CAMPFIRE committees in thirty-six Districts learned basic organisational skills, especially bookkeeping, recording and maintaining minutes of meetings and bank accounts. In at least thirteen districts, natural resource monitors (and community leaders in particular) learned wildlife management skills, which include setting quotas, selling wildlife, monitoring hunting, managing electric fences, problem animal monitoring, counting wildlife and ecological management. Systems of controlling off-take of natural resources were put in place – e.g. fish poachers were fined, with fines being used to pay guards and providing community benefits.

Fire management is implemented in four districts, CAMPFIRE Support Units have been established in thirty-six districts. Over one hundred village and ward wildlife committees have been established. Natural Resources Management by-laws and constitutions have been developed for use in the village and ward committees. Other benefits include training of members of Board of Trustees to maintain assets registers books. In most producer wards, basic record keeping is being maintained. Communities are already undertaking project identification and implementation in wildlife districts.

High levels of transparency and community participation in revenue distribution and use are encouraged at sub-district (village and ward) levels. CAMPFIRE structures provide a forum for community participation in decision-making on Natural Resources Management and other issues. Generally, funds are well accounted for at sub-district level and in RDC CAMPFIRE departments. There is transparency in the flow of information at ward and village levels, and between some wards and villages concerning issues, action plans and projects. Lastly, CAMPFIRE committees at village and ward levels are elected.

7.2.3  Stakeholders and their responsibilities

The responsibilities of eight main stakeholders in the public sector and civil society are summarised below.

Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
The Department is the statutory authority for wildlife management on all land in Zimbabwe. Recognising the failure of punitive conservation, the Department granted appropriate authority to all private landholders in 1975. In 1982, the Parks and Wild Life Act was amended to allow the granting of the same rights to local communities. With effect from 2002, the department is now operating like a parastatal and is known as the “National Parks and Wildlife Authority”.

**Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing**

The role of MLGPWNH is to promote, support and regulate local governance structures and processes. It ensures transparency and accountability in the management of local government affairs. The ministry insists on the openness in the conduct of public affairs by RDCs, Ward and Village Committees. As part of playing its role the Ministry insists on the involvement of people in the planning process, the timely preparation of financial statements, production of audited statements and the holding of report back sessions by councillors in their wards. The ministry provides the vision and an avenue for coordinating local development.

**Zimbabwe Trust (Zimtrust)**

Since 1991 Zimtrust provided institutional and infrastructure development support to four CAMPFIRE districts in Matebeleland. Zimtrust provided implementation support as well as grant management. Since 1994 Zimtrust relinquished grant management services to districts and focused on providing institutional support services. From 1995 to 1998, Zimtrust assisted districts to develop capacity building plans that included proposed infrastructure development. These plans were used to give focus to the capacity building strategy, which has been implemented since 1998 in the CAMPFIRE districts.

**Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS)**

The Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe has been receiving USAID funding to support the CAMPFIRE Programme since 1989 when it received a grant through to 1996. CASS then received a second grant in 1996. CASS’s primary responsibilities were programme policy and socio-economic research and monitoring activities.

**Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE)**

SAFIRE is an NGO which is affiliated to the CAMPFIRE Programme as a service provider. It was formed in 1994, and its mission is to facilitate the development and application of innovative approaches to diversify and improve rural livelihoods, based on the utilization, commercialisation and sustainable management of natural resources. SAFIRE was involved in NRMP II for two years from 1st October 1998 to September 30, 2000.

**Forestry Commission**

The Forestry Commission is a parastatal established under the Forestry Act (Chapter 19:05) of 1948, and falls under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The national mandate of the Forestry Commission is derived from the Forestry Act (Chapter 19:05 as amended in 1999) and the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (Chapter 20 of 1987), which provide for regulatory, management, capacity enhancement and trading functions within the forestry sector. The Commission was received funding for its active participation in NRMP II from July 1998 to July 2000.

**Department of Natural Resources**

The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) falls under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Its mandate is to enable the Natural Resources Board to implement the Natural Resources Act, which is a major piece of legislation, that influence the management of natural resources in Zimbabwe. In view of this, DNR is a focal point for natural resources management at all levels in the country. DNR is involved in a number of natural resources management initiatives, the most important of these being the District Environmental Action Planning programme (DEAP), the Bio-diversity Programme and the National Action Programme.

7.2.4 **Policy and legal environment**
Natural resource legislation concentrates considerable authority and power on Rural District Councils. Although policy guidelines in the wildlife sector attempt to promote the “administrative devolution” of some functions and decision-making to sub-district levels, the RDCs cannot legally be forced to apply these policy guidelines. The policy and legislative framework within which CAMPFIRE operates creates numerous local institutions that operate in parallel, overlap and compete with each other for power and access to financial resources.

The Communal Land Act (1982) places ownership of communal land in the State and the administration of communal land in the hands of the RDCs. The Rural District Council Act (1988) gives the councils power to take measures to conserve natural resources, permit grazing and cultivation, develop land use plans and make bylaws for the protection of natural resources. The councils may issue permits for catching fish, hunting, cutting firewood, cutting grass and collecting honey. The Forest Act (1947) allocates large areas of state land to the Forestry Commission, which leases timber, hunting and photographic tourism concessions. The Commission has adopted the policy of sharing 15% of its income from timber concessions with RDCs. The Communal Land Forest Produce Act (1984) restricts the use of forest products to “own use” and excludes use of products from protected forest areas and areas where a license to cut trees has been granted to others. According to Chitsike (2000,11) under the Act, “without a permit or license, virtually any use of woodland is illegal”. The Environmental Management Act (2002) establishes a general legal foundation for all environmental laws based on sustainable development and addresses inconsistencies, overlaps and duplication in environmental and natural resource legislation. The Act contains limited references to devolution and decentralisation, and does not provide for empowering sub-district levels. The Traditional Leaders Act (2000) provides for Ward and Village Assemblies that would “consider and resolve” all issues relating to land, water and other natural resources. This statement is somewhat ambiguous with regard to actual decision-making powers of the Assemblies. Further, the Act does not provide land rights to the Assemblies and it does not give them any legal status beyond being sub-committees of council.

CAMPFIRE is a dynamic approach, which is now helping Rural District Councils and communities to set up new types of projects. Some of the districts have been able to support diverse community-based natural resource management and income-generating initiatives. Approximately 40% of these new projects focus on the establishment of community-based eco-tourism ventures; while 20% involve the production and sale of products derived from indigenous resources such as beekeeping, crafts and mopane worms. Other major project categories include veld fire management, and commercial fishing in major inland dams.

### 7.2.5 Weaknesses and threats

The CAMPFIRE approach has several weaknesses and threats to deal with. These include:

- The role of Rural District Councils has slackened the devolution of the rights and responsibilities of the communities over natural resources;
- No legislation has been passed to provide proprietorship at village and ward levels;
- The CAMPFIRE Association does not have producer communities and conservancies at the grassroots levels as members;
- Competition among service providers for the programme and between the CAMPFIRE Association and some of the service providers. Marginalisation of the Campfire Collaborative Group-NGO members and the conversion of these into service providers removed the opportunities for long-term facilitation and partnership with producer communities;
• Little synergies were created with the private sector during the development and establishment of infrastructure projects. Consequently, there was insufficient investment in product development and marketing;
• CAMPFIRE had no centralised monitoring system and key monitoring aspects of the program are weak;
• Loss of interest by Project Collaborating Partners/Service Providers;
• Many Rural District Councils and Campfire Service Providers are loosing technical capacity due to the prevailing political and macro-economic factors in the country;
• Other factors that affect the sustainability of CAMPFIRE projects are the capacity of RDC CAMPFIRE Managers/Coordinators, high staff turnover and assignment of CAMPFIRE Managers to other duties; and
• Constraints affecting eco-tourism projects in CAMPFIRE: lack of effective marketing strategies, investor scepticism over the viability of community-based tourism and tourism as a whole under the prevailing economic and political environment in Zimbabwe, remoteness of many CAMPFIRE areas, poor infrastructure, political instability and bad publicity about the country.

7.2.6 Lessons from CAMPFIRE

The following lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the CAMPFIRE Programme:

1. CAMPFIRE aims at further devolution of responsibilities through the formation of Trusts, based on experiences from Botswana and Namibia;
2. Programmatic support in the form of long-term relationships is far more important than short-term consultancy support and training;
3. Large and time-bound projects are an expensive way of development of community capacity and are not well suited to the behavioural changes that programs like CAMPFIRE envisage;
4. Too much emphasis of support efforts is placed on the delivery of products, and too little on the process of behavioural and institutional change;
5. Projects are an inefficient way of driving product diversification, unless they complement the efforts of private entrepreneurs (e.g. venture capital funds);
6. Grant funding of diversification investment results in inefficient use of funds. Moreover, the process whereby communities inexperienced in ecotourism build facilities and then lease them to private sector is sub-optimal. Providing a venture capital loan fund to which community-private partnerships could apply, is likely to have resulted in more viable investments;
7. CAMPFIRE is most sustainable where business partnerships have been developed between communities and the private sector; and
8. Communities are capable of managing funds, building projects and managing wildlife, especially with light, but consistent, technical support.

7.3 Namibia

This section is a summary of a more comprehensive review of Namibia’s CBNRM programme. Full details are given in appendix B.

7.3.1 Background to CBNRM in Namibia

The primary goal of Namibia’s Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme in Namibia is the ‘protection of biodiversity and maintenance of
eco-systems and life support processes through sustainable use of natural resources for the benefit of rural communities’ (Ashley 1995). Namibia’s CBNRM programme started in the mid 1990s, and developed in a political and environmental context highly impacted by Namibia’s colonial past and dominated by unequal land distribution, in which communal land covered about 41 percent of the country but hosted about 68% of the population. At independence, there was gross inequality regarding access to land and resources to develop the land. There were no planning structures to allocate land for specific purposes, there was land degradation due to mismanagement, population growth and climatic conditions, and there was excessive and non-rational use of water resources (NPC 1985; Hubbard and Katjiuanjo 1997). Furthermore, the communal areas were characterised by extremely low farm productivity, a high degree of poverty, household food insecurity and poor nutritional status.

Prior to independence, the state maintained control of most natural resources on communal land although communities had usufruct rights of the land and some resources such as grazing. The state continues to own communal land, but a number of reforms have taken place, which have introduced community management of key resources. Based on the success in the commercial freehold wildlife sector, the Namibian government introduced in the mid 1990s new policy and legislation that gives local communities similar rights to freehold farmers if the communities form a common property institution called a ‘conservancy’. The conservancy must:

- Be legally constituted;
- Have clearly defined boundaries agreed by neighbouring communities;
- Have an equitable distribution plan;
- Have a defined membership; and
- Have a committee representative of the conservancy members.

The conservancy approach is currently moving beyond wildlife resources. New forestry policy and legislation makes provision for the establishment of ‘community forests’ and communities can enter into a forest management agreements with government. Inland fisheries legislation passed in 2003 allows for local communities to develop, in consultation with government, a system for co-management of fisheries. In the water sector new policies enable communities to manage and own their own water points.

A new land policy provides for categories of landholder including bodies such as wildlife conservancies, community forest management bodies and Water Point Associations. The Communal Land Reform Act of 2003 provides for Land Boards to administer communal land in much the same way as in Botswana. The Act does not specifically provide for secure group land tenure, but nor does it preclude group tenure rights, and when read with the relevant clauses in the land policy, community groups may be able to obtain group land rights. Under post independence legislation, traditional leaders are given a general duty to ensure that members of their community use natural resources sustainably.

7.3.2 CBNRM implementation

21 Financial incentives and proprietorship have led to a significant growth in the commercial wildlife sector and in game species found on freehold land.

22 Before a water point can be handed over to a community on communal land through a leasehold agreement, several steps must be met similar to the requirements to register a conservancy.
The main activity of Namibia’s national CBNRM programme has been the fostering of wildlife conservancies. Since 1997, twenty-nine conservancies have been registered and a further 30 are in the process of development. Some 74,000 square kilometres are currently demarcated as conservancy areas with 38,000 people registered as members (usually adults over 18) and an estimated 150,000 benefiting from the conservancy programme (Weaver pers. comm. 2003).

By the end of 2002, four conservancies had signed joint venture contracts with private sector companies to operate tourism lodges. Two more joint venture agreements are currently under negotiation and several other potential sites have been identified. Several lodges that existed before the conservancy movement started are being encouraged to develop formal benefit-sharing agreements with conservancies. Seven conservancies have negotiated trophy-hunting agreements, which effectively lease hunting concessions within their conservancy areas to professional hunting outfits.

In terms of support to conservancies, currently twelve NGOs, the Government of Namibia (represented through five directorates of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism) and the University of Namibia are involved in the CBNRM programme. One of these NGOs (NACOBTA) is a membership and umbrella body that specifically supports tourism and enterprise development within and outside conservancies. All support organisations are members of the formally registered national CBNRM coordinating body NACSO.

### 7.3.3 CBNRM impacts

The CBNRM programme is having a positive resource conservation impact. There is a general increase in wildlife in the ‘wildlife conservancies’, there has been a reduction in poaching, progress in managing human-wildlife conflicts, maintenance of wild habitat, increased awareness of wildlife and tourism as legitimate and productive land uses, and increased requests by conservancies for the re-introduction of game. Conservancies are developing integrated land and resource management plans, developing wildlife and problem animal monitoring systems and carrying out game censuses.

Cash income to conservancies (via their committees) has risen from a total of just over N$325,000 in 1997 to N$3.2 million per annum in 2002 (N$1 = 0.65 Pula and US$1 = N$7.5). The highest earning conservancy had income of N$960,000 from own conservancy activities (LIFE, 2002). The total direct income and benefits to conservancies and community members almost doubled between 2001 and 2002, increasing from N$6.1 million to N$11.1 per annum.

The sources of CBNRM revenues are more diverse than in Botswana, the four major ones being campsites (27%), trophy hunting and meat (22%), joint venture tourism (20%) and selling of thatching grass (10%; NACSO, 2003).

By late 2002, four conservancies had become financially independent (i.e. able to cover all their operating costs from their CBNRM income and have money available for community benefit. Three conservancies have distributed income to their members, the highest payout being N$630 per member. One multi-village conservancy, with a large number of individual members, distributes income on a village basis. The income to individuals or households may not appear significant, but becomes important when viewed against the mean and medium annual household income in Caprivi of N$7 200 and N$3 500 respectively and in Kunene of N$10 600 and N$5 200 respectively in 1993/1994 (CSO 1994; Terry 1999).
Economic research (Barnes et al. 2002) shows that conservancies are economically efficient, and are able to contribute positively to national income and development. The likelihood of their being sustainable is high. The analysis showed that conservancies provide very attractive financial returns for communities, consisting of income from wildlife use (direct wildlife use values) as well as donor grants (reflecting international non-use values). Conservancies also tend to be financially viable as projects. Flexibility and adaptability in design has allowed Namibia’s conservancy initiative to embrace an apparently sound rural development framework, which includes significant intangible values and benefits as well as financial income for communities.

CBNRM is also providing rural residents with a number of social benefits. Some communities appear to be forming conservancies because they believe conservancies provide useful institutional arrangements for managing other resources such as grazing and for gaining a stronger claim over their land. Employment, although limited in extent, is another social benefit, particularly with an average unemployment rate of 34.5% across the country. In 2002 an estimated 374 people were employed full-time (e.g. employed in tourism ventures) and 3,136 part-time (e.g. hunting trackers, craft producers and thatching grass harvesters). The importance of being formally employed or self-employed near one’s home is significant considering Namibia’s apartheid history of migrant labour (SIAPAC 2002). Even low-level jobs offer the opportunity for advancement through training and experience.
Figure 7.1: CBNRM benefits by source (2002; as % of total)

Total value = N$11.1 million

Source: NACSO 2003

Capacity building within the programme has been significant. Conservancies that run community campsites are gaining valuable on-site technical skills and managerial experience that is building capacity for future, higher-value, joint venture lodge operations. Participatory tourism planning and the development of natural resource management plans have increased the capacity of rural people to manage their tourism ventures and natural resources sustainably. The participatory process has also resulted in a feeling of ownership of the plans and responsibility for the natural resources (NACSO, 2003). Conservancy committee members are exhibiting the confidence to negotiate with government, donors, and the private sector, and to liaise with regional councils and line ministries. Conservancies have proven to be sound and strong legal entities to uphold community rights. Considerable training of committees and community members in various aspects of conservancy operation, financial management and natural resource management has taken place. Capacity building of the support organisations (NGOs and government) has been a major focus of the CBNRM programme.

While there are some similarities between the Namibian and Botswana CBNRM programmes, there are some important differences. For example, at the start, Namibia had two existing NGOs with experience in CBNRM and external assistance was based on supporting the efforts of the growing number of local NGOs, rather than directly on the communities. Namibia has a formal association of support organisations (NACSO) that provides for strong coordination and cohesion, but does not yet have an association of CBNRM conservancies, other than those involved in tourism who are members of NACOBTA. In Namibia, communities are able to define their own social unit in order to form a conservancy and are not limited by existing administrative boundaries. Further, individual community members must choose to join a conservancy and do not gain automatic membership through residency. The Namibian programme has provided...
systematic training and support in sound financial management and record keeping, including various checks and balances. There has also been considerably more focus on active community natural resource management in Namibia through resource monitoring, community game guards, game counts and land use planning. Conservancy rights are entrenched in legislation, whereas the rights of community trusts in Botswana are derived from policy and government decrees. Trusts in Botswana have more control over tourism than the Namibian conservancies. In both countries the government retains a large degree of control over wildlife still, reducing the sense of ownership and responsibility over resources by communities.

7.3.4 Lessons for Botswana

The Namibian CBNRM programme may offer several lessons for Botswana’s CBNRM programme and programmes elsewhere in the region:

- Policy and legislation should be based on local needs and come from practical experience. Participatory socio-ecological surveys led to the development of policy and legislation, which was developed by government staff;
- CBNRM policy and legislation should provide a flexible and adaptive framework for communities to operate in. This leads to empowerment, capacity building and a sense of control by the community over their own affairs;
- CBOs need specialised thematic support that can and should not be provided by government alone. Local NGOs have an important role to play, either focusing on certain themes or geographic areas;
- Policy and legislation should allow rural communities to have as much management rights as possible. A real sense of ownership and responsibility comes with strong rights of proprietorship;
- The CBNRM institutional structure has benefits that go beyond wildlife resources, including local water management;
- CBNRM projects are economically viable and attractive if they are run properly. The viability and financial returns decline in marginal areas;
- Namibian conservancies have diverse revenue sources, and are less dependent on hunting revenues;
- CBO membership may have several advantages, including accountability and acknowledgement of rights and responsibilities, better understanding of the constitution, a commitment to the conservancy, and the option of financial contributions from members;
- A national CBNRM coordinating body provides a sense of cohesion and helps to avoid major territorial conflicts;
- Tourism development should be planned based on business principles, particularly the identification of a demand for the product;
- Regular support on financial management is necessary to ensure that finances are handled properly;
- Management authority and rights to benefits should be devolved to the lowest possible level to have the maximum effect on behaviour change; transparency and accountability are easier to achieve with smaller units; and
- Do not mix service provision and advocacy in CBNRM membership associations as difficulties can arise when an umbrella membership organisation tries to do both and issues of sustainability can arise.
7.4 CBNRM in other Southern African countries

7.4.1 Zambia

CBNRM in Zambia has evolved within the wildlife sector and is still focused here. The Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) is the primary mechanism for decentralizing management functions. ADMADE was initiated in 1979 to address wildlife-poaching problems in National Parks and Game Management Areas (GMA), and is operational in twenty-six of the thirty-four GMAs. Given the prominence of traditional leaders, ADMADE relies heavily on traditional leadership structures. In the ADMADE project benefits from wildlife were channelled back to local communities with the chief having a central role in decision making in the distribution of funds.

ADMADE devolves limited rights to manage wildlife within a GMA to a Wildlife Management Authority (WMA). The WMA brings together chiefs, National parks and Wildlife Service Personnel, relevant government technical staff and directors of commercial companies. A WMA is further divided into sub-authorities, which conform to the hunting blocks of a GMA. The area of a hunting block is determined by the local chief’s area and the chief is the chair of the sub-authority, with local headmen forming the hulk of the membership. WMAs and sub-WMAs have legal status and traditional leaders control all decisions to a significant degree.

Revenues are paid to revolving funds. Half goes to the treasury; of the balance, 35% accrues to producer VWA, where the chief decides on development projects), 40% for local wildlife management and 25% for the department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. Certain communities may receive total revenues directly from private sector and pay out relevant levies due to government upon proven financial management capacity.

7.4.2 Malawi

CBNRM initiatives in Malawi have focused on resources within protected areas. This has been facilitated by the Wildlife Act of 1992, which allows for consumptive use by neighbouring communities of resources inside the National Parks and Wildlife Reserves whilst retaining state ownership of all wildlife.

In the 1990s the Government of Malawi began to change legislation governing the use of natural resources, in particular fish. The government shifted away from the traditional top-down approach to one that accommodated the aspirations of the communities. In 1997 the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act was enacted, providing for local community participation in conservation and management of fisheries in Malawi.

In 1995 the community based fisheries management programme was initiated after realising that the influx of seine net fishers were depleting fish stocks in a unsustainable manner. The objective thrust of the co-management programme, in the short term, was to halt the rapid decline in fish stocks and encourage recovery of the fishery industry. Policies were formulated with participation of local communities leading to the setting up of Beach Village Committees along the lake to assist in the management of resources. In 1997 the Lake Chiuta Fishers’ Association was formed.
with support from the Fisheries Department, who also facilitated in the provision of training in leadership and business management skills.

7.4.3 South Africa

One of the central components of the land reform is to conform to the co-ownership of rights to land and other resources of groups and communities living in former ‘Bantustans’. The rights take the form of ‘ownership in common hold’ and communities have the right to choose the institution in which ownership of rights will be vested. One option is for co-owners to constitute themselves into a Communal Property Association (CPA). This is the option, which has been selected by CBNRM initiatives in South Africa.

South Africa does not have one specific CBNRM programme, but each province has adopted different approaches and has different capacities. Natural resource management has been focused upon Parks and Protected Areas and this is reflected in the current focus of CBNRM initiatives in the wildlife sector.

7.5 Conclusions

CBNRM approaches have mushroomed in southern Africa, but the programmes in Zimbabwe and Namibia appear best established. The approaches differ in the historical background, organisational set-up, involvement of NGOs, level of decentralisation, sources of revenues and benefit distribution.

The programmes have had positive resource impacts in terms of wildlife resources outside protected areas, reduced poaching and perceived resource values by the local population. While CBNRM approaches have had initial biases towards wildlife, the resources covered have broadened to veld products and fisheries. Namibia and Zimbabwe have also diversified towards lodges and photo safaris.

In economic terms, the programmes have increased local benefits, particularly with respect to community services. Disbursements to households are common in Zimbabwe, but remain low. Therefore, CBNRM is at best a supplementary source of income.

Finally, Zimbabwe’s experience shows that macro-economic conditions and the international image of the country have a profound impact on CBNRM projects that cannot be controlled by communities.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SYNTHESIS OF CBNRM REVIEW

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the main findings of the review are summarised and discussed in section 8.2), followed by a brief analysis in retrospect (section 8.3); recommendations for improvements are made in section 8.4. The discussions cover the following topics:

- History and current status of CBNRM in Botswana (chapter two);
- Stakeholders capacity analysis (chapter three);
- Socio-economic impact assessment of CBNRM in Botswana (chapter four);
- Environmental assessment of CBNRM in Botswana (chapter five);
- Policy and environmental environment of CBNRM in Botswana (chapter six); and
- Regional CBNRM programmes and lessons for Botswana (chapter seven).

The review is based on literature, interviews with key personnel, case studies of four CBOs (KyT, STMT, KDT and NKXT), two NGOs (KCS and Thusano Lefatsheeng) and two private companies (HCH and Rann Hunting Safaris) and on the discussions held at District workshops.

This chapter also serves as an executive summary. The ‘reader-in-a-hurry’ may wish to read the concluding sections of each chapter too.

8.2 Summary of results

8.2.1 History and current state of CBNRM

The CBNRM process is relatively new in Botswana. The NRMP project (1989-1999) and DWNP are widely credited for the establishment of CBNRM projects, the first one being CECT (1993). The number of Community-Based Organisations (CBO) has rapidly grown since then, and in 2002 forty-six CBOs were registered; twelve of those were involved in a joint venture agreement (JVA) with at least seven private companies. Revenues from JVAs have grown to P8.5 million in 2002 with an average cash value for communities of over P 700 000 per annum. This is a lot of money for the mostly small CBNRM-villages. JVAs can be viewed as the cash engine of the CBNRM process. The rapid growth of the programme is shown in Figure 2.1 and the distribution over the country in Table 4.2 (chapter two).

While CBNRM projects are mostly associated with wildlife hunting and tourism, the projects cover a variety of activities and resources, including veld products and cultural activities.

During the late 1990s, several CBNRM support and lobby organisations (BOCOBONET in 1998, CBNRM Support Programme in 1999 and National CBNRM Forum in 2000) were established and DWNP established an extension department in support of CBNRM projects. Despite the strengthening of the CBNRM landscape, CBNRM is not yet a programme and should still be considered as a group of fairly diverse projects with the common denominator of a village institution in control of resource utilisation and conservation. CBNRM projects can be described as a ‘project or activity, where a
community (one village or a group of villages) organise themselves in such a way that they derive benefits from the utilisation of local natural resources and are actively involved in their use as well as conservation. Communities form an institution that is responsible on their behalf for the utilisation and conservation of local natural resources. Often (but not always), communities will receive exclusive rights and responsibilities from government.’

Compared to a programme, CBNRM-Botswana lacks at least two important components:

- An ‘enabling environment’ that promotes the CBNRM approach and assists the design, implementation and performance of individual CBNRM projects; and
- Mechanisms to raise, discuss and decide on CBNRM issues at a programmatic level.

The CBNRM approach is highly suitable for Botswana as it exploits key comparative advantages of the region (e.g. wildlife resources, scenic beauty, Parks) and Botswana (wilderness, low population density, stability and good international image), particularly in marginal areas with few development alternatives (western and northern Botswana).

8.2.2 Stakeholders capacity analysis

The capacity analysis covered the direct stakeholders, i.e. the communities and CBOs as well as the private companies involved in the JVAs. In addition, support organisations were reviewed, including government, non-government organisations (NGOs) and donors.

Unlike in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the CBNRM process in Botswana started without heavy NGO involvement. The process was driven by government and a USAID project (NRMP), and focused strongly on starting individual CBNRM projects. While the organisational landscape has changed and diversified, this imbalance still persists to some extent as no lead NGO supports the CBNRM process.

Time is a major factor in developing the capacity and performance of CBOs. Generally, older CBOs have a better capacity and perform better. Other factors assisting CBO-capacity include the level of revenues, natural resource endowments and technical assistance. Most CBOs have successfully gone through the establishment phase (mobilisation, constitution/Trust, registration and acquisition of exclusive resource use rights and development of management plan) and have established mutually beneficial relationships with NGOs and DWNP. In addition, some CBOs start to generate community and household benefits beyond the operation of the Trust. Areas of strengths include infrastructure and technology, membership support, advocacy and lobbying and networking. Many CBOs remain as yet weak in organisational structure (there is little beyond a Board and Trust employees), micro management by Boards, lack of community participation, power abuse, financial management and distribution of benefits. Furthermore, CBOs do not seem to monitor their progress in terms of the management plans, and adjust their plans and activities accordingly.

Private companies enter joint venture agreements mostly because of the business opportunities, in part due to the lack of alternatives (private concessions have been taken), the desire to expand the scope of business and to supplement qualities of private concessions that the company may already possess (being able to offer alternatives to
Generally, joint venture partners bring in critical resources such as tourism and enterprise skills, access to markets and funding sources, but their link with CBOs is often sub-optimal; the companies easily get upset by the seemingly endless demands of communities in return for little 'active community participation', the amount of time involved in dealing with communities, and in their lack of enterprise understanding. Private companies pay substantial amounts to communities, and many also deliver community funds/ social responsibility programmes. Such programmes assist communities, but not necessarily in the most efficient way. The programmes may lead to disappointments within the community due to alleged broken promises, and the perceived high costs on the part of private companies. Some private companies try to push (part of) the market risks to CBOs (e.g. downturn in tourism, exchange rate changes), while CBOs do not seem to be receptive and argue that risks are the private company’s burden. Furthermore, the perception of each other’s involvement is totally different. Communities seek temporary assistance from private companies to help communities run hunting and photo safaris on the long term by themselves; in contrast, private companies are involved to make money, and aim to stay longer.

In brief, the JVA can be described as a marriage of ‘in’convenience between two reluctant partners. They need each other; but would rather do it alone. This state of affair has adversely affected CBNRM as the potential benefits of the community-private sector partnership are not fully realised.

A total of nineteen NGOs, the oldest dating back to 1974, offer various types of support to CBOs. The areas of interest cover a wide range of development and conservation issues; the most common areas of interest are sustainable use of natural resources, community empowerment, poverty alleviation and ecotourism. Only three NGOs focus on wildlife resources, and only one on general environmental issues. The main achievements of NGOs with respect to CBNRM lie in the areas of community mobilisation, lobbying and advocacy, institutional strengthening and development of some veldproducts (government is almost inactive in this area). In addition, they assist CBOs with writing project proposals and accessing funding.

Apart from the CBRNM Support Programme, the CBNRM National Forum and BOCOBONET, none of the NGOs has CBNRM as its core business; most have been attracted to CBNRM, in part to compensate for decreased direct donor funding of NGOs. Common strengths of NGOs include infrastructure and technology, good governance, organisation structure and a good understanding of the CBNRM process. Frequent weaknesses include limitations in accessing funding, conflict resolution skills, assistance with tendering and monitoring of own activities. Another weakness is the weak linkages with and support of private companies, particularly in their dealings with communities. NGOs could mediate and try to improve the understanding between the direct stakeholders, and aim to build mutual trust. The NGO sustainability remains a serious concern.

A wide range of central and local government institutions are involved in CBNRM support as well as policy development. DWNP and the Department of Tourism are currently key departments. Other important departments include the department of rural development (poverty reduction and rural development), the National Museum and the remote area development department, charged with the development of remote areas, most of which overlap with CBNRM areas.
The achievements include the establishment of an extension department as well as technical advisory committees in districts. Moreover, pieces of CBNRM policies have been developed during the 1990s, including joint venture guidelines, tendering procedures etc.

Government support is strong on the wildlife side, particularly the technical aspects and extension, but weaker with respect to veld products and business development. The capacity of TACs is inadequate as most members have full time commitments in non-CBNRM areas. As with NGOs, very little support is offered to private companies involved in JVAs. The implicit assumption that these do not need support is mistaken.

Donors have played an important role in Botswana’s CBNRM process, both in terms of funding and technical assistance, but as in other countries with mixed results. Donors have been key in developing infrastructure and technology of CBOs and NGOs and in providing much needed ‘on the ground’ technical assistance. Their on-the-ground local assistance has proven to be extremely valuable for three of the four case study CBOs. However, the subsequent decrease in donor contributions have caused substantial problems in CBOs that were not yet mature enough to sustain themselves without external assistance (e.g. NKXT). These problems became apparent, as government did not fill all the gaps left by donors, despite the important work of the DWNP extension department. The major constraints of donor support and funding programmes include the limited, scattered funding programmes, the small size of the funding available as compared to the needs; short-term funding orientation, aimed at quick results, which are difficult to obtain from community projects; cumbersome, highly technical and time consuming application and approval procedures; substantial reporting requirements and limited co-ordination amongst donor agencies takes place. Moreover, the CBNRM programme has indirectly suffered from a decrease in donor funding because the decrease in NGO funding has eroded their support capacity. While some funding sources remain (e.g. CCF and CEDA), it appears difficult to access for CBOs and NGOs.

8.2.3 Socio-economic assessment of CBNRM projects

CBNRM projects aim to generate significant local benefits (communities and households). Generally, the socio-economic impacts of CBNRM projects appear to be positive, particularly with respect to revenue generation through joint venture agreements and non-material benefits. However, any conclusion on the projects’ impact must be interpreted with caution as baseline information and monitoring are seriously lacking. This makes it impossible to assess the projects’ impacts in objective and quantitative terms.

The main local benefits include revenue generation, employment creation and accumulation of assets (both at community and household level). Other benefits include game meat and improved access to services and market. While the community funds or social responsibility programmes do bring benefits to the communities, they rarely live up to the expectations and it is doubted whether the private companies are the most suitable partner for addressing the community needs. It may be better for CBOs to seek assistance from elsewhere such as from NGOs. Finally, CBNRM projects yield important national benefits, including employment creation, economic diversification, more room for the commercial tourism industry, a ray of hope and support for rural development in areas with few viable alternatives, government revenues, reduced dependency on government hand-outs and scope for self empowerment, and a long term possible
decrease in welfare programmes and expenditures. The CBNRM projects help to keep (some) youth in rural areas, and contribute towards Vision 2016.

Several areas of concern emerged from the socio-economic assessment. Firstly, at present most CBOs seem unable to establish and successfully run projects. This severely limits their income raising potential (non-rent/fee based). Markets opportunities are limited in most villages, but the current Trusts do not fully exploit existing opportunities (e.g. crafts, cultural performances). With the departure of donors, this leaves a highly vulnerable revenue basis, mostly dependent on hunting revenues. Secondly, financial planning and expenditure control are generally weak (again with some exceptions), and can deteriorate quickly without external assistance. Most Trust experience difficulties controlling their expenditures on vehicles, wages and allowances (except KyT that was forced to curb expenditure due to drying up of donor funds). This is particularly risky, as Trust revenues have proven to be volatile and fragile. A healthy financial situation can turn very quickly in a difficult one. Two of the four case study Trusts experience serious financial difficulties at the moment (Table 4.1). Thirdly, the benefit distribution is weak and ad-hoc. CBOs do not have a benefit distribution strategy, and community members benefit little. Often, Trust expenditures take up a large and growing part of the revenues, leaving little funds for distribution among members, for investment and for natural resource management. The current benefit distribution reduces the current and future livelihood impacts of CBNRM projects, and makes Trusts dependent on external financial support for investments and resource conservation. This path is not sustainable. Fourthly, the opportunities of community-private sector partnership are under-utilised at the detriment of both communities and private companies. Private companies could assist communities with enterprise development and financial management, and identify financial assistance (e.g. lodges). Fifthly, CBNRM projects need to consider alternative livelihood sources, including agriculture, and integrate these into their management plans. There is little evidence that this is happening at the moment. Sixthly, the handing over of commercial lodges to CBOs by Land Boards was not properly done as CBOs were ill prepared and lacked the capacity to operate the lodges.

There is great diversity in CBNRM projects and in their performance. Generally, the older CBOs (STMT and KyT) perform better than the recently established ones (KDT and NKXT), suggesting that the time and learning factors are important. While KyT has problems adjusting to less donor funds, it has been successful in selling products and curbing expenditures. Clearly, STMT has had the most significant socio-economic impacts; mostly because of the ‘JVA windfall revenues’ that sharply increased with the new joint venture company HCH. However, it also shows some ability to run projects, and distributes more revenues to community members than most other CBOs. NKXT as well as KDT do not perform well at present. Given the scepticism about the economic potential of CBNRM in the Kgalagadi, NKXT performed surprisingly well in 2000; its recent poor recent performance results from over-reliance on external support, (leading to a rapid decline in Trust management and systems after the support was withdrawn), marginal natural resources and high costs of operations. In contrast, KDT is located in one of the best wildlife areas in the country, but it has had serious management problems that landed the Trust into debts, and forced retrenchment of all staff. Poor management, lack of transparency and accountability, and inability of the community to take action are among the underlying causes.

8.2.4 Environmental issues of CBNRM
CBNRM projects are expected to lead to greater local appreciation of natural resources and better resource management, including a decrease in illegal use. Baseline information and monitoring are missing, and therefore the assessment remains general, and largely qualitative. By and large, the environmental impacts of CBNRM projects appear to be positive: local resources are more appreciated, and illegal use is minimal, probably at least in part due to CBNRM. This is a surprise as community members reap few direct benefits. Moreover, CBNRM projects also contribute towards landscape preservation, i.e. maintaining grass dominated semi-arid savannas and the associated biodiversity. Communities believe that wildlife resources are stabilising or increasing (e.g. KD1), and attribute this in part to CBNRM. The CBNRM projects also have had indirect positive environmental impacts, by reducing pressure on rural agriculture and its associated environmental problems as well as by developing better relationships between communities and conservation groups. The latter is important for future resource conservation efforts.

One area of concern refers to the determination of hunting quotas by DWNP. While DWNP presently seeks comments from communities, the latter feel that their views are not taken into account. This causes disappointment and frustration when quotas are being reduced despite the common perception of communities that wildlife resources have not gone down. There is scope for more collaboration between communities and DWNP, also bearing in mind the roles of CEGs in wildlife sightings. A second area of concern is that no community seems to adopt a holistic and pro-active approach towards resource management. Consequently, resource utilisation and conservation can be expected to be sub-optimal. The benefits and impacts of hunting and photo safaris may not be compared, possibly leading to under-utilisation of photo safaris and over-reliance on hunting (given the quick and high returns). Moreover, other resources than wildlife may be neglected, particularly those veld products whose potential is not directly apparent. Resource monitoring and resource investments are essential components of such a holistic approach, and essential for long term sustainable resource management. They are unlikely to materialise without a holistic NRM approach. A third area of concern refers to illegal roads, littering etc. associated with tourism and campsites. While the situation does not yet appear to be serious, preventive measures need to be considered before the actual harm has been done. A final area of concern is that resources are influenced by many factors beyond the control of local communities (e.g. fences and roads). Therefore, even holistic, pro-active resource management by CBOs cannot guarantee resource conservation.

8.2.5 Policy and legislative environment of CBNRM

Policy and legislative development have fallen behind the development of CBNRM projects. While bits and pieces of CBNRM policy have been developed, no comprehensive CBNRM policy or legislation has been adopted as yet. In fact, most resource policies are not specific to CBNRM. This contrasts with the community-based emphasis that has been given to rural development strategies (1997) and policies (2002). Somewhat surprisingly however, the community focus of the new rural development strategy and policy has not yet significantly impacted on CBNRM policies, possibly because DWNP has been the lead government support department.

The existing resource policies leave room for gaps, inconsistencies and conflicts with respect to CBNRM. For example, veldproduct permits are mostly granted on an
individual basis and CBOs may not even need a permit for their use or purchase, while wildlife permits are granted to communities. Consequently, veldproduct CBOs have a less exclusive and secure resource base (e.g., KyT). As a result, their rights may be affected by new CBOs that would work in the same area, and would acquire resource rights based on the DWNP-model. Moreover, resource policies are rarely adequately monitored, and therefore no incentives exist for communities to contribute towards their implementation.

The situation is worse with respect to the legislative environment. Botswana does not have CBNRM legislation, nor does it have comprehensive environmental legislation such as an Environmental Management Act and Environmental Impact Assessment legislation. This implies that non-compliance with environmental policies and elements of CBNRM policy is difficult to redress. Furthermore, existing resource legislation needs to be reviewed, as it may be incompatible with CBNRM principles (e.g., 1974 Agricultural Resources Conservation Act). Finally, enforcement is even more problematic with legislation. While CBNRM has the potential to reduce enforcement needs due to greater local benefits, it is important that CBOs are accorded the local benefits and enforcement responsibilities.

The review of aspects of CBNRM led to the following conclusions:

- The Trust form is most suitable for RALEs;
- The five-year sub-lease is too short for establishing new photo safari enterprises;
- Several options exist to increase the accountability of Trust, including the establishment of an indemnity clause and placement of Trusts under temporary protection;
- Tendering has generally worked well, but there is need to make the process transparent and more competitive; and
- The option to make trust byelaws has not been used.

### 8.2.6 Regional CBNRM experiences

CBNRM programmes have developed in most of southern Africa. This in itself is indicative of the perceived potential to generate income, employment and livelihood improvements, as they are based on African values and conditions (strong communities and large communal areas) and operate under very different macro-economic conditions. In Zimbabwe as well as Namibia, the socio-economic and environmental impacts are judged to be positive, even though quantitative data are often weak.

The programmes are most developed in Zimbabwe, Namibia and to a lesser extent in Zambia. The programmes in Zimbabwe and Namibia have experienced very strong growth, similar to that of Botswana. There are some basic differences between the programmes. In Zimbabwe, the wildlife user rights are less decentralised (though recently community Trusts have been established that are similar to the Botswana ones), as they are held by Rural District Councils, who pass rights on to wards. Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme has clear guidelines for revenue distribution, and has domestic roots in NGOs and government. It also has a clear policy and legislative basis, and lead agencies in government as well as civil society. The Namibian CBNRM programme (policy part) was modelled on the success of tourism and wildlife conservation in the private sector. Conservancies in communal areas are formed with clearly negotiated,
defined boundaries and membership and a benefit distribution plan. NGOs were supporting the CBNRM process rights from the start. As in Botswana and Zimbabwe, the CBNRM resources have broadened in time, but the approach now extends to the management of village water systems. This demonstrates that CBNRM benefits can extend beyond its initial scope. Namibia has a better developed, and more specialised support structure, particularly for tourism. Unlike in Botswana, donors are still important CBNRM stakeholders; hence the long-term sustainability of the approach remains to be seen. It is however encouraging that at least two conservancies have become financially independent.

Chapter seven contains lists of lessons from CAMPFIRE and Namibia that are not repeated here. A few other noteworthy points:

- Both countries emphasise the need for a more business-oriented approach and greater participation of the private sector. This point also emerges from the Botswana review findings;
- CBNRM projects are economically viable if they are properly conducted;
- Lodge development tend to be long-term joint venture partnerships between communities and private companies;
- The benefits of CBNRM are supplementary at the household level. Therefore, it is unlikely that CBNRM can become the main source of livelihood of the majority of people. Instead, its primary value lies in livelihood diversification and security. It also means that other sources of livelihood need to be actively promoted, for example through the establishment of productive activities;
- The CBNRM-benefits depend to a large extent on the resource richness. Some areas may therefore have a marginal CBNRM potential, and at best bring low revenues. If CBNRM projects are launched there, the risk of failure is high and expectations should be low. This could apply to parts of western Botswana with low wildlife densities. Therefore, CBNRM projects need to focus on areas with a comparative natural resource advantage with a market potential;
- Community projects take a long time to mature. This may clash with the time horizon of support organisations such as donors;
- A strong support network is essential for the programme’s progress, and ideally consists of government agencies, NGOs and private sector; and
- The diversity in CBNRM projects and their performance is significant, as they are determined by local socio-economic and environmental conditions. Therefore, a single CBNRM model is unlikely to be relevant and succeed. CBNRM programmes need to recognise the need for diversity and flexibility. There needs to room for piloting and experiments and learning from failures. Instead, standardisation can be pursued with respect to ‘routine’ practices such as financial management, organisational and administrative procedures etc..

8.3 Brief analysis of CBNRM

The Botswana CBNRM landscape consists mostly of wildlife-based projects and a few veldproduct-based projects. Wildlife-based projects have been the ‘face’ of CBNRM in Botswana, and some of these have generated substantial revenues, mostly from joint
venture agreements. The projects adopted a single model approach (establishment of Constitution/Trust and tendering/auctioning of wildlife use rights) and were primarily supported by DWNP, in particular its community services division and the TACs; NGOs and donors also offered support.

The rationale of CBNRM was that government could not successfully and efficiently protect natural resources outside protected areas, and that community resource management would be a better development and conservation option. Local resource management would encourage greater local participation, and release more resources for resource conservation. Moreover, decentralisation of benefits of wildlife use would increase the local benefits, and stimulate communities’ interest in resource conservation.

The approach fitted very well into the trends towards decentralisation of rights and establishment of common property resource management regimes to combat the perils of open resources access.

In retrospect, the approach was based on several, often implicit, assumptions such as:

1. **Devolution of parts of resource use rights and the associated increase in local benefits will lead to natural resource conservation**
   
   The review has found that poaching is low and appears to have decreased, and that people have developed positive attitudes towards local natural resources. However, no community has developed a holistic approach towards natural resource management that is needed to ensure resource sustainability. There is therefore not really a common property resource management regime; virtually no community has invested in natural resources and infrastructure, and no community has reserved funds for resource conservation. In addition, resource-monitoring efforts are carried out, but remain largely un-used, for example in the quota determination where communities are not involved in. While the CBNRM projects have build components of resource conservation, they have not yet introduced secure resource conservation mechanisms. The possible conclusions are that devolution of rights in itself is not enough to guarantee resource conservation and/or that it may take a longer time than expected.

2. **CBNRM projects will generate local resource benefits that will help to change people’s resource attitudes and improve their livelihoods**.
   
   Generally, local benefits have increased, mostly due to joint venture agreements, but they are proving to be volatile and insecure due to dependency on wildlife quota. Most CBNRM-projects have not been able to increase income from non-wildlife sources. Moreover, few benefits have trickled down directly to members or communities. It came therefore as a surprise that people have developed appreciation for their local natural resources.

3. **Communities are able to design and implement productive projects that will augment and diversify Trust income**.
   
   This has proven to be very difficult for most CBOs. KyT appears currently quite successful, probably due to its more commercial and market-oriented approach. One difficulty is that the private sector is hardly involved in these productive projects. Another difficulty is the limited local market opportunities for productive projects. This calls for a broader approach of Trusts towards investments, including a review of external investment opportunities, and involvement of the private sector.
4 **Communities will improve their performance and in the end be able to manage natural resource and CBNRM projects alone**
The review finds that most communities require substantial support, particularly hand-on, on the ground support. Support continues to be needed with respect to organisational and administrative management, financial management and enterprise skills, particularly related to tourism. Support is needed for longer than originally anticipated.

5 **Communities are able to distribute the benefits fairly and in a transparent manner.** Communities do not have a benefit distribution plan, and the primary beneficiaries are those employed by Trusts and those benefiting from access to allowances. The direct benefits to communities and to individual members are minimal. Currently, no consideration is given to investments into natural resource management and into external investments.

6 **Communities are able to identify and pursue common, unified interest and activities**
The wildlife CBNRM-model assumed that the formation of a Trust and village committees (for multiple village CBOs) and provision for general meetings with members are sufficient to successfully pursue unified interest and activities, and resolve conflicts that may emerge within the communities; that the institutions would be representative, accountable and legal. The review finds that such institutions are legal, but not necessarily representative and accountable. Representativeness and accountability require additional factors to be in place such as checks and balances and smaller homogenous institutions within villages.

7 **‘One model fits all’ CBNRM projects**
The drive to initiate projects has been accompanied by a single model approach, probably because it is easier understood and implementable. However, a uniform approach is unlikely to incorporate local variations in natural resource and socio-economic conditions. The latter include population density, ethnicity, settlement patterns, and differences within communities, size of CBNRM area and the location vis-à-vis markets. The one model approach can easily become coercive, and cause neglect of important local factors.

8 **Communities control the key determinants of resource conservation and economic development.**
The implicit assumption is that communities are able to control the key determinants of resource conservation and economic development; this is only partly true. Firstly, quota are set by DWNP, and not influenced by communities. This weakens the incentives for communities to manage wildlife resources sustainably. Secondly, the state of natural resources is determined by several factors beyond the control of CBOs. These include infrastructural developments such as fences, diseases, and fragmentation of wildlife habitats that interferes with resource mobility. Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE experience shows that unfavourable macro-economic and political conditions may have a strong, negative impact on the results of CBO projects. In general terms, external shocks may have substantial impact on resource conservation and development results of CBNRM projects. CBOs should plan for such shocks, and government should minimise shocks on CBNRM projects (e.g. savingram, quota changes, resource bans etc.).
Natural resources offer comparative advantages that render natural resource utilisation the most viable development option

CBO projects are based in relatively resource rich areas with limited agricultural potential. Therefore the utilisation of natural resources makes economic sense. However, there is a vast difference in potential among CBNRM areas, as is demonstrated in Table 4.4. It is important to establish the comparative natural resources advantages in more detail before CBO plans are being developed; this assessment should include costs-benefit considerations. The review shows that the economic potential of CBNRM in western Botswana may be more limited than the first joint venture agreements suggested.

BNRM projects can become successful and independent in a relatively short period. The implicit assumption has been that successful CBOs and projects can be established within ten years; this turns out to be untrue. Even relatively successful CBOs such as STMT are still at risk of mismanagement and poor performance. It needs to be recognised that working with communities is a long-term process, yielding few short-term and mostly long-term results. During that period withdrawal of support can lead to collapse of the CBO.

Common weaknesses of CBNRM programmes in southern Africa include:

- The inability to generate substantial economic benefits, and to let these benefits trickle down to community members;
- Underestimation of the difficulties of community-decision-making and the establishment of strong and effective local institutions;
- Underestimation of the tendency by individuals, bureaucrats and groups to capture a disproportionate share of the benefits;
- Lack of genuine political commitment to devolution of resource use rights;
- Underestimation of the strong incentive that poverty forms for illegal resource use and open resource access;
- Dependency on hunting and tourism, that both are vulnerable to global market shifts that are difficult to understand for communities.

Experiences from Botswana and the region show that growth, diversity, flexibility, time and experimentation and learning are key to the CBNRM process. Below, a series of CBNRM fundamentals are given that are critical to the long-term success of CBNRM in Botswana.

1. Any CBNRM programme needs to recognise the local diversity in socio-economic and environmental conditions and potential. Such conditions include the settlement patterns, remoteness, ethnicity, capabilities, natural resource variety, abundance and economic potential. Therefore, a CBNRM programme should facilitate the development of different local CBNRM models based on local needs and capabilities;

2. The primary justification of CBNRM lies in promoting rural development, improving livelihoods and conservation of natural resources. Consequently, CBNRM projects should aim at increasing revenues and other benefits, and distributing such benefits to the benefit of the community and its members. CBNRM is not meant to only sustain Trusts and the few direct beneficiaries.

3. Community empowerment and participation requires more than community meetings and a Board. There is need to develop structures within the community
that operate under and with the Board to increase participation, ownership and transparency. The KyT group model may hold opportunities for other CBOs;

4. CBNRM projects are economic activities, and not charity or social welfare projects. To sustain these, Trusts need to operate efficiently, and projects need to be viable. Trust projects are not necessarily implemented by the Trust, especially if Trusts lack relevant expertise. Projects could be run by a group of villagers, by individuals or by a company;

5. CBNRM is a slow, evolutionary process, which sees CBOs passing through different stages (establishment, initial implementation, consolidation, and maturity). Time is needed to increase the capacity of CBOs; with time, the tendering system also improves due to lessons learnt from previous tenders and growing competition. It is important to give CBOs time and room to learn from successes and failures. Moreover, support should be adjusted to the stage of the CBOs, and be made conditional on progressing to other stages;

6. Sustainability is the key to the future of CBNRM. While the potential economic, environmental and social sustainability have been clearly demonstrated, empirical data do not exist to demonstrate sustainability progress. Monitoring as well as research and development are essential components of a sustainable CBNRM programme.

8.4 Recommendations

It is long over due to integrate the current CBNRM projects into a systematic and comprehensive CBNRM programme. This requires:

- An enabling policy and regulatory environment, in which individual CBNRM projects can flourish;
- A comprehensive, efficient and accessible support structure that allows CBOs as well as private JVA companies to seek the support they need;
- A CBNRM covenant or strategy that transcends individual CBNRM projects, sets measurable targets, has clear instruments to promote CBNRM, clarifies responsibilities and duties of stakeholders, and assesses the funding requirements and sources. The covenant would offer guidance for individual and groups of stakeholders and be binding; non-compliance with the covenant would lead to reprimands and/or penalties. Table 8.1 highlights key aspects of the recommended covenant approach (recommendation one);
- Systematic monitoring and evaluation of CBNRM-progress and adjustments in projects and the programme when needed;

Below, recommendations are made for each of the key areas of this review.
Table 8.1: Key aspects of the recommended CBNRM covenant (recommendation one)

A covenant is an agreement concluded between all CBNRM stakeholder parties. The agreement is the result of negotiations usually initiated by government. Such negotiations may take some time (e.g. one year), and usually involve compromises from each stakeholder group. The overall result is often better than the results of legislation and economic instruments alone. In addition, stakeholders usually feel ownership of the covenant, and are more likely to comply.

Covenants have been used in Europe, particularly in the quest to combat pollution. In southern Africa, few applications are known. This is surprising given the strong tradition of consultation and participation. It appears ideal for CBNRM implementation.

The covenant’s duration should be ten years with regular progress reviews, and adjustments when necessary.

A covenant could include:

- An overall goal and clear environmental and development targets for the duration of the covenant;
- A set of instruments available to stakeholders for the implementation of the covenant;
- Clear plan of activities and commitments by stakeholder for the duration of the covenant;
- Rights and responsibilities of stakeholders, particularly the CBOs and private companies;
- Funding and funding mechanisms for the covenant implementation. For example, funding could come from government, donors and direct stakeholders;
- Broad guidelines for benefit distribution at the local and national level;
- Peer review mechanisms to evaluate the implementation of the covenant;
- Code of conduct and best practices in CBNRM that all stakeholders could work towards;
- Conflict resolution procedures and sanctions for non-compliance or under-performance;
- Progress and performance results by group of stakeholders could be made public.

The covenant would be binding for all stakeholders/signatories.

The usefulness of a CBNRM covenant:

- It offers guidance for the implementation and progress measurement of individual CBNRM projects;
- The negotiations and the resulting covenant more contacts between stakeholders and a better understanding of and greater appreciation for each others strategies, actions and potential;
- Clarification of the roles, responsibilities and entitlements of stakeholders;
- It offers opportunities for streamlining and simplifying CBNRM-procedures;
- Opportunities for networking and information exchange;
- Ensures regular review and evaluation, and stimulates applied research;
- Opportunities for co-ordination of funding sources;
- Greater transparency that can be used at the project level by communities and support groups.
8.4.1 Recommendations for stakeholders

Recommendation two:
Establish a representative, accountable and legal CBNRM platform with participation of all stakeholders.

This institution could be charged with the implementation of the CBNRM covenant. It is recommended to formally register the National CBNRM Forum as a membership trust made up of representatives from the government, CBOs, the private sector, NGOs and the principal donors supporting CBNRM.

The Forum would have overall responsibility for: monitoring the implementation of the CBNRM covenant; coordinating support activities; encouraging the development of standard financial, administrative and organisational procedures for CBOs as well as codes of conduct; gathering and disseminate information; monitoring and review progress. Where relevant, initiate strategic discussions and policy CBNRM procedural amendments; inputs into policy and legislation; other services currently supplied by the CBNRM Support Programme. The Forum would also maintain contacts with other CBNRM programmes in the region, and exchange information and lessons, and seek joint funding opportunities. Finally, the Forum would establish a web site to disseminate information about Botswana’s CBNRM programme as well as to market the projects locally, regionally and globally.

The National CBNRM Forum would focus on the following priority areas: encouraging greater and more balanced participation of the private sector; covenant implementation and review; monitoring the performance of CBNRM, quality control and identifying key success and failure factors, documenting best practices and facilitating exchange among stakeholders; and preparation of CBNRM statistics.

If the CBNRM Forum becomes a legal body at the national level, it makes sense for each district to have its own ‘branch’.

Recommendation three:
Clarify and optimise the roles of stakeholders

CBNRM implementation
- The role of government in direct implementation of CBNRM projects needs to be reconsidered. Government involvement in direct implementation of CBNRM needs to focus on areas where the specific government departments have specialised knowledge and expertise;
- There is need to provide more space for NGO and private sector involvement in direct implementation of CBNRM projects; and
- The emphasis of CBNRM implementation and co-ordination should be at district level. TACs should go back to their original role of technical advice, particularly with respect to joint venture agreements and rural development aspects of CBNRM.

CBNRM support strengthening and coordination
- Establishment of an association of CBNRM support organisation (BOCSO) with representation of government, NGOs and donors.

CBNRM enabling environment
• Government needs to provide an enabling policy environment for the effective implementation of CBNRM. The roles of the different actors involved in facilitating CBNRM need to be clearly reflected in the CBNRM policy;
• Establishment of a government CBNRM Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to provide oversight over the implementation process; and
• Establish a separate CBNRM Policy Development Unit that would be responsible for the CBNRM policy development and evaluation as well as the co-ordination of government’s CBNRM efforts.

CBNRM monitoring and evaluation
• The CBNRM National Forum would be actively involved in overall CBNRM monitoring; and
• The Government’s unit would be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of policies and legislation.

Recommendation four:
Development of strong and effective umbrella organisations for stakeholder groups
• BOCOBONET needs to be strengthened into a representative and accountable association that serves the interests of CBOs. BOCOBONET needs to continue its mandate of lobbying and advocating on behalf of its members on issues of concern within the CBNRM policy framework;
• NGOs need to strengthen their lobbying and advocacy strategies through BOCONGO; and
• HATAB should also continue serving the interests of its private sector membership.

Recommendation five:
Strengthening of individual groups of stakeholders

Government
• Departments such as the National Museum and ARB that are critical to the facilitation of CBNRM need to clarify their roles and areas of support to CBNRM projects;
• Greater involvement of ARB, fisheries and other relevant departments into the CBNRM process
• Better co-ordination of government activities through the new CBNRM Policy Unit;
• Increase the role of districts in CBNRM, and explore the opportunities to get Councils more actively involved.

CBOs
• Experiment with different organisational models, particularly within communities; for example, by establishing smaller institutional entities below the Boards. This could enhance participation, ownership and transparency;
• Make CBOs more professional and outsource specialised expertise that cannot be efficiently provided by a CBO;
• Continuous training of the Board, staff and the general membership on the constitution/deed of trust, roles and responsibilities of each level of the CBO

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structure, business management, tourism and enterprise development are key areas where capacity is required;

- Adopt rotational Board elections to improve the continuity of Boards;
- Adopt transparent and simple administrative, organisational and financial management procedures;
- Adopt a standard, transparent selection process for joint venture agreement parties; and
- Establish strong and effective deterrents for irregularities.

The level and nature of support should be determined by the development stage of the CBO, and by progress made. The latter provides a performance incentive for CBOs. Moreover, CBO-performance indicators need to be established and annual inspections of CBO and JVP performance need to be carried out.

**NGOs**

- NGOs should make CBNRM one of their core businesses, and need to specialise their support themes and areas;
- Offer support to increase the capacity of the various NGOs working in CBNRM, at all levels (technical, financial, institutional/organisational). This can be done through long-term service contracts within the covenant framework;
- Assess the needs for ‘on the ground advisors’ and establish longer-term programmes to avoid that CBOs become dependent;
- Encouraging spatial and thematic specialisation of NGO support and promoting high quality services. NGO support structures could be established in Maun, Hukuntsi and another one in eastern Botswana;
- Establish a community-based tourism enterprise support unit, for example under the wings of HATAB to co-ordinate, develop, build capacity and market CBTEs and eco-tourism;
- Establish a **financial and business management support unit**, for example within BOCCIM, Enterprise Botswana or another civil society group;

**Donors and funding**

- Funding agencies need to adopt a longer-time horizon for their support, make a longer term support commitment or integrate their short-term support in the longer-term CBNRM strategic plan/ covenant;
- The Economic Promotion Fund under the RADP could be integrated into or harmonised with CBNRM funding.
- Funding and support of CBOs and NGOs could take the form of **performance based contracts** of at least five years;
- The recommended new role of the CBNRM Forum carries resource implications and capacity building. The DARUDEC Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme under DNP and other CBNRM funding instruments may be in the position to support the new institution;
- Funding mechanism, procedures and requirements need to be simplified in order to facilitate CBO access. It is further recommended that funding could be channelled through the National CBNRM Forum to provide funding and technical support. Ideally, funding and support would be available from a **one-stop support centre**; and
• Strengthen co-ordination of donors supporting the same organisations or with the same geographical focus be promoted to maximise resource use and avoid duplication.

8.4.2 Recommendations regarding the socio-economic assessment

Recommendation six:
Increase socio-economic data generation and analysis by:

• Introducing standard baseline information and monitoring methods, including basic performance indicators, in which the direct stakeholders and support organisations can participate. This leads to cost reductions and strengthens the understanding of CBOs, private companies and support organisations;
• Compiling annual CBNRM statistics based on existing reports and statistics as well as the baseline and monitoring data. This would benefit CBNRM planning, implementation and new projects;
• Establishing a CBNRM Research Fund to stimulate applied research in key aspects of CBNRM. Students, NGOs and other stakeholders could carry out such research. The fund would generate better insights into CBNRM trends, performance, constraints and opportunities.

Recommendation seven:
Increase the local benefits, as well as their reliability and sustainability by:

• Developing a long-term revenue generation strategy, which is based on JVA revenues, other local income sources and income generated from investments elsewhere. Raising revenues, diversification of income sources and resilience to revenue fluctuations should be key components in this strategy;
• Maximising existing sources of revenues by increasing competition and transparency of tender procedures and auctions; by establishment of reserve prices and/or by separate treatment of the most valuable species such as elephants;
• Better utilisation of the photo safari potential, and collaboration opportunities with the private companies. This could be achieved by separating tenders for hunting and photo safaris, each with distinct conditions that encourage development of both activities;
• Exploration and exploitation of viable projects based on commercialisation of veldproducts, fish resources (e.g. fish farming) and wood resources by the Trust, community groups/individuals or private companies; and
• Exploring and promoting viable local investment opportunities, e.g. through micro-lending and/or tendering of such opportunities.

Recommendation eight:
Promoting a fair and sustainable distribution of local benefits

• CBOs should be made aware of the fragility and volatility of their revenue sources, and the determinants of the value of natural resources. Fragility and volatility should be taken into account in the planning of Trust operations, and require financial buffers;
• Adopt a revenue sharing formula that takes into account the following: benefits to community members, trust recurrent expenditures, resource conservation and productive investments.
• Development of a five-year benefit distribution plan. This ensures consistency and transparency in benefit distribution;
• The benefits for individual members and communities need to be increased, and the Trust expenditures reviewed and brought under control;
• Development of guidelines and strategies for vehicle purchase and maintenance, employment strategies and conditions as well as for various types of allowances;
• Focus community support on the poorest, and ensure that households receive compensation for any costs associated with living with CBNRM-resources;
• Restrict the community wish list in JVA to needs that can be efficiently delivered by the private companies. CBOs need to seek the services from other agencies for other needs; and
• Subsistence hunting rights and livelihood needs should be honoured. Community rights should not be given to the private company when subsistence hunting needs are not met, and members do directly benefit from commercial hunting;
• Given the low direct benefits of CBNRM projects, opportunities for viable agriculture and other income alternatives need to be better explored, exploited while minimising their possible conflicts with CBNRM resources.

Recommendation nine:
Develop the full potential of community-private sector partnerships

Improve and intensify the relationships between communities and the private sector. This starts with ensuring a better understanding of each other, development of mutual trust, and ends with increased and more productive collaboration. Better relationships requires efforts from all stakeholders:

• The private sector has to become more actively involved in CBNRM process; not just in individual projects;
• The communities need to appreciate the strengths of private companies, and be willing to learn from it;
• Information dissemination and education about CBNRM and the strategy and role of each stakeholder;
• Regular contacts at the programme level are needed; and
• Support organisations should pay more attention to the (potential) role of the private sector in the CBNRM process.

8.4.3 Environmental recommendations

The environmental analysis leads to recommendations nine to fourteen below.

10. Resource monitoring by aerial surveys should be complemented by participatory monitoring strategies with VDCs, safari operators and professional trophy hunters.

11. It is recommended that quotas will be determined in closer, and more genuine co-operation between DWNP, CBOs and the private companies. Monitoring of indicators should be linked to the determination quota. Records of trophy quality should be kept by CBOs and DWNP.
12. Wildlife off-take within CBNRM should be monitored against set quota. Safari operators should keep records of trophy quality giving details to the lengths of horns of trophy animals, body lengths for carnivore species and tusk weight for elephants. This is necessary so as to detect over-harvesting (if any).

13. Problem Animal Control (PAC) of trophy species could be incorporated into the hunting quota within CBNRM. However, this has remained difficult to implement in Botswana due to the perceived slow response time of the hunting safari operators and necessary legislative changes that need to be effected in relation to PAC.

14. A holistic approach to natural resources monitoring within the CBNRM is required. This could be summarised in an environmental management plan that also reviews active management such as restocking, propagation and water points. Indicator variables that could be used to reflect on the health of the ecosystem as a whole need to be identified and monitored from baseline levels. Moreover, the viability and sustainability of different resource uses should be compared in order to maximise the sustainable benefits of hunting, photo safaris and veldproducts. This also includes:

- Bartering of veld products between CBNRM;
- Considering providing of water point to retain reasonable numbers within CBNRM area;
- Restocking of animal species that have been decimated in the CBNRM areas;
- Diversification of CBNRM into veld products and identification of high potential veld products areas; and
- Diversification of consumptive utilisation of wildlife into non-consumptive utilisation (or photographic tourism).

8.4.4 Policy and legislative recommendations

The policy and regulatory analysis has led to the following recommendations:

15. Enforcement of existing policies in various ministries and department should be enhanced. Those government departments whose responsibilities it is to monitor, implement and enforce the policies should do that in order to improve the utilisation and conservation of community-managed natural resources.

16. Policies that are in draft form should be speedily finalised and implemented. This is particularly important for the CBNRM policy. In finalising the policy, it should be extensively amended to ensure consistency across natural resources and have a simple, implementation framework that does not unduly burden CBOs (e.g. one-stop CBNRM institution). The revision should take into account the detailed comments made in chapter six.

17. Legislation on community-based natural resources should be enacted, which will specifically define the resources that need to be protected, delineate the onwerhsip/ user rights and duties of communities and CBOs and a whole range of enforcement or protective regime of these resources.
18. Umbrella environmental legislation is adopted to provide overall protection for the country’s natural resources.

19. The present trust model for CBOs should be retained and encouraged for new CBNRM projects too; it is further recommended that CBO Trusts consider the company model to run productive project, initiated by the trust.

20. In order to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the Board’s activities vigorous education and training of local Board Members is necessary. It is further recommended that a management team comprising individuals with technical background be left to implement the Board decisions. The Board must be involved only at policy level.

21. As a standard provision, there should be a requirement that trusts should contain indemnity clauses to protect the beneficiaries against embezzlement of funds in cases of fraud, mishandling of funds etc. It is furthermore recommended that Trust that cannot meet accountability standards be placed under protection for a certain period during which its house should be put in order with external assistance. Afterwards, full authority will be returned to the Trust, or in case of failure, the head-lease will be terminated.

22. In order to achieve the objectives of the lease agreement, particularly in training and education of communities, the lease period should be increased. For hunting companies, the lease period should be at least ten years, renewable. For tourism, the period should be a renewable twenty-five year period; the lease period will be subjected to conditions to ensure that there is no abuse.

23. A JVA-bid at the end of the first five years in relation to a company that operates an enterprise successfully should be waived and should be subject to rental adjustments.

24. Trusts need to develop and enforce regulations and bylaws to strengthen the checks and balances in their operations, to clarify rights and obligations of Trust members, and to strengthen natural resource management.
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