HOW SUSTAINABLE IS THE COMMUNALIZING DISCOURSE OF ‘NEW’ CONSERVATION? THE MASKING OF DIFFERENCE, INEQUALITY AND ASPIRATION IN THE FLEDGLING ‘CONSERVANCIIES’ OF NAMIBIA

Sian Sullivan

Introduction

We have also come to understand and realize that many of the . . . people who came to introduce the [1996 Nature Conservation Amendment] Act to us, are the former all-white employees of your Ministry who as individuals resigned from Government to venture into private sector businesses.

The above quote is from a June 1999 letter to the Minister of Environment and Tourism, Namibia. It was written by two residents of southern Kunene Region, who recently each applied for formal Permission to Occupy Land (PTO) leases to establish campsites and thereby capitalize on a post-independence increased flow of tourists to this wildlife-rich area. Their immediate complaint is that the granting of these applications has been put on hold following a request to this effect by the local ‘conservancy committee’. More revealing, however, is the rationale behind their
complaint: that how can this hold on local entrepreneurial activity be justi-
ified when national policy vis à vis conservation in communal areas has
been driven largely by expatriates, many of whom are themselves cur-
rently employed in the private sector. This is coupled with serious, albeit
contested, allegations levelled at the ‘legality and authority’ of the con-
servancy committee.

Namibia’s conservancy policy for communal areas was developed as
the basis for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)
through devolved management of wildlife without moving people from
the land (Nujoma 1998). Communal area residents, as conservancy mem-
bers, can benefit from, and have management responsibilities over, ani-
mal-wildlife. To be registered as a wildlife management institution, a
conservancy requires a defined boundary and membership, a representa-
tive management committee, a legal constitution and a plan for the equi-
table distribution of benefits (MET 1995a and b). Like the much publicized
CAMPFIRE programme of Zimbabwe – blueprint for USAID-funded
CBNRM programmes throughout southern Africa and elsewhere3 – the
assumption informing conservancy policy is that ‘conservation and
development goals can be achieved by creating strong collective tenure
over wildlife resources in communal lands’ (Murombedzi 1999: 288). This
‘new’ conservation thus is driven by: acknowledgement of the costs
experienced by farmers living alongside wildlife in these areas; a need to
counter the alienating effects of past exclusionary conservation policies;
realization of the lack of economic incentives for local people to maintain
a benign relationship to animal-wildlife; and recognition of the economic
development needs of rural populations. The primary ‘facilitators’ of
CBNRM tend to be NGOs. In the Namibian case, this role falls primarily to
IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation) which
is considered to have ‘a particular onus . . . to facilitate conservancy regis-
tration and development’ (Durbin et al. 1997: 5).

Namibia’s conservancy policy has been heralded as the most progres-
sive initiative of its kind in southern Africa (Mafune 1998). In September
1998 Namibia became the first country worldwide to be honoured for a
people-centred environmental initiative with a World Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF) Gift to the Earth Award (Sutherland 1998). It is claimed that
conservancies will improve livelihood sustainability through diversifica-
tion of incomes (Ashley 1997; Hulme and Murphree 1999); that they are
based on a participatory decision-making process that is empowering to
women (Jones 1999a: 302); and that they will ‘empower poor, disadvan-
taged rural people’ (Jones 1995; Ashley 1998 in Callihan 1999).

As identified by recipients, however, this ‘new’ conservation is also
viewed as a continuation of past conservation policies: in terms of who is
driving and implementing policy and in the ways in which local difference
and aspirations are masked by the associated ‘communalizing’ rhetoric
(see Table 9.1 for recent critique). Displacement in these contexts becomes
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<th>Reference</th>
<th>Location and programme</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1994: 8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Re: views of Tembo-Mvura gatherer-hunters of north Zimbabwe: ‘CAMPFIRE is a programme for the Chikunda and the Safari people. They are the ones who gain from it. What CAMPFIRE does is to stop us from hunting so that white people can come from far away to kill animals for fun. We have heard that these people pay money but we have never seen any of it . . . All the village wild life committee is made up of the Chikunda’.</td>
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<td>Patel 1998: 22, 41</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Villagers from five districts considered the wildlife sector to remain in the control of ‘a distant “white” force, in which the safari operator and his clients yield the ultimate power’, thus bolstering ‘the economic and political power of minority whites in Zimbabwe’ rather than constituting meaningful local empowerment.</td>
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<td>Wels, 1999: 20–21; Dzingirai, 1995: 4 in Wels, 1999: 21</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>There is a noticeable trend towards the construction of fences by safari and hunting operators around hunting blocks so that ‘clients can hunt freely and safely without having to worry about human habitation’ and to ‘prevent animals from damaging property and crops and humans themselves outside the hunting area’. Justifiable associations between fencing and alienation and exclusion have led to perceptions on the part of villagers ‘that the safari operator wanted to create a private farm out of their land, . . . to prevent people from accessing . . . resources . . . [and] to reintroduce white colonialism’.</td>
</tr>
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Table 9.1 continued

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<th>Reference</th>
<th>Location and programme</th>
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<td>Matenga 1999: i</td>
<td>Zambia, ADMADE</td>
<td>‘[I]s just a modernization project in the wildlife sector designed not to improve economic livelihoods of local communities but to defuse local opposition towards national wildlife conservation’. Matenga concludes that ‘while these projects were in theory supposed to empower the local communities through their participation in the management and sharing in the benefits of wildlife related activities, their participation has proven to be elusive, . . . leading to their disempowerment economically, socially, psychologically and politically’.</td>
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<td>Taylor 1999: 10</td>
<td>Botswana, NRMP</td>
<td>‘One of the expatriate NRMP team members in Botswana admitted informally that their real aim is conservation, and community development is included as a means to achieve this’.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
something more subtle than the physical eviction of peoples from their land in the name of conservation. It is about the manner in which local, multi-layered narratives of, and rights to, land and resources are displaced in global discourses which survive only by excluding such complexity; and about how local differences can constitute distinct relations of disadvantage, enhanced in ways which are masked by such normalizing discourses.

In this chapter, and drawing on fieldwork in Namibia since 1992, I use the particular context of the establishment of Namibian communal-area conservancies to draw attention to several issues underlying ‘community-based conservation’. My discussion begins with an alternative framing of the conservancy model as representing a continued concern for preserving threatened large mammal species and ‘wilderness’, where the blatant exclusion of people from resources is no longer acceptable. Divergences between conservationist and local priorities are apparent in the different ways that debate regarding conservancy establishment has been articulated: namely, that instead of being pursued as a policy enabling greater community rights to animal-wildlife it has been appropriated locally as a forum for expressing and contesting claims to land. I move on to explore assertions of the success of CBNRM initiatives in Namibia under the rubric of conservancy formation: specifically, that the anticipated diversification of incomes will improve livelihood sustainability; that decision-making processes are representative and participatory; and that conservancies per se provide an enabling environment for empowering structurally disadvantaged people.

Conservancies and Continuities: Moulding Wildlife Conservation to a Post-apartheid Context

The term ‘conservancy’ emerged in the 1970s in an apartheid-structured South Africa to describe the consolidation of exclusive rights over animal-wildlife among co-operating white settler farmers, largely through the employment of game guards to militate against ‘poaching’ on freehold land by black African ‘neighbours’ (Wels 1999). Furthering the ‘ecological apartheid’ of the protected area system, conservancies were seen in this context as the only ‘viable alternative for the salvation of wildlife on private land’ in a context where it was considered that ‘[f]ailure to provide security and management for wildlife on private land must, inevitably, lead to its demise’ (Collinson 1983: 167, in Wels 1999: 12).

In Namibia, the conservancy concept similarly emerged in the context of freehold farmland. Here, since 1968 and subject to conditions set by the MET (Ministry of Environment and Tourism) (particularly with regard to fencing) European settler farmers have had legal rights to consumptively and otherwise utilize animal-wildlife on their farms (Jones 1995: 4). Under
these circumstances landowners ‘realised that it is advantageous to pool their land and financial resources to make available a larger unit on which integrated management practices can be carried out’ (Jones 1995: 4; Barnes and de Jager 1995). Some twelve conservancies existed on freehold land in 1999 which, while acknowledged and supported by the MET, were without legal status (Jones 1999c: 11).

Alongside this co-ordinating of wildlife access and management by settler farmers on freehold land, conservationists were voicing increasing concern regarding the future of animal-wildlife in Namibia’s communally-managed indigenous ‘homelands’. A particular focus of this anxiety was the Kaokoveld of north-west Namibia; the imagined ‘last wilderness’ of South African environmentalists (Reardon 1986; Hall-Martin et al. 1988; but see Bollig 1998), and the world-famous birthplace of Namibian community-based conservation. Here, large-scale losses in the 1970s and 1980s of internationally-valued large mammal species, particularly desert-dwelling elephant (*Loxodonta africana*) and black rhino (*Diceros bicornis bicornis*), provided an impetus to enlist local support for conservation (Owen-Smith 1995). Initially, this was led by individuals spearheading a privately-funded conservation charity, the Namibian Wildlife Trust (NWT). These included Mr G. Owen-Smith, now IRDNC’s co-Director and Project Executive.

The reasons for the 1970s and 1980s wildlife losses in Kaokoland are many and complex. In the 1960s the area was exploited as something of a private hunting reserve by top government officials, including Cabinet Ministers in the South African government (Reardon 1986: 13). In the 1970s, it appears that ‘the majority of men appointed to safeguard the Kaokoveld embarked on a hunting frenzy’ (Reardon 1986: 13). In the late 1970s and early 1980s devastating drought caused wildlife losses, both directly and through stimulating local ‘poaching’ in attempts to counter erosion of pastoralist livelihoods. Organized illegal trafficking in ivory and horn during the 1980s, known to have been pursued as a ‘deliberate policy of the various organs of the South African state’ (Ellis 1994: 3), also may have reduced Kaokoland’s elephant and rhino populations. The situation in north-west Namibia was exacerbated by regional warfare between South Africa, Namibia and Angola. This made firearms available, often via distribution by the South African Defence Force (SADF) to local people as a means of fostering tensions between different groups, thereby compromising regional and national opposition (Fuller 1993: 81).

In other words, the ultimate causes of wildlife losses appear beyond the control of local people. Nevertheless, it is they who were constructed as a locale of responsibility for protecting regional wildlife populations. A network of paid male ‘community game guards’ (CGGs, formerly ‘auxiliary’ game guards) was created, appointed with the help of local headmen and oriented towards protecting the region’s threatened large mammal species. This initiative generally is credited with creating empowerment...
and a sense of ‘ownership’ over wildlife (Durbin et al. 1997: 13) and it is this ‘participation’ of local people which is considered to have enabled recovery of wildlife populations during the late 1980s. Undoubtedly the CGGs contributed to wildlife population increases (otherwise related to improved rainfall and a relaxing of combat activities in the area), but as much by extending the policing and anti-poaching role of MWCT (the then Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism, now the MET) as by asserted ‘participation’. Similarly, the employment offered by the CGG system was perhaps as important as any attributed ‘empowerment’ over wildlife: unsurprisingly, CGGs became less effective after the mid-1980s in areas where salaries and rations, as well as supervision by the MWCT and NWT/IRDNC, were reduced (Durbin et al. 1997: 20). Assertions of ‘success’, in terms of both wildlife increases and local empowerment, thus depend on what are malleable interpretations of context.

Following independence in 1990, the apparent success of the north-west Namibian CGG system was invoked by the MWCT and IRDNC in applying the conservancy concept to communal areas (MWCT 1992; Jones 1999a). The Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 thus significantly alters the 1975 Nature Conservation Ordinance by devolving proprietorship over wildlife, and concessionary rights over commercial tourism, to people on communal land (MET 1995a and b). I emphasize the term proprietorship because, as elsewhere (Neuman 1997; Madzudzo 1999; Matenga 1999), the ultimate ownership of wildlife remains with the state (MET n.d.: 9; The Namibian 1999a). As detailed above, proprietorship is conditional on registration as a conservancy with a defined boundary and membership, a representative management committee, a legal constitution and a plan for the equitable distribution of benefits.

The employment of male CGGs remains a defining component of the wildlife-rich emerging conservancies in Namibia’s communal areas. Although they are viewed by NGOs and donors as the ‘primary link’ between ‘communities’ and the formal conservation authority (Durbin et al. 1997: 15), their major functions, like game guards on both protected areas and private conservancies, are wildlife monitoring, policing and anti-poaching (confirmed by local views in Mosimane 1996: 15–16, 29–30; Powell 1998; The Namibian 1999a).

Recently, consultants for WWF have recommended that CGGs be equipped with firearms, suggesting that wildlife protection activities in Namibia’s communal areas might become increasingly militarized (Durbin et al. 1997: 18). Ironically, given the language of devolving rights to resources to local ‘communities’, it seems that CBNRM instead intensifies policing of animal-wildlife in communal areas. More serious are the implications of what amounts to arming civil society in the name of wildlife conservation (Leach 1999). That this is occurring in Namibia is evidenced by the locating of armed guards to protect the IRDNC-supported conservancy office in Sesfontein/!Nani|aus, southern Kunene.
Region, following recent local protest to circumstances surrounding conservancy establishment in the area (Sullivan in press a).

It has been observed that ‘similarities in institutional arrangement between conservancies that have developed on freehold land and those on communal land are striking’, with both measuring ‘up well against the principles for designing long lasting common property resource management institutions’ (Jones 1999c: 13). Given the historical evolution of the conservancy concept, the legacy of exploitative policies supporting state and settler interests, and extremely restricted access to alternative models for ‘self-determination’ among communal area inhabitants, however, it is hardly surprising that ‘joint solutions’ for the conservation of wildlife in communal areas have emerged which are in line with existing ideas of conservancies promoted by the MET. While the legislative situation may be more progressive than elsewhere, continuities with past priorities are clear. Conservancy establishment in communal areas remains ‘land acquisition for conservation in the non-formal sense’ (Jones 1999b: 47 emphasis added), with a focus on effective protection and policing of an internationally-valued wildlife of large and dangerous mammals. ‘Rural development’ and ‘empowerment’ in these contexts appear circumscribed: constrained to providing effective protection for a handful of species which are potentially harmful to local residents and their other economic activities; and dependent on deals struck up with outside tourism and hunting operators, often outfits whose claims to capitalize on wildlife and wilderness are those considered legitimate by agencies and individuals advising ‘communities’ (also Mosimane 1996: 37). In this sense, CBNRM in practice maintains the interests of conservationists, tour-operators, hunters and tourists; i.e. those conventionally associated with ‘touristic’ enjoyment of, and financial benefits from, wildlife and ‘wilderness’.

Claims to Land, Claims to Wildlife: Objectives and Interests framing Policy Appropriation

Conservancy legislation is asserted as devolving ‘a large measure of authority, and responsibility over wildlife and the right to benefit from wildlife use to landholders themselves, both freehold and communal’ (Jones 1999c: 13 emphasis added). Observations of parallels in the development of conservancies on different categories of land (see above), and references to communal area residents as ‘landholders’, however, obscure substantial structural differences regarding land distribution and rights. Specifically, that a minority of settler freehold farmers have inalienable rights to a major proportion of the most productive land in southern and central Namibia. Moreover, their title to land means that they effectively and legally own the capital constituted by their land and the resources on it, including ‘huntable game’. With the human population density of
commercial farmland being under a third that of communal areas (Mooresom 1982; Adams and Werner 1990; Central Statistics Office 1994), and with the former hosting some 70 per cent of the nation’s ‘game’ (Jones 1995: 4), these relationships clearly are grossly unequal. Moreover, for freeholders, ensuring returns on their wildlife capital is by no means dependent on their membership of a conservancy.

Conservancy policy since its inception thus has been understood and appropriated by local people primarily as a land issue, and secondarily as a wildlife management issue, with local meetings dominated by debate regarding claims to land rather than to wildlife (also see Taylor 1999: 10). Three further reasons have fuelled this situation. First, discussions over establishing conservancies have provided a much-needed outlet for debate regarding land redistribution in the context of speculation and optimism ushered in by an independent Namibia. Second, because two criteria for gazetting a conservancy are that its physical boundaries and community membership be defined, the situation is treated as one of establishing rights to land areas even though legally a ‘community’ is only establishing rights to returns on animal-wildlife in those areas. Third, and related to this, because there has been a lack of an overriding legal procedural basis for establishing tenure rights to land in communal areas, the conservancy option has become the only means by which people can gain any apparent security to land. This, together with a constitutional context in which Namibian citizens can move to wherever they wish on communal land (with the unmonitored proviso that they observe the customary rights of existing inhabitants) (GRN 1991: 28–9), enhances anxiety over claims to community ‘membership’. The exponential rate at which conservancies are now being formed thus might be an attempt on the part of communal area inhabitants to establish rights to land and resources in the absence of any other legitimate way of doing so (cf. Shivute 1998; Inambao 1998a); as well as reflecting the ‘marketing’ of the concept and a capitalizing on opportunities presented by donors and NGOs. Elsewhere, and reflecting ambiguities in how the conservancy policy is understood, it appears that people have been unable to use conservancy policy to ensure that they retain access to natural resources other than animal-wildlife (Powell 1998: 120).

In recognition of the importance of secure land tenure to support rights to wildlife resources, policy-makers in the MET, as well as implementing conservation NGOs, anticipated and hoped that ‘the conservancy approach, even if embedded only in wildlife legislation, could help shape appropriate [land] tenure reform’ (Jones 1998: 5; also Durbin et al. 1997: 10). Indeed, the National Land Policy tabled in 1997 included an option for ‘legally constituted bodies and institutions to exercise joint ownership rights over land’, implying that a community which defined itself as a conservancy could register tenure rights to the land defining the conservancy’s territory (GRN 1997: 9). The recently tabled Communal Land Reform Bill,
however, appears not to support this option (GRN 1999). While stating that regional Land Boards ‘must have due regard to any management and utilization plan framed by [a] conservancy committee’ (GRN 1999: Section 31(4): 20) the Bill does not explicitly vest conservancies with tenure rights other than those set out in the Nature Conservation Ordinance, i.e. to wildlife and wildlife-related revenues. Elsewhere, the Bill appears to focus on the individualization of land-holdings: in providing for the registration of farming and residential units ‘in the name of the person to whom it was allocated’ (GRN 1999: Section 25: 14); and in the granting, by a Land Board, of leasehold tenure to individual applicants (GRN 1999: Section 30: 19). It remains to be seen how an essentially individualizing land policy trajectory (Shigwedha 2000) will affect the establishment and maintenance of ‘community-held’ communal area conservancies.

### Diversification of Incomes will improve Livelihood Sustainability

Community-based conservation and community-based tourism generally are considered able to improve ‘livelihood sustainability’. It is thought that revenue from consumptive and non-consumptive uses of wildlife will enhance livelihoods by diversifying sources of income. And that this will be sustainable because tourism, worldwide and in Namibia, is a growth industry; and because ‘once income is derived by local communities from the use of wildlife, they develop a vested interest in conserving game animals’ (Jones 1995: 9), whereby environmental degradation, namely erosion of biodiversity and habitat integrity, is reduced. CBNRM thus relies on an economizing framework to justify projects and policy aimed at the ‘sustainable use of natural resources’ as a means of rural development (Ashley and Garland 1994; Ashley et al. 1994; Ashley 1995, 1997; Callihan 1999; Jones 1999c following Murphree 1993).

But it is unlikely that revenue from wildlife and/or tourism can constitute a particularly large source of income for all members of a ‘community’ at household and individual levels (Hackel 1999). This is without projected increases in rural (human) populations. Again, this reflects a structural situation whereby population densities throughout the communal areas generally are higher than in the commercial farming areas. Thus, average benefits per capita are likely to only ever be much lower for people in communal areas. Table 9.2 indicates that per capita income from the consumptive and non-consumptive uses of wildlife in Namibia’s communally-managed areas generally is low. In Table 9.2, the highest recent annual per capita income, by an order of magnitude, is that recorded for Torra, Namibia’s ‘flagship’ conservancy. Here, income per inhabitant works out at approximately N$1041.39 or US$132.32 (£87.33). An additional N$363.32 or US$46.09 (£30.42) per inhabitant was received in
wages to community members employed by Damaraland Camp. Callihan (1999: 10) points out that wages are likely to constitute the main source of income extended via the establishment of conservancies: this of course will depend on a conservancy’s ability to secure enterprise investment and is relevant primarily for conservancy members who are offered employment (‘trickle-down effects’ notwithstanding). The next highest conservancy per capita annual income is substantially lower at N$150 or US$19.06 (£12.77). A comparison with the government old-age pension of N$160/month indicates that the relative annual per capita contribution provided by conservancies also is low. The use of surrogate monetary values for resources consumed directly is misleading. For example, the figure of US$25,000 calculated for the value of meat consumed in Kunene Region in 1993 (Jones 1999c: 2) is spurious considering the manner by which local people have been alienated from the consumption of ‘bushmeat’ throughout this century and criminalized should they hunt for their own use.

Despite low per capita returns, CBNRM discourse often goes further than arguing that incomes from wildlife and tourism can diversify livelihoods. For example, it is suggested that returns on wildlife will encourage people to dis-invest in other means of livelihood, particularly livestock and cultivation, thereby reducing the ‘degrading’ effects of these forms of land-use while sustaining incomes (Ashley 1995, 1997; references in Powell 1998: 121; Callihan 1999). Thus for north-west Namibia Hulme and Murphree (1999 after Jones 1999a) maintain that ‘the economic incentives created by devolving proprietorship over wildlife and tourism have led to people in this area re-evaluating the relative roles of wildlife and agriculture (domestic livestock and crops) in local development’. However, if per capita incomes from community-based wildlife and tourism initiatives remain low, and even without cultural influences over choice of livelihood, it is unlikely that people will view wildlife as an alternative to their usual means of livelihood. Instead, it might be anticipated that people will direct income and/or increased decision-making power deriving from CBNRM towards livelihoods over which they have direct control and ownership, and via which they are more likely to raise their individual material standards of living (as observed in Nabane 1995; Jones 1999c: 31; Murombedzi 1999).

Again, while some communal areas of Namibia appear ideal for enhancing livelihood opportunities through capitalizing on animal-wildlife this is by no means evenly distributed. Kunene and northern Erongo Regions in north-west Namibia are characterized by diverse landscapes, a spectacular wildlife of large mammals, and relatively low human population densities. Under donor-led framings of community-based conservation, these constitute perfect conditions for the evolution of so-called ‘5-star conservancies’ (Durbin et al. 1997; Jones 1999c). Not surprisingly, therefore, this area has been a focus of NGO and donor support for the establishment of conservancies: five out of ten registered
### Table 9.2 Recent Figures for Income Received in Communal Areas from both Consumptive and Non-consumptive Uses of Wildlife

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N$/a-1</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>N$/cap.a-1</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purros community:</strong> via tourism, partnerships and joint venture agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1993?</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>75 adults</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Bednight-levy from Skeleton Coast Fly-in Safaris. This company has a PTO for their campsite which is located within the proposed Purros conservancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1993?</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>75 adults</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Estimated tips to Himba settlement from visiting tourists.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Epupa Falls, Kunene Region:</strong> via tourism, partnerships and joint venture agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Payment from Epupa Camp to community. Amounts to &lt;3% per tourist bed-night.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>East Caprivi, Mudumu National Park: Lianshulu Lodge and neighbouring villages:</strong> via tourism, partnerships and joint venture agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>3581</td>
<td>7.26 (35/ house-hold)</td>
<td>Distributed by Lianshulu Lodge to 5 neighbouring villages (comprising 746 households with an average of 4.8 people per household in Caprivi Region).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>62,000?</td>
<td>3581</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>40 local staff employed at Lianshulu and paid between N$600–2500/month. Based on 40 x a mid-figure of 1550 between these two salaries: probably an over-estimate.</td>
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Table 9.2 continued

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$N$</th>
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<tr>
<td>via trophy-hunting agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunene campsite in proposed Marienfluss conservancy: via tourism, partnerships and joint venture agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Recommended tips from guests to campsite employees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salambala conservancy, East Caprivi: via tourism, partnerships and joint venture agreements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Earnings by LIFE-funded campsite; income after salary costs of $N$1,000 removed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>via trophy-hunting agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000 &amp; 2001</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>Two-year hunting concession negotiated with Wésé Adventures (+ staff employed and meat from elephant hunts distributed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyae Nyae conservancy, eastern Otjozondjupa Region: via trophy-hunting agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Hunting contract with La Rochelle, including $N$40,000 for game translocation, at the discretion of the conservancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>As above</td>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N$ a-1</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>N$/cap. a-1</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>294000</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Grant from the newly initiated Game Products Trust Fund (GPTF) (primarily built on income received from the auction of stock-piled ivory) to be used for the construction of alternative water-points for use by elephants, away from farms.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N$ = Namibian dollars (currently US$1 = N$7.87 in January 2001); n = numbers of individuals in area; N$/cap.a-1 = Namibian dollars per capita per year.
Sources: Central Statistics Office (1994: 11, 16); Jones (1999b: 4, 1999c: 78–9, 1999d: 8); Inambao (1998b); The Namibian (1999b); Roe et al. (in prep. 28, 52, 57, 60–61, 102, 116–17, 122, 124).
Figure 9.1 Map of Namibia showing new Regional Boundaries, Regional Population Sizes, and Approximate Locations of Gazetted and Proposed Conservancies in Communal Areas

Sources: Central Statistics Office (1994); MET (1998); Maletsky (1998a and b); Shivute (1998); Jones (1999b: 73–83); The Namibian (1999a)
conservancies, and all emerging conservancies are found in this area (see Figure 9.1). Critique is particularly unwelcome in this context because these circumstances appear so ripe for ‘success’. At the same time, widely publicized elaborations of success based on these situations present an unrealistic picture of the possibilities for the national conservancy policy to improve livelihoods in the country’s communal areas as a whole.

Also obscured are concerns at national level to increase user-accountability for the costs of maintaining public-sector services and national assets in remote and difficult environments. This is clear in the context of water provision, for which a community-based system of water-point committees is being advocated – ostensibly as a means of empowering communal area farmers, but basically by encouraging their participation in funding and maintaining boreholes (Africare 1993; Tarr 1998). CBNRM similarly involves a shifting of costs and responsibilities to local levels: in the policing of people’s activities in relation to wildlife; in the funding of community institutions designed to manage wildlife and related revenues; and in the day-to-day experience of living with large and sometimes dangerous mammals (see Table 9.3). MET and IRDNC employees also have argued that revenue accruing to conservancies from wildlife could be mobilized to fund other sectoral developments such as school-building (see statements in Gaisford 1997: 124). This implies a vision that conservancies could carry the costs of public-sector development beyond wildlife conservation.

As Durbin et al. (1997: 17) state, and in accordance with the USAID’s LIFE programme objective that at least five conservancies will become self-sustaining by 2002 (Callihan 1999), the ‘expectation is that conservancies, once financially viable, will take on the payment of the game guards, some of the staff and equipment such as vehicles and/or radios required to support them’. To date, these have been paid for by NGOs and via the major donor-funded national CBNRM programme (LIFE), and these costs tend not to appear in calculations of income received to date by conservancies. An indication of the amounts of money involved in establishing Namibian CBNRM is indicated in the extent of its funding: some US$25 million was received from 1993 to 2000 (Callihan 1999: 6–7),14 of which US$14 million was channelled to IRDNC between 1992 and 1999 (Durbin et al. 1997: 28). It is envisaged that the running costs of conservancies will be transferred to local conservancy institutions as communities are able to ‘wean’ themselves off NGO support (Jones 1999a: 300; Durbin et al. 1997). It is probable, however, that rather little income will remain after the running costs of the conservancies have been covered.15 Logically, this amounts to a situation whereby the conservancy finances the costs of conserving an animal-wildlife accessed and valued by conservationists, ecotourists and trophy-hunters, while receiving very little additional income for the efforts of its members. The phasing out of donor-funding thus raises significant questions for the ‘sustainability’ and the development claims, of these
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<th>Reported impacts</th>
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<td>A 1998 survey of residents in Caprivi’s Kwandu area (adjacent to West Caprivi Game Reserve) indicated that 74% had experienced crop losses due to wildlife in the last five years. In Kwandu, West Caprivi, four people were killed by crocodiles in the first three months of 1998. In 1999 some 450 cases of elephants destroying property were recorded by the MET whose Minister recently asserted that compensation cannot be paid for such damage because of the frequency of such occurrences. In southern Kunene, conflicts between people and elephants are prominent at settlements along the Ugab River. Elephants moved to this river in 1994 having not been known in the area for some 50 years. Far from experiencing this new constraint on livelihoods in a passive way, and without compensation for their troubles, many people living in the area have rebuilt their homes on hillsides away from the river and avoid danger through not venturing out at night. Wind-pumps and gardens have been damaged by elephant. Early in 1999 a child was killed while crossing the river on route to the school in Aniŋgab, having unwittingly disturbed a group of elephants concealed in Tamarix usneoides thickets along the river. Cases of marauding desert elephants ‘bothering’ communal farmers have in recent weeks been reported in the Kunene area, while in the Caprivi two villagers, one a Namibian and the other a Zambian, drowned after a hippo attacked their dug-out canoe along the Linyanti-Chobe River. Other fatal attacks on humans reported in the Caprivi have involved attacks by elephants, crocodiles and lions. ‘In recent weeks there has also been an upswing in the number of livestock… that have been killed and eaten by lions and hyenas at a number of villages.’</td>
<td>Mosimane 1998 in Callihan 1999 Maletsky 2000 Pers. comm. with inhabitants of Aniŋgab, Gudipos and</td>
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Table 9.3 continued

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<td>In 1999 the MET recorded almost 450 cases of elephants destroying people’s property. More than half of those cases (260) occurred in the Kavango region where two people were killed by migratory elephants. ’A total of 140 cases of destruction were reported in the Kunene region, with one fatality recorded. In the Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto regions, 48 cases were reported.’ Incidents of local protest against animal-wildlife In Mukwe district, western Caprivi, and following a lack of response from MET officials, farmers recently warned that ‘they would take up fire arms to protect their produce from marauding elephants which have been destroying their mahangu [millet] crops’. In June 1998 it was reported that fires were started in Mamili National Park, Caprivi, by villagers living around the park as a means of injuring wildlife in the expectation that such animals would be slaughtered and the meat distributed to neighbouring villagers – some 110 buffalo were affected by the blaze.</td>
<td>Maletsky 2000</td>
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conservation ventures. Requiring further problematization is the dependence on increases in tourism income for calculations of the sustainability of CBNRM. It is by no means certain that tourism will remain a consistent growth industry for a variety of reasons (Gaisford 1997; Infield and Adams 1999; Moyo 1999). The situation is tragically but forcefully brought home by current conflict in Caprivi Region, which fuelled cancellations by tourists and is causing the temporary closure of lodges in the area and the retrenching of many of their employees (Inambao 1999, 2000b).

Participation, Representation, Empowerment – and Inequality

CBNRM is credited with providing an enabling context for the development of democratic and empowering local institutions (Jones 1999b). Donors and implementing organizations are under pressure to demonstrate the success of their activities in these terms. But recent dynamics in Namibian CBNRM indicate that problems are emerging which relate to the ‘massaging out’ of conflict and complexity in CBNRM implementation and reporting (Sullivan in press a).

The initiation of dialogue with rural ‘communities’ regarding wildlife conservation in communal areas in a post-independent Namibia began with the conducting of several ‘socio-ecological’ surveys by the MET. These generally are credited with assessing the attitudes of communal area residents to wildlife, identifying problems and seeking joint solutions (Jones 1999c: 1). As Jones (1999b: 3; also 1999a) states, ‘[t]he conservancy approach was not imposed from outside, but developed from a joint recognition of problems and solutions between communities, government and NGOs’. Above I traced the evolution of the conservancy model in Namibia and suggested that its uptake is unsurprising because communities did not have access to alternative models (cf. Powell 1998: 117). What I would like to raise here are implications of a situation whereby initial meetings regarding communal area conservancies took place with individuals who were not necessarily representative of the wider ‘community’ and the diverse interests embodied by community members.

For example, in 1994 a two-week ‘socio-ecological’ survey of southern Kunene region was conducted to introduce the idea of establishing locally-managed conservancies to rural communities. A major meeting took place in Sesfontein/!Nani |aus, a relatively large settlement in southern Kunene Region. Shortly after this, I interviewed people from some 20 per cent of ‘households’ in the settlement (Sullivan 1995). Of the 28 individual and small-group discussions no adults had attended the public meeting. In fact, the majority did not even know that the meeting had taken place and certainly did not realize they had a right to attend and contribute to discussion. This survey was primarily of Damara people, the major group in a location shared with Herero and some Nama and Owambo. Otherwise it
included men and women, young and old, and rich and poor. Significantly, the survey suggests that the then Development Committee of Sesfontein, in whom the MET had vested responsibility for informing the wider community of the meeting, had not fulfilled this responsibility (also see Jones 1996; Mosimane 1996: 29; Gaisford 1997; Powell 1998). Relying on local institutions thus is by no means a guarantee that ‘community-based’ ‘joint solutions’ will be reached in a consultative and representative manner. Making claims to this effect, however, sidesteps the importance of evaluating the process in communication with the range of individuals comprising ‘communities’ in the broadest sense.

Further, recent analyses are revealing a number of instances where axes of shared differences are exacerbated in CBNRM initiatives, despite their stated focus on equality, representation and empowerment (Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1994; Taylor 1999; Twyman in press). If some groups are marginalized despite the inclusive rhetoric of ‘community-based natural resources management’ then an important issue becomes how to enhance a context for dialogue and negotiation which is more empowering to those groups. A first step might be a commitment to exploring what it is about the economic and symbolic relationships people have, or are perceived to have, with the wider landscape that structures either the occlusion or the elevation of particular groups in CBNRM initiatives. Thus if ‘livelihoods are not just about subsistence but also represent notions of identity and provide continuity with the past’ (Twyman in press: 10), then engaging with these symbolic complexities might constitute a significant approach to addressing aims of both empowerment and livelihood sustainability (Sullivan 1999, forthcoming).

An obvious issue here is the way in which conservation projects in southern Africa revolve around a limited wildlife of large mammals, inextricable from constructions of a white South African masculine identity linked economically and psychologically to hunting (Mackenzie, 1987; Ellis, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; Skidmore-Hess, 1999; Wels, 1999). Both Leach (1999) and Ellis (1994), for example, make clear the gender implications of links between conservation, firearms, masculinity and warfare. As Ellis (1994: 55) states, there is a longstanding association ‘between game parks and military men all over Africa’. Historically and today, amongst European settler and African societies, women have been the ‘decorative fringe’ to men as hunters and conservationists such that they are conceptually, and sometimes literally, excluded from discussion. Given that symbolically gendered associations with environment and wildlife are so strong, conferring ‘distinct relations of disadvantage’ for women (McNay 1992; Jackson 1997), it is perhaps surprising that they have been afforded relatively little attention in wider CBNRM discourse.

A number of incidents suggest that these associations conferred a less than enabling context for the participation of women in instituting communal-area conservancies in Namibia. At the final workshop of the 1994
southern Kunene ‘socio-ecological survey’, for example, all Damara and Herero women who attended the meeting were physically excluded from participating by being obliged to sit outside the shelter in which the meeting was held (Sullivan 2000a). This was justified by MET convenors on the strength that they were working within the constraints of the (male) traditional leadership. Notwithstanding the extent to which current forms of this traditional leadership are a construction of Namibia’s colonial history (Krieke 1991; Fuller 1993; Lau 1995), this is somewhat ironic given that the purpose of the meeting was to try to begin a process of new institution-building, enabling better representation and participation in the decentralization of decision-making power (also see Nabane 1995: 12; Gaisford 1997: 32; Matenga 1999; Wels 1999). Interesting in this regard is that Damara do not necessarily observe strict divisions of labour and decision-making along gender lines, and during my own fieldwork people were often quick to draw a distinction in this regard between themselves and Herero. A question here, therefore, is whose ‘traditional’ sensibilities the MET and conservation NGOs were trying to observe.

Namibia’s LIFE project is forging attempts specifically to involve women in CBNRM initiatives, through their employment by IRDNC as ‘community resource monitors’ ‘to better exploit natural resource management opportunities and to facilitate the flow of information’ regarding resource management issues (Wyckoff-Baird and Matota 1995: 1). Unqualified claims for the success of women’s activators (e.g. Durbin et al. 1997: 40) leave open questions as to the extent to which women are integrated into existing conservancy committees, and whether the separation of positions along gender lines compromises the contribution of women to conventionally male domains of decision-making (Nabane 1995).

A second question regards the influence of ethnicity in conceptions of, and claims to, land, resources and decision-making power. Ethnicity is a hoary issue in development debates and especially so in a context such as Namibia, where a unifying ideology of nation-building has been critical in structuring a ‘struggle for independence’ from the ‘divide and rule’ policies of an apartheid administration. Further, the former apartheid state tended to reify the static ethnic categories imagined by a missionary and colonial ethnography’s ‘excessive preoccupation with ethnicity and cultural distinctiveness’ (Fosse 1992: 3; Fuller 1993), contributing further to a shying away from the implications of ethnic differences. In considerations of representation in local-level institutions, and in understanding issues infusing use of, and competing claims to, natural resources, however, ethnicity becomes a crucial axis of difference. Particularly important is a recognition that in areas of historically overlapping and contested claims to land it tends to be the same groups who are marginalized from decision-making on account of both culturally-influenced associations with resources, and perceptions of these associations by others (e.g. Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1994; Mosimane 1996; Sullivan 1999, 2000a, in press a;

For example, in north-west Namibia some Damara people travel substantial distances to gather specific resources and many trace ancestral associations in the wider landscape to areas far afield from current settlement locales (Sullivan 1999; Sullivan and Ganuses forthcoming). As has been pointed out to me, if these are important to people in the establishment of conservancy boundaries then they will come up in debate regarding where these boundaries are established (pers. comm. Tagg, 1999). But if the conservancy committee is not representative of these wider issues and practices of resource use and landscape history, then it is highly unlikely that they will feature in boundary debates. The probable outcome of such a situation is that individuals will procure resources much as they have always done, across boundaries not of their choosing and into areas where restrictions may be operative, because these practices remain important in affirming ‘who they are’. As long as collectors avoid large mammals, it is unlikely that anyone will take much notice: but one could hardly describe this as a situation which empowers people’s diverse interests in land and natural resources. Further, continuing frustration with (perceived) consistent exclusion from CBNRM debates and conservancy establishment is likely to fuel incidents of protest and conflict. This is what seems to have occurred recently at Sesfontein, north-west Namibia. Here, accusations that IRDNC worked primarily with one group over another erupted in protest, involving the enacting of a symbolic burial for the NGO marked by a grave-site. An armed guard from outside Sesfontein was subsequently stationed in the settlement’s IRDNC-supported conservancy office to protect it from an unsupportive faction in Sesfontein, despite the location of the office on community land and next to inherited gardens (Sullivan in press a).

Conclusion: ‘Donor Assistance has been significant, but Donor Agendas have not dominated’ (Jones 1999c: 3)

A recent review of CBNRM in Namibia concludes with the exhortation to ‘beware the dominance of donors and the arrogance of academia in trying to categorise and judge the lives of rural Africans and the work of the people at the coalface of conservation’ (Jones 1999c: 36). Inappropriate mining metaphors aside, I would suggest that a categorizing and consequent homogenizing of diverse groupings of people is a key element of a donor-fuelled communalizing discourse. Given that most evaluation of CBNRM projects is donor-led and written by a relatively small group of consultants, who in many cases are intimately involved with the formulation and implementation of national CBNRM programmes, I would argue that academic research actually has a crucial role to play – particularly in
problematizing criteria for reckoning the ‘success’ of projects, and in highlighting issues of representation and revealing alternative perspectives (Brosius et al. 1998). Interestingly, much critique of a communitarian development discourse is being led by scholars from the south (e.g. Escobar 1996; Matenga 1999; Murombedzi 1999). Academic, actor-oriented research is a route whereby long-term and detailed work, exploring local diversity and multiple voices, can make explicit contradictions and tensions between an essentializing ideology of ‘community’ and local aspirations and differences. Admittedly, however, a major challenge facing academic researches which reveal alternative and occluded narratives is an embracing of the responsibility to make these researches available and accessible to national and international policy discourses (with the attendant criticism this may entail) (Sullivan 2000b, in press b).

As Matenga (1999: 15) points out, a gloss of success in the marketing of southern African CBNRM programmes makes it rather hard to criticize the famed and ‘outstanding’ (Durbin et al. 1997: 5) CBNRM projects of the region. Clearly, it is preferable that local people benefit from the animal-wildlife with which they live instead of remaining alienated from these resources in a ‘fortress conservation’ of the colonial past. But underneath the rhetoric, CBNRM is not the radically and qualitatively different approach to conservation that it claims to be. Escobar (1996) argues that a language of emancipation and democratization is inseparable from a northern modernizing development discourse which asserts conformity and control through donor-funding to the countries of ‘the south’. In the case of conservation, a cavalier coinage of the term ‘community’ is a means of extending the modernizing agenda of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Peet and Watts 1996), via the various international conventions relating to environment and development and via implementing agencies such as WWF-US and USAID. Through these processes ‘communities’, as depoliticized and undifferentiated entities, ‘are finally recognized as the owners of their territories (or what is left of them), but only to the extent that they accept seeing and treating territory and themselves as reservoirs of capital’ (Escobar 1996: 57). In the case of conservation in Africa, this means that support is only available to ‘communities’ if they agree to construct themselves as ‘suitable’ custodians of internationally-valued biodiversity, particularly animal-wildlife.

A middle class of ‘the developed world’, collectively the ‘virtual consumers’ (Kiss 1999: 8) of an exotic and spectacularly imaged fauna of ‘the south’, appears concerned with the pending loss of a ‘global resource’ of wildlife and ‘wilderness’. While now stressing that local people should benefit from this wildlife, a number of perhaps unrealistic, and generally unvoiced, expectations remain: that African communal area residents should continue to live with a sometimes dangerous wildlife on ‘their’ land; that efforts should be made to foster the increase of populations of
these same dangerous, but threatened, species; that this should occur over and above investment in alternative sources of livelihood; that, as donor-funding is phased out, revenue received from conservation efforts should be used to finance newly created communal-area wildlife management institutions; and that a primary responsibility of these institutions should be the negotiation of business agreements which allow private safari operators continued access to the wildlife resources on which their profits depend.

But is it reasonable to expect that a structurally entrenched rural poor should continue to service the fantasies of African wilderness projected by environmentalists, conservationists, tourists and trophy hunters? Or that a communalizing discourse equating rural development and ‘empowerment’ with wildlife preservation and foreign tourism will be ‘sustainable’, given both the constraints it imposes on individual aspiration and the dissatisfaction it produces in people who feel excluded? If the world’s wealthy wish to retain an ideal of African wildlife and ‘wild’ landscapes then perhaps we should put our money where our collective mouth is: through direct payment for the service of maintaining wildlife (Simpson and Sedjo 1996; Kiss 1999). In Europe, and under certain conditions, land-use is manipulated through the payment of economically realistic subsidies to individual farmers (for example, under the European Union’s arable payment scheme). In some cases this includes ‘setting aside’ land rather than working or converting it to alternative uses. If conservation boils down to economic incentives, I suggest that it will be ‘sustainable’ only if accompanied by a ‘consumer pays’ approach which is honest about the distribution of both interests in, and the costs of, wildlife conservation. This implies nothing short of a secure commitment to substantial and long-term (upwards of several decades) international subsidies directly to local land-users, of amounts realistic enough to compensate for the opportunity costs of not converting either land to alternative uses or large mammals to cash. Failing this, it seems logical that policing and law enforcement, whether by government officials, NGO employees or CGGs, will remain the foundation on which preservation of an internationally-valued animal-wildlife depends. So, what else is ‘new’?

Notes

1 My thanks go to Kathy Homewood, James Fairhead, Eugene Marais, Guy Cowlishaw, Martin Evans, Debby Potts, Bill Adams, Mike Taylor, Keith Leggett, Rob Gordon, Heena Patel, Richard Pakleppa, Martin Evans, Brian Jones and Rick Rohde, who all commented on an initial draft of the paper; the views presented remain my own. I’m also grateful to Peter Udovch and Fiona Flintan who made several references available to me. Fieldwork in Namibia was conducted with support from the ESRC, the UCL Equipment Fund and the Nuffield Foundation and the paper is written as part of a British Academy Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship.
2 I do not intend to ‘unpack’ the validity or otherwise of all the claims made in this letter, but to acknowledge the significance of local observations concerning implementation of conservancy policy. The letter has been described as containing ‘untrue or irrelevant allegations’ (email to author from B.T.B. Jones, 26 October 1999) and as ‘probably libellous’ by one of the Directors of IRDNC, Namibia’s main community-based conservation facilitating NGOs (email to author from M. Jacobsohn, 25 October, 1999).

3 In southern Africa, USAID funds CBNRM programmes in Botswana (Natural Resources Management Programme, NRMP), Zimbabwe (Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, CAMPFIRE), Zambia (Administrative Management Design, ADMADE) and Namibia (Living In a Finite Environment, LIFE).

4 As also occurred in East Caprivi (Mosimane 1996: 7).

5 Fifty-one CGGs employed by IRDNC in 1997 (Durbin et al. 1997: 13).

6 Conflict in Caprivi and reports of arms distributions in Kunene Region suggest that Namibia is not immune to the instability and violence located in various parts of Africa in recent years (Maletsky and Amupadhi 1999; Amupadhi 2000; Amupadhi and Ngasia 2000; Inambao 2000a).

7 Nb. Sections 14(2) and 20 of the Commercial (Agricultural) Lands Act (GRN 1995) provide the government with rights to expropriate, with suitable compensation and under certain circumstances, land otherwise under freehold tenure.

8 President Nujoma’s recent offer for Africans throughout the continent and overseas to settle in Namibia’s ‘vast landscapes’ might further exacerbate insecurity regarding rights to communal land (The Namibian 1999b).

9 Nb. The 1997 draft National Land Policy apparently makes provision for a second Bill which ‘will set out forms of family, group and community ownership’ (Jones 1999b: 57). This has not yet appeared and it is difficult to see how these will mesh with the remit of the Communal Land Reform Bill which is ‘to provide for the allocation of rights in respect to communal land’ (GRN 1999: 2).

10 Recently Namibian tourism contributed approximately 5% of GDP and 12% of foreign exchange earnings (after mining and agriculture) and is the only sector experiencing strong growth (Gaisford 1997).

11 The average national population growth rate is calculated as 3.33% (Dewdney 1996).


13 Nb. Namibia and South Africa are unique in the distribution of state pensions: income from CBNRM programmes elsewhere is likely to make a proportionately greater contribution to household livelihoods (pers. comm. Debby Potts, Dept. of Geography, SOAS, London).

14 A further US$12 million from USAID has been approved to carry the Namibian CBNRM programme from late 1999 to 2004 (Callihan 1999: 6–7). Jones (1999b: 57) states that the LIFE programme received approx. US$14 million from July 1993 until August 1999, administered primarily by WWF-US. IRDNC received Swiss Francs 2,794,550 from WWF-Intern towards its work in Kunene Region between 1996 and 2001 (Jones 1999b: 76).

15 The LIFE programme estimates that US$28,000 per year are required to run a conservancy while average income will be around US$28,600 plus wages accruing to individuals working for wildlife-related tourism ventures. This is calculated on the basis of an income of 2 x US$13,000 (from both a joint venture lodge operation and a trophy hunting contract), plus US$2,600 from a community-campsite. An additional US$18,000 is the approximate figure calculated for wages to members of the community from enterprises established with foreign investments (Callihan 1999: 22).

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